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Management review
In 2015, all Finnish nuclear power plants operated safely and caused no danger to their 
surrounding environment or employees. The collective radiation doses of employees were 
yet again historically low and the radioactive releases into the environment very small. The 
low employee radiation doses were the result of short annual outages and improvements 
implemented at the nuclear power plants.
Over the course of 2015, Fortum Power and Heat Oy (Fortum) submitted to STUK a total 
of 13 operational event reports. The operational events did not compromise nuclear or 
radiation safety. STUK performed an annual outage inspection in compliance with the 
inspection programme. In this inspection, STUK oversaw the repairs of the primary circuit 
reactor coolant pumps, in particular. The pumps and the wearing of their spare parts will 
be reviewed as part of the ageing management inspection in 2016. In 2015, STUK focused 
its regulatory oversight on inspecting Fortum’s management, competence, resource and 
procurement processes. The Fortum management system renewal project has proceeded as 
planned.
In 2015, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) submitted to STUK 18 operational event reports. 
The operational events did not compromise nuclear or radiation safety. STUK performed 
an annual outage inspection in compliance with the inspection programme. A special topic 
studied during the oversight of annual outages was the replacement of feedwater line 
mixing points. The mixing points were replaced due to cracks observed during the 2014 
annual outage. TVO implemented a new organisation and operations model in 2015. STUK 
reviewed document updates and safety assessments made based on the change. More work 
is needed to establish the new operating model, and STUK will continue to monitor the 
change as part of its regulatory oversight.
At both Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPPs, modifications required for improving safety continued. 
As a result of the Fukushima accident, four air-cooled heat exchangers were installed at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2014 and 2015. They ensure cooling of the fuel in the 
reactor and the fuel pools in case heat transfer to the sea is lost. Furthermore, separate 
flood protection improvements have been implemented in some systems important to 
safety. This work was continued in 2015. STUK continued its review of the Loviisa I&C 
renewal documents and supervised pre-installation work during the 2015 annual outage. 
The plan is to complete the first installation stage during the 2016 annual outage, and the 
I&C renewal should be complete by 2018.
As a result of the Fukushima accident, Olkiluoto will improve, for example, systems used 
to cool the reactor and add whole new systems for pumping water into the reactor in case 
of a complete loss of AC power. STUK approved related plans in 2015. Another ongoing 
project at Olkiluoto is an upgrade of the reactor coolant pumps and the emergency diesel 
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generators. In 2015, STUK continued its review of documents pertaining to the reactor 
coolant pumps and the supervision of manufacture. TVO plans to commission the new 
reactor coolant pumps between 2016 and 2018.
In 2015, STUK evaluated how well the operating plant units at Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
comply with the requirements of the new nuclear safety guides (YVL Guides), decided 
which requirements will be applied and how safety must be further improved. No major 
technical modification needs arose in connection with these implementation decisions, as 
the most important of the new required issues were already implemented or are being 
implemented after the Fukushima accident. According to STUK’s decisions, however, 
both Fortum and TVO must, in the next few years, expand the coverage of accident 
analyses, improve ageing management procedures of the plants and further develop plant 
documentation to promote better traceability of design modifications.
Design, installation and construction work of the Olkiluoto 3 project are almost complete 
and the commissioning phase will start soon. In 2015, STUK’s oversight focused on the 
finalisation of design and analyses, restarting of activities at the construction site, effects 
of the TVO’s organisational change, commissioning tests and preparation for operation. 
STUK approved the plant’s I&C design and conducted site visits to the I&C testing field 
in Germany in 2015. The installation work at the plant site, which had been discontinued, 
was restarted in the summer. STUK paid special attention to good construction site 
practices after the break. Due to the TVO’s organisational change, STUK’s inspections 
focused on the clarity of roles and responsibilities and adequacy of resources for the 
Olkiluoto 3 project. No major non-conformances in these issues were detected. In 2015, 
STUK reviewed system commissioning plans. The plan is to start the commissioning tests 
of the nuclear island systems during the spring of 2016.
On 30 June 2015, Fennovoima submitted a construction licence application for a new 
nuclear power plant to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. At the same time, 
Fennovoima submitted to STUK for review documents regarding the plant site and 
separate reports required by the Nuclear Energy Decree. Fennovoima will supplement the 
construction licence application in stages in compliance with its licensing plan between 
2015 and 2017. STUK oversaw the development of Fennovoima’s management system 
and quality management, and assessed the company’s organisational resources to begin 
construction of a nuclear power plant. In addition to reviewing the management systems of 
these actors, STUK conducts inspections to verify that the operations of the organisations 
comply with the requirements in practice. In September 2015, STUK launched the 
inspections included in the regulatory inspection programme, and a total of six inspections 
were carried out in 2015. Furthermore, STUK’s experts participated as observers in audits 
of the plant supplier and its subcontractors, arranged by Fennovoima.
The handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel and operational nuclear waste and disposal 
of operational nuclear waste were implemented safely, and no events compromising safety 
were detected at the Loviisa or Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. Due to the successful 
planning of operations, the plants accumulated clearly less operational waste than nuclear 
power plants on average. Fortum was able to determine the cause of the cracks observed 
in the concrete packages at the Loviisa solidification facility for low- and intermediate-
level liquid radioactive waste and commissioning of the facility proceeded as planned in 
2015. The concrete packages will be placed in the waste disposal facility in the power plant 
area. In late 2014, Fortum studied the cause and repair methods of cracks observed in the 
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outer surface of a concrete tray in the disposal facility for solidified radioactive waste. The 
concrete trough must be repaired and the repairs must be approved before the disposal of 
solidified waste can begin.
The enlargement of the spent fuel storage facility at Olkiluoto, which started in 2009, was 
completed in 2015 when STUK finalised the safety assessment on commissioning of the 
extension and approved TVO’s application to increase the capacity of the spent fuel storage 
facility. In connection with the enlargement, the storage structures were modified to 
correspond to the new safety requirements in terms of an airplane crash, for example.
The operating licence for the research reactor FiR 1 is valid until the end of 2023. However, 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland decided to shut down and decommission the 
reactor earlier due to financial reasons. VTT stopped using the research reactor in June 
2015 and completed the measures needed to keep the reactor in permanent shutdown state 
by the end of the year. In 2015, STUK continued the oversight of the reactor’s operational 
safety as before. Furthermore, STUK reviewed the requirements on decommissioning 
and regulatory oversight together with VTT. Since this is the first nuclear facility 
decommissioning project in Finland, adressing of the requirements and safety issues 
already before the submission of the licence application is important to ensure effective 
regulatory oversight.
STUK made implementation decision for the FiR research reactor on 14 YVL Guides. VTT 
will apply the other requirements from of the old YVL Guides as long as the FiR reactor is 
in permanent shutdown and during decommissioning. The most important requirements 
and effects of the implementation decisions on the FiR 1 reactor involved the development 
of the management system and the development of employee radiation protection for the 
decommissioning.
STUK finalised and submitted to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy a 
statement and safety assessment on the construction licence application for the Posiva 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility in early 2015. STUK’s conclusion was that 
the encapsulation plant and disposal facility can be constructed in such a manner 
that it will be safe. After the review, STUK also prepared decisions on the documents 
laid down in section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. In these decisions, STUK posed 
several requirements on Posiva regarding the construction phase and the preparation 
of the operating licence application. After the statement, STUK focused on planning the 
regulatory oversight of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility construction and 
assessing the requirements with Posiva to ensure that the work done by Posiva based on 
the plans is sufficient to meet the requirements.
After Posiva received the construction licence from the Government on 12 November 2015, 
STUK’s oversight has focused on the construction phase of the encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility. The regulatory oversight during the construction phase covers design, 
manufacture, construction and installation of the nuclear waste facility and its safety-
classified systems, structures and components. This stage also includes the nuclear waste 
facility’s commissioning phase, at which time STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations, 
review test run plans and test run results, and perform commissioning inspections. In 
practice, construction in 2015 focused on the expansion of facilities implemented as part of 
the underground research facility (Onkalo). STUK oversaw the construction activities and 
the research in Onkalo to the required extent.
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Posiva aims at harmonising its management system and operations with those of TVO 
and promote the use of shared resources and competences. STUK focused its oversight 
on ensuring that resources and functions needed to verify the safety of Posiva’s nuclear 
facilities will be taken into account when integrating and reconciling the functions. 
Oversight takes place as part of the construction inspection programme, for example. 
STUK launched the construction inspection programme when Posiva received the 
construction licence. Inspections included in the programme assess the performance of 
Posiva’s management system, the sufficiency of procedures and their ability to guide 
design, manufacture, construction and installation operations, as well as the taking into 
account of safety requirements at different stages of the project.
Nuclear safeguards in Finland were implemented in compliance with the international 
treaties. Nuclear safeguards ensure that nuclear materials and other nuclear items 
remain in peaceful use in compliance with the relevant licences and declarations, and 
that nuclear facilities and the related technologies are only utilised for peaceful purposes. 
STUK maintains a national control system which handles the nuclear safeguards that 
are necessary for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. STUK processed reports and 
declarations on nuclear materials and performed safeguard inspections together with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission. Based on 
these inspections, it was concluded that nuclear energy was used in compliance with the 
declarations and no undeclared activities were detected.
Based on the amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act that entered into force on 1 January 
2016, which changed STUK’s mandate on providing regulations, STUK prepared five 
regulations in 2015. Four of them replaced the Government Degree on the Safety of 
Nuclear Power Plants, the Government Decree on Emergency Response Arrangements 
at Nuclear Power Plants, the Government Decree on the Security in the Use of Nuclear 
Energy and the Government Decree on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste. 
A regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling Activities to Produce Uranium or 
Thorium is completely new. Specific requirements that could not be issued in STUK’s 
regulations were transferred to the Nuclear Energy Decree.
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1 Development and implementation 
of legislation and regulations
Amendments of the Nuclear Energy Act
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended on 1 July 
2015. The amendments emphasise the independ-
ence of STUK and its regulatory oversight. STUK’s 
mandate in radiation monitoring in the immediate 
vicinity of nuclear power plants was expanded and 
STUK received the mandate to give orders regard-
ing nuclear safety issues. Furthermore, regulations 
on the Government’s obligation to take into ac-
count STUK’s proposals given in the preliminary 
safety assessment when making a decision-in-
principle and the licensing authority’s obligation 
to take into account in the licence conditions the 
safety proposals given by STUK in the licence ap-
plication statement were added to the legislation. 
In addition, charges of the licensee of the nuclear 
facility and licensee under a waste management 
obligation were increased for a fixed period of time 
to allow development of the nuclear safety and nu-
clear waste management research infrastructure.
Preparation of regulations
The Nuclear Energy Act includes a list of 27 is-
sues in which STUK may impose regulations. The 
list is based on previous decrees and an amend-
ment of the Nuclear Energy Act in 2011 when the 
Government was given a mandate to issue safety 
rules regarding mining and milling activities to 
produce uranium or thorium.
In 2015, STUK prepared five regulations in pro-
ject established for this purpose. The regulations 
were implemented by replacing the Nuclear Energy 
Act decrees, i.e. the Government Degree on the 
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants, the Government 
Decree on Emergency Response Arrangements at 
Nuclear Power Plants, the Government Decreeon 
the Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy and 
the Government Decree on the Safety of Disposal 
of Nuclear Waste with STUK’s regulations. The 
Regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling 
Activities to Produce Uranium or Thorium is com-
pletely new.
The revoked Government Decrees included 
regulations on issues that cannot be governed 
with STUK’s regulations. In these cases, the 
Government still has the power to decree. Such 
issues include the limitation of radiation exposure 
and radioactive releases as well as duties falling 
under the jurisdiction of other authorities. For 
these issues, an amendment of the Nuclear Energy 
Decree entered into force at the beginning of the 
year. STUK was closely involved in the preparation 
of the amended decree.
The plan was to retain the contents of the cor-
responding Government Decrees, except for the 
above-mentioned issues transferred to the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. The Regulation on the Disposal of 
Nuclear Waste was updated based on experience 
gained from the processing of Posiva’s construc-
tion licence application and regulatory activities 
of other nuclear power plants. The regulation was 
also standardised in terms of structure and content 
to correspond to the Regulation on the Safety of 
Nuclear Power Plants. The most important change 
is the fact that the design extension condition in-
cluded in the nuclear facility regulations is also 
taken into account in the case of nuclear facilities 
that process spent nuclear fuel. These changes 
clarify the design of nuclear waste facilities and 
specify the regulations on long-term safety of nu-
clear waste.
Official hearing of the draft regulations was ar-
ranged in the summer. The consultation period and 
the parties to be heard are specified in the legisla-
tive amendment: licensees, Advisory Committees 
on Nuclear Safety and Security Arrangements, 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry 
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of the Interior, the Ministry of the Environment, 
the rescue authorities and other authorities, if 
necessary. An event for stakeholders was arranged 
during the consultation period, on 12 August 2015, 
to present the legislative amendment and the in-
dividual draft regulations. A total of almost 450 
proposed corrections or comments were issued dur-
ing the hearing and in the comments of the revised 
draft regulations thereafter. STUK has recorded 
how these comments were taken into account in 
the regulations and the justification for the deci-
sions made.
The draft regulations were presented to the 
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety in its meet-
ing in August, at which time the committee issued 
a statement regarding the current draft regula-
tions. The regulations, finalised based on the hear-
ing comments, were presented to the new advisory 
committee in its kickoff meeting in December.
The STUK regulations prepared based on the 
amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act and their 
justifications were published on 31 December 2015 
on Finlex in Finnish and Swedish.
Implementation of YVL Guides
The nuclear safety guidelines (YVL Guides) cov-
er all issues influencing the safety of a nuclear 
power plant, such as design, operation, safety of 
the plant and its environment, nuclear materials, 
nuclear waste, structures and equipment. The re-
newed guides were competed in late 2013 and have 
been applied as such to new nuclear facility pro-
jects, such as the Fennovoima nuclear power plant 
project, ever since. The YVL Guides entered into 
force for the currently operating plant units at 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto and the FiR 1 research reac-
tor of VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
with separate STUK’s implementation decisions 
in 2015. The YVL Guide implementation decisions 
for the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit, which is currently 
under construction, will be made when processing 
the OL3 operating licence application.
In an YVL Guide implementation project, STUK 
assessed guide-specific reports by the licensees, fo-
cusing on the processing of non-conformances and 
measures proposed by the licensees. An assess-
ment of compliance with requirements was com-
pleted as spot tests, but the assessment will be con-
tinued in connection with the continuous oversight 
(such as in inspections of the periodic inspection 
programme). The project covered 42 YVL Guides 
and around 8,000 requirements included in them.
In 2015, STUK processed a total of 98 imple-
mentation decisions for TVO, Fortum and VTT. All 
of the YVL Guides (except for YVL A.11) entered 
into force for the operating plant units of TVO and 
Fortum during the autumn of 2015 or at the latest 
as of 1 January 2016. Implementation decisions on 
14 YVL Guides for the FiR research reactor of VTT 
were made. They entered into force as of 1 January 
2016. VTT will apply the other regulations of the 
old YVL Guides, where applicable, as long as the 
FiR reactor is in permanent shutdown and during 
decommissioning. More than 60 people partici-
pated in the STUK implementation project, using 
4–5 man-years.
The YVL Guide requirements and the power 
companies’ responses (compliance, references to 
verifying plant documentation, proposals on jus-
tified improvement measures, etc.) were entered 
into STUK’s Polarion database. STUK’s comments 
on compliance with the requirements, STUK’s 
decisions on whether the licensees’ proposals on 
exemptions from a requirement are approved, 
STUK’s additional requirements, justification, 
STUK’s policies and revision needs of the YVL 
Guides were also entered into the database. In the 
future, the database will be used as a tool in con-
tinuous oversight.
No major technical modification needs arose for 
the operating plant units at Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
in connection with the implementation project, as 
almost all of the new required issues were already 
implemented after the Fukushima accident (2011). 
According to STUK’s decision the operating units 
must, in the next few years, expand the coverage 
of accident analyses, improve ageing management 
procedures of the plants and further develop plant 
documentation to promote better traceability of 
change design.
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2 Results of regulatory oversight of 
nuclear power plants in 2015
2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa power 
plant and assessed its organisation in different 
areas by means of reviewing materials provided 
by the licensee, carrying out inspections in line 
with the periodic inspection programme and the 
YVL Guides, and by overseeing operations at the 
plant. Inspection of the periodic safety review that 
started in 2014 was also continued. Summaries 
of inspections included in the periodic inspection 
programme for 2015 are included in Appendix 4. 
On the basis of this regulatory oversight, STUK 
can state that plant operations did not cause a ra-
diation hazard to the employees, population or the 
environment.
Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
The limit value for the collective dose of a nuclear 
power plant’s employees averaged over two suc-
cessive years is 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of 
net electrical power. This means an average value 
of 1.24 manSv for the Loviisa plant units. This 
threshold was not exceeded at either of the units. 
The collective occupational dose at Loviisa 1 was 
0.28 manSv and the collective occupational dose 
at Loviisa 2 was 0.24 manSv. The combined radia-
tion dose of both units, 0.52 manSv, is the lowest 
ever recorded. The improvement was due mostly 
to the improved radiation safety working methods 
and the replacement of reactor coolant pump seals 
with seals that do not contain any antimony in 
2014. Activated antimony from the primary circuit 
piping has been a major source of radiation in the 
steam generator room.
The effective dose for a single worker from ra-
diation work may not exceed the 20  manSv/year 
average over any period of five years, or 50 manSv 
during any single year. The actual radiation doses 
remained clearly below these limits.
Radioactive emissions into the air and sea 
remained clearly below the set plant site specific 
emission limits. The calculated radiation dose of 
the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
plant was around 0.07 µSv per year, i.e. less than 
0.1% of the set limit (Appendix 2, indicator A.I.5c).
A total of approximately 300 samples were 
collected and analysed from the land and marine 
environment surrounding the Loviisa power plant 
in 2015. External background radiation and the 
exposure to radioactivity of people in the vicinity 
of the NPP were also regularly measured. Minute 
amounts of radioactive substances originating 
from the plant were observed in some of the ana-
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Figure 1. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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lysed environmental samples. The amounts were 
so small that they are insignificant in terms of the 
radiation exposure of the environment or people.
Operation and operational events
In 2015, the Loviisa nuclear power plant submit-
ted to STUK for information or approval a total of 
13 operational event reports. These reports comply 
with the new Guide YVL A.10, meaning that they 
include the former special reports, major opera-
tional transients and other plant events submitted 
to STUK for information. Detecting and investi-
gating non-conformances is important in terms of 
operating experience feedback. Based on STUK’s 
oversight and the submitted operational event re-
ports, one can state that Fortum has established 
and functional procedures to identify, investigate 
and report events. The only development areas are 
investigation of more minor events, streamlining 
of the reporting process and assessment of the im-
pact of corrective measures. The operational events 
in 2015 did not compromise nuclear or radiation 
safety. The most important operational events are 
described in Appendix 3.
The annual outages of the plant units were 
implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. In addition to refuelling and modi-
fications, a large number of maintenance measures 
and inspections are carried out during each annual 
outage to ensure the safe and reliable operation of 
the NPP. The annual outage inspections were car-
ried out on schedule and in the planned scope. As 
part of the oversight, STUK performed an annual 
outage inspection in compliance with the periodic 
inspection programme. In this inspection, STUK 
oversaw the repairs of the primary circuit reac-
tor coolant pumps, in particular. Damage that was 
more extensive than normal was observed in the 
parts subject to wear of the reactor coolant pumps. 
STUK requested separate reports on this damage 
before startup of the unit. The pumps and the wear-
ing of their spare parts will be reviewed as part of 
the ageing management inspection in 2016. More 
information about annual outages of the plant units 
is available in Appendix 3.
Development of the plant and its safety
Several modification projects that will improve 
plant safety that were designed based on assess-
ments of the Fukushima accident are currently 
ongoing at the nuclear power plant. These modi-
fications will improve the provisions for extreme 
external threats.
A heat sink independent of sea water was in-
stalled in 2014–2015 and tested during the 2015 
annual outage at the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
as part of the safety improvements included in the 
Loviisa renovation programme. The heat sink is 
backed up by air-cooled cooling units. Two cooling 
units have been installed in both plant units. They 
can be used to cool the fuel pools via an intermedi-
ate circuit and transfer the reactor’s residual heat 
from the emergency cooling system to the atmos-
phere. The towers are designed for a long-term loss 
of heat sink (more than 72 hours).
As part of the preparations for high seawater 
level, Fortum added in 2015 flooding protection in 
compliance with its own assessment in emergency 
systems where they might be necessary under 
extreme conditions. The modifications included, 
for example, raising the temporary dams and pro-
tecting the reserve emergency feedwater pumping 
plant by adding waterproofing to the walls and 
doors, and adding flooding protection in drains to 
be used if necessary.
During the 2014 annual outage, new main 
steam line (RA) safety valves were added in 
Loviisa  2. It was observed during commission-
ing tests after installation that the safety valves’ 
forced opening function is not able to open the 
valves at the designed low pressure. STUK re-
quired that Fortum submit, before starting Loviisa 
2 after the 2014 annual outage, to STUK for ap-
proval a preliminary report on how the opening of 
the safety valves at a higher pressure would influ-
ence transfer of the plant into a safe state after an 
accident. The issue was discussed further in 2015 
and based on analyses and reports by Fortum, us-
ing the valves’ forced opening function to reach a 
safe state after a rare design extension condition 
is possible. Operating manual modifications are 
still needed, however. The plan is to install similar 
valves in Loviisa 1 during the 2016 annual outage.
New main steam line (RA) radiation measur-
ing instruments were installed and commissioned 
at Loviisa 2. Fortum decided to postpone the 
commissioning of the new RA radiation measur-
ing instruments for Loviisa 1 to the 2016 annual 
outage to ensure the adequacy of spare parts, for 
example. Furthermore, operating experience from 
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the radiation monitors at Loviisa 2 can be utilised 
at Loviisa 1.
STUK continued the review of the documents 
of the Loviisa I&C renewal (the ELSA project; 
formerly the LARA project) and supervised pre-
installation work during the 2015 annual outage. 
The work was completed as planned. Document 
review of the Loviisa I&C renewal has proceeded 
on schedule, and top level documents for the first 
implementation phase (2A) have been approved. 
The plan is to perform the stage 2A installation 
during the 2016 annual outage. The I&C renewal 
should be complete by 2018. Planned renewal of 
the refuelling machine and reactor building crane 
at the Loviisa NPP did not proceed much in 2015. 
STUK approved an updated conceptual design 
plan of the reactor hall crane.
Periodic safety review
STUK continued the inspection of the Loviisa pe-
riodic safety review. According to the terms of the 
operating licence that was granted to Fortum in 
2007, the licensee must prepare comprehensive 
safety assessments for the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority by the end of the years 2015 and 
2023. The licensee submitted the required docu-
ments in several batches in 2014–2015. A request 
for information regarding the document batch sub-
mitted by the licensee in late 2014 was made, and 
the necessary answers were received in late 2015. 
At the end of the year, STUK started the drafting 
of its own safety assessment based on the licen-
see’s reports. Key issues in this periodic safety 
review include ageing management, implementa-
tion of the new YVL Guides (a separate project, but 
an important interface), as well as the licensee’s 
safety culture and safety management. STUK will 
finalise the safety assessment and make a decision 
regarding it in 2016 based on STUK’s new regula-
tions and the YVL Guides.
Emergency preparedness
STUK oversaw the ability of the power plant’s 
emergency preparedness organisation to oper-
ate under exceptional conditions and performed 
an emergency preparedness inspection included 
in STUK’s operation monitoring programme. The 
inspection is described in Appendix 4. Emergency 
preparedness at Loviisa nuclear power plant com-
plies with the key requirements. No events re-
quiring emergency response actions took place at 
Loviisa NPP in 2015.
An unannounced emergency preparedness 
drill, LOVIISA-15, was arranged at Loviisa NPP 
in November. In addition to the plant itself, partici-
pants in the drill included STUK, Eastern Uusimaa 
Fire and Rescue Services, Eastern Uusimaa Police 
Department and Kerava Emergency Response 
Centre. The drill tested the response time in form-
ing of the emergency preparedness organisation and 
how operations can be started outside regular work-
ing hours, as well as offered training to new employ-
ees. A similar drill was arranged last in 2010.
Nuclear security
STUK assessed the security arrangements of the 
nuclear power plant by performing two inspections 
of the periodic inspection programme (Appendix 
4) and other inspections. No significant deviations 
were detected in the inspections. The measures re-
sulting from remarks made in the course of earlier 
inspections were also considered to be appropriately 
implemented. The inspections covered renewal of 
the surveillance system in 2014, personnel train-
ing and preparation of the implementation of the 
new YVL Guides (A.11 and A.12). Furthermore, a 
separate safety arrangement readiness drill was ar-
ranged in October. STUK also participated in the 
drill. The drill tested and trained the employees of 
the alarm centre and the security personnel in a 
situation where outsiders attempt to enter the plant 
with the help of an employee. The drill was suc-
cessful: the attempted infiltration was detected and 
properly handled. The security organisation identi-
fied, alone and in cooperation with STUK, develop-
ment areas that will be improved in the security 
organisation’s future drills and training events.
Fire safety
Fire safety at the Loviisa nuclear power plant is 
at an acceptable level. In 2015, STUK oversaw the 
plant’s fire safety with an inspection included in 
the periodic inspection programme (Appendix 4), 
with site visits and by reviewing reports submitted 
by Fortum.
In its inspection, STUK paid attention to minor 
leaks and leakage marks in the fire water piping 
that were observed in a condition survey and fire 
compartmentalisation of the plant’s new fibreglass 
seawater piping that is used to remove residual 
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heat and that was in use during the 2015 annual 
outages. Reports about these issues were requested 
for information. Modifications that improve fire 
safety implemented in 2015 include new fire wa-
ter piping and triggering centre for a transformer 
substation (10AT01), automatic fire extinguishing 
systems for the operational waste facilities and a 
manually operated water extinguishing system in 
the motor room of the reactor coolant pumps.
Organisational operations and 
quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight, one can state that, 
with a view to ensuring safety, the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant organisation has operated in a system-
atic and development-oriented way. STUK oversaw 
the operations of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
organisation and competence management by, for 
example, performing three inspections included in 
the periodic inspection programme (Appendix 4). 
STUK focused its regulatory oversight particularly 
on Fortum’s management, competence manage-
ment, resource management and procurement pro-
cesses. Fortum’s nuclear operations management 
system renewal project has proceeded according 
to plan: the top level process map, key processes 
and supporting processes have been identified. 
Furthermore, STUK monitored the development 
of quality management in the development of For-
tum’s procurement operations and Fortum’s exten-
sive training project on good practices that was 
carried out in 2015.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low and 
intermediate level waste (NPP operational waste) 
at the Loviisa nuclear power plant were carried 
out as planned. The volume and activity of opera-
tional waste in relation to reactor power remained 
low compared with most other countries. The NPP 
pays attention to keeping the amount of waste 
generated as low as possible by very efficiently 
reducing the volume of waste and releasing from 
control waste that contains very little radioactive 
substances. Fortum updated its procedures on the 
release of operational waste and hazardous waste 
from control in 2015. STUK has approved the li-
censee’s procedures and will follow the amount of 
waste released from control and its activity concen-
trations.
In terms of the solidification facility for liquid 
radioactive waste, STUK oversaw commissioning 
tests of concrete containers, which were completed 
and approved. Fortum submitted to STUK for ap-
proval an operating licence application for starting 
production operation of the solidification facility. 
STUK processed the application and prepared its 
safety assessment in late 2015. The safety assess-
ment was completed in 2016 and STUK approved 
the starting of production operation.
Fortum first detected corrosion damage on the 
outer surface of a concrete vault in the hall for the 
solidified waste in the disposal facility for low- and 
intermediate-level waste in August 2014. Accord-
ing to Fortum’s report, the vault can be repaired. 
Weeping drains in the underground hall around 
the vault must be improved to manage the environ-
mental stress to which the vault is subjected. The 
intermediate-level waste facility is not in use yet 
and no nuclear waste has been placed there. STUK 
will approve the commissioning of the disposal fa-
cility when method has been solved and the vault 
has been repaired.
Nuclear safeguards
In 2015, a total of twelve nuclear safeguards inspec-
tions were carried out at the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant. STUK performed an inspection pertaining to 
the verification of the physical inventory of nuclear 
materials together with the IAEA and the European 
Commission both before and after the annual out-
New nuclear safety guidelines
In 2015, STUK will evaluate how well the plant 
units Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 as well as Olki-
luoto  1 and Olkiluoto 2 meet the requirements 
of the new nuclear safety guidelines and deci-
sions on how safety must be further improved. 
No major technical modification needs arose in 
connection with the implementation decisions, as 
the most important of the new required issues 
were already implemented after the Fukushima 
accident. According to STUK’s decisions, however, 
both Fortum and TVO must, in the next few years, 
expand the coverage of accident analyses, improve 
ageing management procedures of the plants and 
further develop plant documentation to promote 
better traceability of design modifications.
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Forgeries of small valve 
material certificates
Valves where the material certificates for the mate-
rials of some components were forgeries have been 
delivered to the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants. In July, a company that sells valves to the 
nuclear power plants notified Fortum and TVO that 
a wholesale metal dealer that sold raw materials to 
the valve manufacturer had forged additional test 
certificates. Such valves were also delivered to nuclear 
power plants in other countries. Studies revealed that 
the valves installed in the Finnish nuclear power 
plants did not compromise the safety of the plants.
A total of 209 valves with unclear material cer-
tificates due to the above-mentioned forgeries were de-
livered to the Loviisa nuclear power plant. According 
to a preliminary report submitted by Fortum and ad-
ditional surveys done in connection with the annual 
outage, most of the valves were installed in measuring 
piping. The suspected materials proved compliant 
with the requirements in inspections, except for a 
batch of four valves, two of which had already been 
installed at the plant. These valves were replaced in 
connection with the annual outage. STUK has pro-
cessed Fortum’s reports and non-conformance reports 
regarding the material certificate forgery and noted 
that the rest of the suspected valves can be approved 
for use.
A total of 107 valves whose material properties 
had to be studied were delivered to the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant. According to a report by TVO, such 
valves were installed in Olkiluoto 1, Olkiluoto 2 and 
the interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, but 
the forgeries did not affect Olkiluoto 3. A ban on the 
use of the valves in storage was imposed. Based on the 
report, the document forgeries have not influenced the 
valves’ operability. Furthermore, proper certificates 
obtained directly from the material manufacturer 
were available for the valve components, and deter-
mining that the components meet the requirements 
was possible based on these certificates. However, as 
an additional confirmation TVO plans to review some 
of the material analyses. Processing of this case will 
be continued, because TVO has submitted an updated 
report of the incident. Furthermore, the installed 
valves and the valves in storage that are currently 
under the ban will be approved by means of non-
conformity processing as fit for use.
ages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the locations of 
the reactor core fuel assemblies prior to closing of 
the reactor cover in Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. STUK 
performed two interim safeguards inspections. One 
of the inspections focused on the nuclear use items at 
the plant, such as the control rod drive mechanism, 
the fuel transport baskets, the instrument for meas-
uring fuel assembly geometry and the spare devices 
in the outer warehouse. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion and the IAEA performed an extra inspection 
and IAEA completed one visit on maintenance of the 
surveillance cameras. No remarks were made in the 
inspections. The remote data transmission system 
installed in 2014 was operational in 2015.
2.2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
STUK oversaw the safety of Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plant and assessed its organisation in different 
areas by means of reviewing materials provided by 
the licensee, carrying out inspections in line with 
the periodic inspection programme and overseeing 
operations at the plant. Summaries of inspections 
included in the periodic inspection programme for 
2015 are included in Appendix 4. On the basis 
of this regulatory oversight, STUK can state that 
plant operations did not cause a radiation hazard 
to the employees, population or the environment.
Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
The limit value for the collective dose of a nuclear 
power plant’s employees averaged over two suc-
cessive years is 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net 
electrical power. This means an average annual 
dose value of 2.20 manSv per Olkiluoto plant unit. 
This threshold was not exceeded at either of the 
units. The collective occupational dose at Olkiluoto 
1 was 0.24 manSv and the collective occupational 
dose at Olkiluoto 2 was 0.51 manSv.
Radioactive emissions into the air and sea 
remained clearly below the set plant site specific 
emission limits. A total of approximately 300 sam-
ples were collected and analysed from the land and 
marine environment surrounding the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant in 2015. Minute amounts of 
radioactive substances originating from the plant 
were observed in some of the analysed environ-
mental samples. The amounts were so small that 
they are insignificant in terms of the radiation 
exposure of the environment or people.
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Operation and operational events
In 2015, TVO submitted to STUK for information 
or approval a total of 18 operational event reports. 
These reports comply with the new YVL Guide 
A.10, meaning that they include the former spe-
cial reports, major operational transients and other 
INES-classified events submitted to STUK for in-
formation. Detecting and investigating non-con-
formances is important in terms of operating ex-
perience feedback. Based on STUK’s oversight and 
the submitted operational event reports, one can 
state that TVO has established and functional pro-
cedures to identify, investigate and report events. 
The operational events in 2015 did not compromise 
nuclear or radiation safety. The most important op-
erational events are described in Appendix 3.
The annual outages of the plant units were 
implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. A large number of maintenance 
measures and inspections are also carried out dur-
ing each annual outage to ensure the safe and reli-
able operation of the NPP. Non-destructive inservice 
inspections of pressure equipment were implement-
ed in compliance with an inservice inspection pro-
gramme approved by STUK. STUK performed an 
annual outage inspection in compliance with the pe-
riodic inspection programme during the annual out-
age. Special attention was paid to the replacement 
of the mixing point of the feedwater system piping 
and piping from the reactor coolant system of the 
shut down reactor. The mixing points were replaced 
due to cracks observed during the 2014 annual out-
ages. More information about the annual outages of 
the plant units and the cracks at the piping mixing 
points is available in Appendix 3.
Development of the plant and its safety
Several modification projects that will improve 
plant safety that were designed based on assess-
ments of the Fukushima accident are currently 
ongoing at the nuclear power plant. These modi-
fications will improve the provisions for extreme 
external threats. STUK approved the system-level 
pre-inspection documents of the high pressure core 
cooling system. TVO will install a steam turbine-
driven core cooling system to manage a situation 
where a total loss of AC power has occurred. The 
plan is to commission the system in 2017 and 2018. 
STUK also approved a conceptual design plan sub-
mitted by TVO on ensuring residual heat removal 
in a case where the primary heat removal route 
is unavailable. This plan is connected to the de-
velopment of the diversity principle, which was a 
requirement of the previous periodic safety review 
of 2009.
Dependence of the auxiliary feed water system 
on seawater was eliminated at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. 
The dependence was eliminated by implement-
ing a modification where the recirculation lines 
are connected to the demineralised water storage 
pools that are also the water source of the auxiliary 
feedwater system, and cooling of recirculated water 
with seawater is no longer necessary. The modifica-
tion will not influence the operation of the system 
in any other operating mode apart from the re-
circulation mode. Abnormal vibration and sounds 
were observed in the new recirculation line during 
commissioning, however. Furthermore, springs on 
the pressure side of the auxiliary feedwater system 
pump broke off during commissioning. This did not 
influence operation of the pumps, however, and 
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the fault would not have prevented the supply of 
water to the reactor in case of need. Studying of the 
problems, most of which occurred in train D, was 
continued in 2015. A new observed phenomenon is 
instantaneous exceeding of the recirculation line 
design pressure when switching from recirculation 
mode to pumping to the reactor. STUK approved 
a strength analysis submitted by TVO, which is 
connected to this issue. The studies aiming at 
eliminating the problems continue and TVO has 
proposed several alternative further measures. A 
similar modification of the recirculation line will 
not be implemented at Olkiluoto 2 until the studies 
are completed.
A project on replacing the reactor coolant pumps 
and the frequency converters needed to control and 
supply power to the pumps, as well as a project 
on replacing the NPP’s emergency diesel genera-
tors are also ongoing at the Olkiluoto NPP. STUK 
continued its review of documents pertaining to 
replacement of the reactor coolant pumps and the 
supervision of manufacture. TVO plans to com-
mission the new reactor coolant pumps between 
2016 and 2018. In the emergency diesel generator 
project, eight of the power plant’s emergency diesel 
generators will be replaced and a ninth generator 
will be built. The diesel generator project has been 
delayed and TVO estimates that all of the new die-
sel generators will be installed and commissioned 
by the spring of 2022. The new diesel generators 
can be cooled with seawater and air. The current 
ones can be cooled only with seawater.
Emergency preparedness
STUK oversaw the capability of the emergency 
preparedness organisations of the nuclear power 
plant to act under abnormal conditions. Emergency 
preparedness at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
complies with the key requirements. No events 
requiring emergency response actions occurred at 
Olkiluoto NPP in 2015. An unannounced emergen-
cy preparedness drill was arranged in the autumn. 
For more information on the drill, please see the 
next chapter.
Nuclear security
In 2015, two emergency drills on threatening sit-
uations were arranged at Olkiluoto. STUK also 
participated in the drills. A drill on cooperation 
between the nuclear power plant and the authori-
ties involved a scenario complying with the design 
basis threat. The security organisation eliminated 
the threat in accordance with the protection goal. 
The unannounced drill assessed fluency of commu-
nications between different organisations, among 
other issues. Over the course of the year, STUK 
monitored the security organisation’s refresher 
training on the use of force. TVO has developed 
the drill reporting procedures and the monitoring 
of measures as part of the assessment of the per-
formance of its security arrangements. In addition, 
STUK assessed the NPP’s security arrangements 
by performing three inspections of the periodic in-
spection programme (Appendix 4). STUK approved 
the Olkiluoto security policy. It covers the TVO and 
Posiva nuclear facilities in the same area.
Fire safety
Fire safety at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
is at an acceptable level. In 2015, STUK oversaw 
fire safety of the NPP by means of regulatory in-
spections and site visits, and by reviewing reports 
submitted by TVO.
Organisational operations and 
quality management
Based on STUK’s oversight and the results of oper-
ating activities, it can be stated that with a view to 
ensuring safety TVO’s organisation has operated in 
a systematic and development-oriented way. TVO 
implemented a new organisation and operations 
model in 2015. STUK has reviewed document up-
dates and safety assessments made based on the 
change. Based on STUK’s oversight, one can state 
that the new operating model has been introduced 
but some work to establish the practices is still 
needed. STUK will actively monitor the effect of 
the change on TVO’s operations.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low- and 
intermediate-level waste (NPP operational waste) 
at Olkiluoto NPP were carried out as planned. The 
volume and activity of operational waste in rela-
tion to reactor power remained low compared with 
most other countries. The NPP pays attention to 
keeping the amount of waste generated as low as 
possible by very efficiently reducing the volume of 
waste and releasing from control waste that con-
tains very little radioactive substances. TVO up-
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dated its procedures on the release of metal waste 
from control in 2015. STUK has approved the li-
censee’s procedures and will follow the amount of 
waste released from control and its activity concen-
trations.
Enlargement of spent fuel storage facility
TVO enlarged the interim storage facility for spent 
nuclear fuel (KPA storage) at Olkiluoto with three 
new pools and modified the storage structures to 
comply with the new safety requirements against 
airplane crash, for example. STUK approved TVO’s 
application on increasing the storage capacity of 
the spent fuel storage facility Based on STUK’s 
safety assessment, one can state that the KPA stor-
age enlargement presented in TVO’s application 
meets the requirements laid down in sections 5–7 
of the Nuclear Energy Act.
Nuclear safeguards
A total of eighteen nuclear safeguards inspections 
were performed in 2015. STUK performed, togeth-
er with the IAEA and the European Commission, 
inspections on the physical inventory of nuclear 
materials at both plant units and the spent nuclear 
fuel storage facility both before and after the an-
nual outages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the 
locations of the reactor core fuel assemblies prior 
to the closing of the reactor cover in Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto 2. STUK reviewed and approved an 
updated nuclear safeguards manual submitted by 
TVO. Nuclear safeguards equipment and methods 
of the European Commission were renewed in the 
reactor buildings of both plant units and in the 
spent fuel storage facility.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the European Commission launched remote data 
transmission in nuclear safeguards at the Olkiluoto 
units in November 2015. Remote data transmission 
reduces the number of onsite inspections by the 
international organisations at the Finnish nuclear 
power plants. Enabling the electronic transfer of 
monitoring data is an obligation laid down in the 
additional protocol of the Safeguards Agreement be-
tween Finland and the IAEA.
2.3 Olkiluoto 3
STUK continued its assessment of Olkiluoto 3. De-
sign, installation and construction work of the pro-
ject are almost complete and the commissioning 
phase will start soon. In 2015, STUK’s oversight 
focused on the finalisation of design and analyses, 
restarting of activities at the construction site, re-
source issues, effects of the TVO organisational 
change, commissioning tests and preparation for 
operation.
STUK’s oversight of system design focused 
mainly on assessment of the I&C. The I&C design 
was completed slower than the other design areas. 
Another design focus area has been verifying the 
compliance of design with the requirements by 
means of analyses and tests, for example. Issues 
pertaining to commissioning and future operation 
of the plant unit were discussed in several inspec-
tions and meetings both from the technical view-
point and from the viewpoint of the organisation.
Based on the construction inspection pro-
gramme and other oversight activities by STUK, 
the methods, operations and adequacy of TVO’s 
organisation have mainly been found to be at a 
good level, for example as far as the commission-
ing of the plant is concerned. During construction, 
TVO and the plant supplier have taken into ac-
count modification needs that have emerged as 
design of the various engineering disciplines have 
matured. Deficiencies detected in manufacturing 
and installation have either been corrected so that 
the original quality requirements are met, or it has 
been demonstrated by means of additional inspec-
tions or analyses that the requirements are met. In 
summary, based on the results of regulatory over-
sight, STUK is able to state that the original safety 
targets of the plant can be achieved.
Design
Over the course of the year, STUK approved the 
plant’s I&C system design and other systems 
whose design was completed later than that of 
other systems, such as the radiation measuring 
system and the diesel building ventilation system. 
The conceptual plant design and system design 
have now been approved. STUK also reviewed 
and approved modifications of system design. 
Modifications have been necessary when, for exam-
ple, systems designed at different times have been 
reconciled to each other.
The most important component that is still 
being processed is the pressurizer safety valve 
station, which will protect the plant’s primary 
circuit from overpressure. Some parts of the valve 
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represent new design, and modifications have been 
made because of problems observed during testing. 
Performance of the modifications and the whole 
were tested in France. STUK monitored some 
of the tests onsite. At the end of the year, STUK 
received valve design documents where the modi-
fications have been taken into account. STUK ap-
proved the design documents but requested some 
supplements. Testing of the valve station continues 
and STUK has required that the test results be 
submitted to STUK and STUK be given the oppor-
tunity to monitor the testing.
STUK inspected several updated design docu-
ments of steel platforms. Unlike in the original 
plans, the safety significance of the steel platforms 
has increased because process piping and safety 
critical equipment will be supported on them. The 
design documents were approved without remarks.
Analyses and testing
As part of the system design assessment, STUK 
has inspected analyses that verify compliance of 
design, such as system failure mode and effects 
analyses, strength analyses of mechanical compo-
nents and their initial data, such as load specifi-
cations and load descriptions. Most of the system 
failure mode and effects analyses were approved 
but STUK required several supplements and clari-
fications to the main I&C system failure mode and 
effects analyses. The load specifications and load 
descriptions were of good quality and STUK did 
not have any remarks regarding them.
The transient and accident analyses included 
in the final safety analysis report of Olkiluoto 3 
were submitted to STUK for a pre-review in late 
2014. Their review continued in 2015. STUK did 
not observe any major deficiencies in the analyses. 
STUK ordered independent comparison analyses 
of the overpressure analyses, severe accident anal-
yses and a variety of pipe breaks. The procedures 
and calculation software used when creating the 
comparison analyses are not the same as the 
procedures and tools used by the plant supplier. 
Results of the comparison analyses corresponded 
to the results of the plant supplier’s analyses, i.e. 
the comparison analyses verified the correctness 
of the plant supplier’s analyses. Some comparison 
analyses are still unfinished.
I&C testing in the test bay in Germany contin-
ued. STUK performed some site visits to the test 
bay and monitored selected tests. The tests were 
completed by the end of the year and no major 
deficiencies or problems in design were observed. 
STUK reviewed applications on transferring the 
systems from the test bay to the plant site after 
testing, and most of the main I&C systems were 
transferred to Olkiluoto by the end of the year.
Qualification of I&C components, which had 
proceeded slowly so far, started to proceed more 
quickly. Qualification ensures that the components 
will operate as planned under all the conditions 
determined for them, including potential accidents. 
STUK observed some deficiencies in the delivered 
documents, such as out of date or missing infor-
mation, and required that the deficiencies be cor-
rected.
An updated probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) 
for Olkiluoto 3 was not submitted to STUK in 2015. 
STUK aimed at ensuring with its regulatory over-
sight that content and up-to-dateness of the mate-
rials regarding the PRA and its applications that 
are to be submitted as appendices to the operating 
licence application, as well as their compliance 
with the requirement level laid down in the YVL 
Guides, were ensured.
Manufacture, installation and construction
The installation work at the plant site, which had 
been discontinued, was restarted in the summer. 
STUK paid special attention to good construction 
site practices after the break. TVO’s actions to en-
sure fluency of work and orientation of new em-
ployees and organisations were discussed in sev-
eral meetings. TVO’s procedures on supervising the 
construction site and control the restarting of work 
were also covered by two inspections included in 
the construction inspection programme. One of the 
inspections took place before the start of installa-
tion work and the other after the work had started. 
It was noted in the first inspection that TVO has 
established installation supervision practices and 
practices for the orientation of new contractors. 
When the installation work had started, STUK 
performed an unannounced inspection covering 
the adequacy of installation supervision resources. 
Based on the inspections, TVO’s resources were 
deemed sufficient.
Modifications of nuclear island cabling, which 
started in the autumn of 2014, continued through-
out the year. The modification project will update 
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the plant’s cabling to comply with the current 
system design. STUK oversaw the work on the 
cabling onsite in connection with its site visits. 
Furthermore, STUK monitored the testing of elec-
tricity systems onsite. STUK performed a construc-
tion inspection programme inspection electrical 
engineering. It covered management of electrical 
engineering modifications and TVO’s installation 
inspection resources. One requirement was posed 
in the inspection: it required presentation to STUK 
of the results of the mapping of software-based 
components used in the electricity systems.
The I&C inspection also covered installation, 
testing and change management practices. No 
requirements were posed based on the inspection. 
The inspected activities were appropriate, but the 
commissioning change management procedures 
were still at such an early stage that they will be 
revisited in future inspections.
In addition to inspections carried out in accord-
ance with the construction inspection programme, 
STUK also inspected TVO’s installation supervi-
sion in connection with regulatory activities onsite 
to verify the sufficiency of TVO’s supervision meth-
ods and resources. During  daily oversight, compli-
ance with approved procedures was monitored, 
among other things. Furthermore, STUK verified 
the practical implementation of security arrange-
ments with site walk-downs in two construction 
inspection programme inspections on physical se-
curity arrangements and information security.
The actual construction work was already com-
pleted before 2015. Thus, construction oversight 
activities were minor and mostly consisted of the 
installation supervision of the steel platforms.
Commissioning
System commissioning tests in the turbine island 
have been completed, insofar as testing was pos-
sible without the nuclear island. Some electric-
ity system testing has taken place at the nuclear 
island. Fire prevention systems of the plant have 
also been tested. Extensive commissioning testing 
at the nuclear island cannot be started until the 
process systems have been finalised, the operation-
al I&C has been installed and its tests have been 
completed. The current plan is to start commis-
sioning tests of the nuclear island systems during 
the spring of 2016. More and more system commis-
sioning programs have been submitted to STUK. 
When reviewing these plans, STUK has focused on 
assessing coverage of the tests and the approval 
criteria. The plans have been of a good quality 
and STUK has been able to approve most of them 
without any remarks. TVO’s procedures to ensure 
coverage of testing were covered in a construction 
inspection programme inspection in September. 
STUK deemed TVO’s procedures sufficient.
In 2015, STUK performed two inspections in-
cluded in the construction inspection programme 
that covered planning of security arrangements 
for the different commissioning phases. No defi-
ciencies influencing safety were observed in the 
inspections.
Pressure and leak tightness tests of the Olkiluoto 
3 containment were already completed in early 
2014, but the final results of the tests were not sub-
mitted to STUK for review until in January 2015. 
The results prove that the containment meets the 
set leaktightness and strength requirements. STUK 
approved the result report but noted that according 
to the testing standards, the leak test must be re-
peated before commissioning of the reactor if more 
than 36 months have passed after the first test.
In addition to technical trial runs, commission-
ing also includes verification of the organisation’s 
capability to operate the plant in a safe manner. 
The prerequisites of safe operation include an ad-
equate number of licensed operators and the neces-
sary plant documentation, such as procedures and 
the operational limits and conditions.
The operational limits and conditions (OLC) 
were submitted to STUK for review in 2014 and 
their review continued in 2015. STUK submitted 
its review observations to TVO but did not approve 
the operational limits and conditions yet. OLC are 
part of the operating licence application documen-
tation and will be approved in connection with the 
operating licence application. This review was a 
pre-review that aims at facilitating the processing 
of the actual operating licence application.
STUK monitored the progress of operator train-
ing, development of the training simulator and 
preparation of plant guidelines. These issues were 
discussed with the licensee and plant supplier in 
several meetings. STUK participated as an ob-
server in an audit by TVO of the plant supplier’s 
training unit. The training simulator has now been 
updated to comply with the current status of plant 
design. A number of trial runs must be run on the 
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simulator before operator training can be started. 
The trial runs will be used to assess whether the 
simulator describes the actual plant accurately 
enough for it to be used in training. The plan is to 
start the trial runs in early 2016 and to complete 
them by August.
Organisational operations
Focus areas of organisational oversight were ef-
fects of TVO’s organisational change, restarting the 
operations at the construction site after the hiatus 
and preparation of the organisation for the future 
operation of the plant.
TVO completed a major organisational reform 
in the spring of 2015. Performance of the organi-
sation was covered in several inspections of the 
construction inspection programme. The inspec-
tions focused particularly on the clarity of roles 
and responsibilities in the TVO organisation and 
the adequacy of the resources for the Olkiluoto 
3 project. It was observed in the inspections that 
the new organisation with its new roles and new 
operating methods were still somewhat unclear 
to some of the employees. STUK did not observe 
any deficiencies that could compromise nuclear or 
radiation safety in the definition of responsibilities 
or other issues, however.
Over the course of the year, TVO and the plant 
supplier speeded up the closing of the project’s 
open issues: schedules were prepared, responsible 
persons were named and progress of work was 
monitored with more care. The status of open is-
sues was covered in a quality assurance inspection 
of the construction inspection programme in the 
autumn. STUK is of the opinion that the situation 
has improved over the past six months due to the 
measures taken by TVO and the plant supplier.
Quality management system of the OL3 project 
will be more closely connected to the TVO manage-
ment system when the operating licence is applied. 
At that time, the general part of TVO’s manage-
ment manual, approved by STUK, will be in use. It 
will be supplemented with a quality plan prepared 
specifically for OL3. TVO submitted the quality 
plan to STUK at the end of 2015.
Review of documents related to the 
operating licence application
STUK has agreed with TVO that STUK may re-
view parts of the operating licence application doc-
uments before the delivery of the actual operating 
licence application. The pre-review will balance the 
workload of the various parties as completed the-
matic sections can be reviewed in advance. The 
documents submitted for pre-review must form a 
logical entity, and represent the final plant design. 
As a result of the pre-review, STUK will present 
Reports on reactor pressure 
vessel quality at Olkiluoto 3
In April 2015, the French nuclear safety authority 
ASN announced that non-conformances that affect 
strength had been detected in the carbon content 
of the head and bottom of the reactor pressure ves-
sel at the nuclear power plant currently under 
construction at Flamanville in France. Olkiluoto 
3 is of the same type as the Flamanville unit, 
but the pressure vessel at Olkiluoto has not been 
manufactured by the same company as the one 
in Flamanville. However, the manufacturer of the 
Flamanville pressure vessel has manufactured 
some of the components in the Olkiluoto 3 reac-
tor coolant system. Uniform quality of the reactor 
coolant system components at Olkiluoto 3 was 
monitored during manufacture and no non-con-
formances were observed. STUK also participated 
in the monitoring during manufacture. STUK 
still required TVO to provide a report on mate-
rial manufacture of the reactor pressure vessel 
and the other reactor coolant system components 
in the summer of 2015. In its report submitted 
in late June, TVO announced that the Olkiluoto 
reactor pressure vessel has been manufactured 
using a method other than the method used when 
manufacturing the Flamanville pressure vessel 
and the alternative method is superior in terms 
of quality. TVO also noted that similar problems 
would have been detected in the inspections per-
formed in connection with manufacture. According 
to a supplementary report submitted by TVO to 
STUK in early November, the other reactor cool-
ant system components were properly inspected in 
connection with manufacture. TVO inspected the 
carbon content of the steel used in the manufacture 
of a reactor coolant system pressurizer in October. 
The measurement results showed that the carbon 
content complies with the requirements. STUK 
reviewed the reports submitted by TVO and found 
that they are sufficient and the conclusions made 
are well justified.
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a decision including potential observations and 
requests for further clarifications. The pre-review 
also functions as practice for the review procedures 
planned for the operating licence phase. All the 
documents that are delivered to STUK in connec-
tion with the operating licence application will be 
reviewed by STUK at the operating licence phase 
as a whole, and STUK will approve their key parts 
before delivering a safety assessment and a state-
ment on the operating licence application to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
STUK continued with the review of the docu-
ments submitted for pre-review in 2014 (FSAR 
Section 15, Accident analyses, and FSAR Section 16, 
Operational limits and conditions). Several sections 
of the final safety analysis report were submitted 
to pre-review in 2015: Section 3 (General design 
bases), Section 8 (Electric power), Section 10 (Tur-
bine island), Section 12 (Radiation protection) and 
Section 20 (Decommissioning). Review of Section 3 
was still underway at the end of the year, but STUK 
finished reviewing the other sections and submitted 
its observations to TVO. No major deficiencies were 
observed in the review.
Nuclear safeguards
STUK performed a safeguards inspection of the 
Olkiluoto 3 design information (basic technical 
characteristics) with the IAEA and the European 
Commission in November 2015. The inspection fo-
cused on verifying the key areas for the safeguards 
of nuclear materials, such as fuel storage locations 
and transfer routes. Plans on installation of nu-
clear safeguards equipment at the plant were also 
reviewed.
2.4 Hanhikivi 1
Preparation for processing of the 
construction licence application
In the spring, of 2015 STUK provided, at the licence 
applicant’s request and by virtue of the Nuclear 
Energy Act, preliminary instructions to Fenno-
voima as Fennovoima prepared for the construc-
tion licence phase. STUK participated in meetings 
on various themes with Fennovoima and the plant 
supplier Rosatom Overseas (RAOS), and partici-
pated in the assessment of the project’s principal 
suppliers as an observer. STUK provided train-
ing for Fennovoima’s employees on the YVL Guide 
requirements, STUK’s experience in oversight of 
plant projects and lessons learned from STUK’s 
inspections of the Olkiluoto 3 project.
STUK organised and launched its own oversight 
project FIN6 on processing of the construction li-
cence application. STUK will also participate in 
national and international cooperation between au-
thorities regarding the project. STUK has continued 
the development of requirement management pro-
cedures and tools for the processing of the construc-
tion licence application.
Starting the processing of the construction 
licence application in the autumn of 2015
On 30 June 2015, Fennovoima submitted a con-
struction licence application for a new nuclear 
power plant to the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy. Fennovoima simultaneously submit-
ted licensing documents by virtue of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority for the launching of a safety assessment. 
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
studied issues pertaining to the ownership of the 
project after the application had been filed and 
submitted a request for a statement to STUK on 
8 September 2015. In the request, the Ministry 
asked STUK to provide a statement and a safety 
assessment as well as a statement from the Advi-
sory Committee on Nuclear Safety on the project 
by the end of 2017, if possible.
In connection with the construction licence 
application, the section of the preliminary safety 
analysis report on the plant site, the general part 
of the safety analysis report, part of the sections 
describing project quality assurance and some 
separate reports required by section 35 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree were submitted to STUK 
for processing. Fennovoima will supplement the 
construction licence application in stages in com-
pliance with its licensing plan between 2015 and 
2017. STUK started processing of the delivered 
parts of the construction licence application. A 
decision to discontinue the processing of the gen-
eral part of the safety analysis report was made in 
the autumn of 2015 because the submitted mate-
rial did not meet the Finnish requirements. In late 
2015, Fenno voima updated its licensing plan and 
some of the licensing document batches that were 
originally to be submitted in late 2015 were post-
poned to 2016.
STUK-B 203
23
STUK continued the project and subject-specific 
meetings with Fennovoima and the plant supplier 
RAOS after the construction licence application 
had been filed. Finnish licensing and safety re-
quirements as well as available solutions to meet 
these requirements were discussed in the project 
meetings and the subject-specific meetings. STUK 
emphasised the importance of thorough licensing 
planning in the success of the project’s official pro-
cessing.
STUK monitored the development of Fenno-
voima’s management system and quality assur-
ance, and assessed the company’s organisational 
resources to begin construction of a nuclear power 
plant. Furthermore, STUK’s experts participated 
as observers in audits of the plant supplier and its 
subcontractors, arranged by Fennovoima. Fenno-
voima started audits in late 2014, focusing on as-
sessing the compliance of the project’s key design 
and supply organisations.
During the processing of the application docu-
mentation linked to the construction licence ap-
plication of the Hanhikivi 1 plant project STUK 
assesses both technical compliance of the plant 
and ability of the organisations of the licensee, the 
plant supplier and the main service providers to 
construct and ultimately operate a nuclear power 
plant. In addition to reviewing the management 
systems of these actors, STUK conducts inspec-
tions to verify that the operations of the organisa-
tions comply with the requirements in practice. 
STUK launched the inspections included in the 
regulatory inspection programme (RKT) in Sep-
tember 2015. Inspections are planned biannually. 
In 2015, a total of six inspections were performed:
•	Management	and	processing	of	safety	issues
•	Management	system	and	key	processes
•	 Fennovoima’s	safety	culture
•	 Security	arrangements
•	 Resources	and	competence	management
•	 Principal	designer	inspection
The inspection results will be used when prepar-
ing STUK’s safety assessment and statement on 
the construction licence. A summary of the RKT 
inspection results is available in Appendix 6.
In order to arrange the operator’s own control 
activities and the safeguards of nuclear material 
arranged by STUK and international parties, it is 
important to include the safeguard requirements in 
the design and construction of new plants as early 
on as possible. In June, Fennovoima submitted a 
description on how to arrange the safeguards that 
are necessary to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. In October 2015, Fennovoima submitted 
to STUK and the European Commission an update 
to the preliminary basic technical characteristics 
(BTC) of Hanhikivi 1. The European Commission 
assigned Material Balance Area code WFV1 for the 
plant and submitted the information to the IAEA.
2.5 Research reactor
The operating licence for the research reactor 
FiR 1 is valid until the end of 2023. VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland has decided to shut 
down and decommission the reactor earlier due to 
financial reasons. VTT stopped using the reactor in 
June 2015 and placed it in permanent shutdown. 
STUK submitted a statement on this to VTT on 23 
April 2015. VTT plans to submit an application on 
revision of the operating licence to allow for decom-
missioning in early 2017.
STUK monitored safety of the research reactor 
by reviewing materials provided by the licensee, 
as well as by carrying out inspections in line with 
the periodic inspection programme and the YVL 
Guides. STUK assessed the updated physical pro-
tection procedures of the research reactor, taking 
into account the decommissioning plans. On the 
basis of this regulatory oversight, it could be stated 
that reactor did not pose any radiation hazard to 
the employees, the population or the environment.
As stated in Chapter 1, implementation deci-
sions for the FiR 1 research reactor were made on 
14 YVL Guides which were deemed pertinent at 
the upcoming decommissioning phase. Based on 
the decisions, the management system of FiR 1 will 
be developed in many ways and annual reporting 
will be somewhat expanded. Radiation protec-
tion of the employees and monitoring of radiation 
exposure will be improved in preparation for the 
demolition phase. Performance of the emergency 
preparedness organisation during the permanent 
shutdown and decommissioning will be taken care 
of. Attention will be paid to criticality safety, moni-
toring condition of the nuclear fuel during the per-
manent shutdown and safety of transfers.
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Decommissioning and waste management
VTT submitted an updated nuclear waste manage-
ment plan for the research reactor to the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy in September 
2015. It was an update to the 2014 report, and it 
included all measures and further measures tak-
en after the preparation of the last report. Based 
on a request by the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, STUK submitted to the Ministry a 
statement on the VTT nuclear waste management 
report on 12 November 2015. In the statement, 
STUK emphasised preparation for risks pertaining 
to the returning of nuclear fuel and preparation of 
the six-year plan required by virtue of section 74 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree.
Nuclear safeguards
In nuclear safeguards, VTT’s material balance 
area and site cover the nuclear materials in the 
Otakaari 3 building and related activities. At the 
end of 2014, VTT submitted to the European Com-
mission the basic technical characteristics (BTC) of 
the Centre for Nuclear Safety, which is currently 
under construction. The plan is to move some of 
the nuclear materials to the Centre for Nuclear 
Safety. The Commission assigned the Centre for 
Nuclear Safety a new Material Balance Area code 
for nuclear material accountancy. In 2015, STUK 
reviewed VTT’s site declaration accordant to the 
Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement, 
reviewed together with the Commission the nucle-
ar material accountancy and approved the deputy 
nominated by VTT for the person responsible for 
nuclear safeguards.
2.6 Spent nuclear fuel encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility
In early 2015, STUK completed the processing of 
the documents submitted in connection with Posi-
va’s construction licence application for the nuclear 
waste facility. After the review, STUK prepared 
approving decisions on the documents laid down in 
section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. Further-
more, STUK prepared comprehensive inspection 
reports to support decisions on the preliminary 
safety analysis report and post closure safety case. 
In addition to the reviewed documents, results and 
related conclusions of STUK’s inspections during 
the processing of the construction licence applica-
tion were taken into account.
A statement and a safety assessment on the con-
struction licence application for the Posiva nuclear 
waste facility were prepared by STUK and a state-
ment on the construction licence application was 
requested from the Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Safety. Feedback given by the advisory committee 
was taken into account when finalising STUK’s 
statement and the safety assessment. STUK’s state-
ment, the safety assessment and the statement of 
the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety were 
submitted to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy on 12 February 2015.
In decisions related to the documents required 
in section 35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, STUK 
posed several requirements to Posiva. As a re-
sult of these requirements, several meetings with 
Posiva on the disposal facility, development of 
the long-term safety case and supervision of the 
manufacture of engineered barriers, for instance, 
were arranged over the course of the year. Posiva’s 
supplementary plans due to the requirements were 
discussed in these meetings. Furthermore, follow-
up meetings on quality management, construction 
planning and proving feasibility of the engineered 
barriers were arranged with Posiva.
In 2015, STUK submitted requests for addi-
tional information on system design of the Posiva 
nuclear waste facility. The requirements included 
in the decision on the preliminary safety analysis 
report were further specified in these requests. 
Issues pertaining to system design, such as system 
modifications and fault tolerance analyses, have 
been discussed on regular meetings with Posiva. 
Planning of the transport of spent nuclear fuel has 
also been discussed in the meetings with Posiva.
According to section 7 k of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, naming of the responsible manager of con-
struction and the persons responsible for ensuring 
of security, emergency preparedness arrangements 
and nuclear safeguards and their deputies requires 
that competence of the candidates and their depu-
ties has been assessed and STUK has approved 
them. In 2015, STUK arranged competence assess-
ment events for the people proposed by Posiva and 
approved the proposed people.
After submitting the statement and the safety 
assessment on the construction licence application, 
focus of STUK’s oversight project switched to the 
planning of oversight for the construction phase 
of Posiva’s nuclear waste facility. Oversight of con-
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struction will also take into account the issues for 
which further information was requested during 
the construction licence application phase. STUK 
started oversight of the construction of Posiva’s nu-
clear waste facility when Posiva received a construc-
tion licence from the Government on 12 November 
2015. Based on experiences obtained during the 
construction licence application phase, organisation 
of STUK’s oversight activities was changed to bet-
ter correspond to the construction supervision and 
inspection needs during construction of the facility.
When the construction licence was granted, 
STUK launched the construction inspection pro-
gramme. Inspections included in the programme 
assess the performance of Posiva’s management 
system, the sufficiency of procedures and their 
ability to guide design, manufacture, construction 
and installation operations, as well as the taking 
into account of safety requirements at different 
stages of the project. The programme aims at per-
forming around ten onsite inspections per year. The 
inspection focus areas will be determined every six 
months. The programme was launched in late 2015 
when the construction licence had been granted 
and two inspections were performed in 2015: an 
inspection of the monitoring of the disposal facil-
ity and a management inspection. One of the goals 
of these inspections was to assess readiness of the 
Posiva organisation to carry out the construction 
project. The inspections and their results, as well 
as the requirements by STUK, are described in 
more detail in Appendix 7. STUK also continued 
oversight and assessment of Posiva’s auditing ac-
tivities by participating in three supplier audits 
by Posiva in 2015. The regulatory oversight during 
the construction phase covers design, manufacture, 
construction and installation of the nuclear waste 
facility and its safety-classified systems, structures 
and components. The oversight also includes the 
nuclear waste facility’s commissioning phase, at 
which time STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations 
during commissioning, review test plans and test 
results, and perform commissioning inspections of 
components, structures and systems.
During the construction phase, Posiva will de-
velop its post closure safety case in compliance 
with STUK’s requirements. STUK will oversee and 
monitor development of the disposal facility and 
the post closure safety analysis, for example.
The focus of the development of the manage-
ment system will switch from design to implemen-
tation and preparation of commissioning. One of 
the goals as of 2015 is harmonizing the manage-
ment system procedures with the procedures of 
TVO where possible. This also applies to Posiva’s 
safety culture and its assessment and development. 
Posiva will close its safety culture programme and 
workgroup, and participate in the future in the 
Group-level (TVO–TVONS–Posiva) safety culture 
programme where annual organisation-specific ac-
tion programmes are developed. STUK has as-
sessed the implemented change and posed require-
ments about it to Posiva. Observations regarding 
the safety culture are discussed in more detail in 
Appendix 7.
In 2015, Posiva implemented two organisa-
tional changes. One of them was part of TVO’s re-
organisation. With the new organisational model, 
Posiva aims at improving the comprehensive moni-
toring of the nuclear facility project, particularly 
its development and links between plant projects. 
Furthermore, Posiva is planning to adopt a project-
centred approach to almost all of its operations. In 
order to assess Posiva’s new organisational struc-
ture, operating model and safety culture develop-
ment methods, STUK has required that Posiva 
submit to STUK updated personnel resource plans 
and project plans, the Group-level (TVO, TVONS 
and Posiva) safety culture assessment and develop-
ment action plan and Posiva’s action plan for 2016. 
Furthermore, STUK has requested that Posiva 
systematically update all management system 
guidelines that are affected by the organisational 
changes.
In 2015, Posiva has developed the security ar-
rangements in compliance with STUK’s require-
ments, which – in STUK’s opinion – has promoted 
Posiva’s security arrangement competence. STUK 
has assessed the security arrangement competence 
of the responsible manager for construction and 
approved the information security manager.
26
STUK-B 203
Oversight of the construction of 
the research facility (Onkalo)
Construction of underground facilities at Onkalo 
continued in the demonstration rooms and techni-
cal rooms. At the construction site above ground 
level, Posiva prepared construction of the encapsu-
lation plant and disposal facility, and constructed 
the next part of the hoisting device building. STUK 
approved rock engineering plans for the expansion 
of the technical rooms.
Construction of Onkalo was overseen with con-
struction site inspections and construction follow-
up meetings. Furthermore, STUK implemented its 
construction inspection programme for Onkalo un-
til the construction licence was granted. An inspec-
tion on disturbances caused by excavation, which 
was part of the programme, was held in June 2015.
Posiva is engaged in continuous development of 
the disposal system in the underground facilities. 
In connection with the design and implementation 
of the disposal facility, Posiva develops a rock clas-
sification system and related detailed modelling at 
the construction depth of rock structures. Posiva 
monitors disturbances caused by the excavated un-
derground rooms and assesses how the construction 
disturbances could influence post closure safety of 
disposal facility. The development, monitoring and 
assessment are included in the scope of STUK’s 
oversight activities. In 2015, these issues were 
monitored in construction follow-up meetings and 
by reviewing reports submitted by Posiva.
Nuclear safeguards
STUK has implemented nuclear safeguards of dis-
posal in compliance with the national regulatory 
plan. Finland is the first country in the world to 
implement safeguards of nuclear materials on a 
disposal facility, which is why STUK holds a key 
position in the future development and implemen-
tation of international safeguards of nuclear mate-
rials regarding geological repositories.
In November 2015, STUK, the Commission and 
the IAEA inspected the basic technical character-
istics of the future disposal facility in the research 
facility to verify that the facility has been built 
in compliance with the declaration. The EU Joint 
Research Centre (JRC/Ispra) assisted the IAEA 
and Commission by measuring and updating an in-
dependent 3D model of the research facility to use 
as the basis of future inspections by international 
organisations. Comparisons with previous meas-
urements to detect any changes were also made.
The international safeguard concept for dis-
posal has been developed in cooperation with the 
IAEA, the Commission and Posiva. In 2015, sev-
eral meetings on the oversight of the encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility were arranged between 
the IAEA, the Commission, STUK, Posiva, TVO 
and Fortum. Active interaction ensures that the 
safeguard activities planned by the international 
organisations can be implemented in practice at 
the Posiva facilities. The plan will be updated and 
maintained as plant design proceeds.
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3 Regulatory oversight of other 
forms of nuclear energy use
In addition to nuclear facilities, STUK’s oversight 
covers other uses of nuclear energy, such as the 
production of uranium, the possession of nuclear 
materials, as well as R&D activities pertaining to 
the nuclear fuel cycle.
Mining and mineral processing
In a sulphide mine at Talvivaara in Sotkamo, met-
als are separated by means of bioheapleaching, 
where uranium is dissolved from the ore in addition 
to other metals. Talvivaara Mining Company Plc 
prepared for the extraction of uranium by building 
a separate facility, but the commissioning of the 
facility has been delayed. A Government decision on 
a licence for the separation of uranium by virtue of 
the Nuclear Energy Act was appealed and the per-
mit is not legally valid. In 2015, a new company, Ter-
rafame Oy, started operations at Talvivaara. Terra-
fame has not applied for a new permit, which means 
that the commissioning of the uranium separation 
facility did not proceed at all in 2015.
A complaint about STUK’s oversight activities 
at Talvivaara was lodged with the Chancellor of 
Justice in 2015. STUK submitted a report about 
the case to the Office of the Chancellor of Justice. 
In its decision, the Chancellor of Justice stated 
that based on the submitted documents and taking 
into account the applied regulations, the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority was not guilty of 
any unlawful or erroneous procedures that would 
require action by the supreme guardian of law. 
The complaint did not lead to any action by the 
Chancellor of Justice.
Small amounts of uranium are being separated 
in the production processes of Freeport Cobalt Oy 
in Kokkola and Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy in 
Harjavalta. STUK has reviewed their inventory 
reports on the production of uranium.
In 2015, the IAEA requested in its annual 
oversight meeting additional information about 
the extraction of uranium at Talvivaara and the 
processing of ore concentrate that contains ura-
nium, originating in Greenland, in Finland. STUK 
provided the IAEA with the requested additional 
information and stated that nothing to declare 
took place at Talvivaara and the latter case did not 
involve ore concentrate falling under the oversight 
scope of safeguards.
Other inspections and approvals
According to the new Guide YVL D.1, all opera-
tors must prepare a nuclear material manual that 
includes instructions on the implementation of 
nuclear safeguards. In 2015, STUK processed 19 
manuals, of which 14 were approved to be taken 
into use. Some holders of a small amount of nucle-
ar materials abandoned their operations and the 
manual of one new holder of a small amount of nu-
clear material was not finished by the end of 2015. 
A couple of the operators have separate manuals 
on nuclear safeguards for nuclear materials and 
R&D activities, because they have separated these 
functions. The stakeholders have named respon-
sible persons for R&D activities pertaining to the 
nuclear fuel cycle, but STUK did not approve them 
because the operations are subject to a notice, i.e. a 
licence is not required.
Also operators with nuclear material inven-
tories in the Helsinki University Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry and the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority were inspected. No remarks were 
made in the inspections.
In 2015, STUK granted VTT and Platom Oy 
licences for the possession and transfer of nuclear 
information regarding the Fennovoima nuclear 
power plant. The Geological Survey of Finland was 
granted a licence for possession, processing, use 
and storage of nuclear materials.
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4 Safety research
grammes. The safety research programmes also 
have an important role in the training of organisa-
tions that provide STUK with technical support 
services, such as the VTT Technical Research Cen-
tre of Finland, the University of Helsinki, the Aalto 
University, the Geological Survey of Finland and 
Lappeenranta University of Technology.
The total volume of the four-year SAFIR re-
search programme that was concluded in 2014 was 
EUR 40 million and 279 man-years of research. 
More than a hundred experts from STUK, the pow-
er companies, research facilities and universities 
participated in the guidance of the programme. 
The programme created new analysis and meas-
uring methods and 1,244 publications on issues 
integral to the safety of nuclear energy. These is-
sues are: 1) humans, organisations and society, 2) 
I&C and control rooms, 3) fuel research and reac-
tor analysis, 4) thermal hydraulics, 5) severe ac-
cidents, 6) structural safety of reactor coolant sys-
tems, 7) structural engineering safety, 8) probabil-
istic risk assessment and 9) infrastructure. 
The programme’s concluding seminar was 
arranged in March 2015. 200 experts from 
eight countries participated in the seminar.
 The new SAFIR2018 safety re-
search programme consists of 33 projects 
that were selected in the autumn of 2014 
based on a competitive bidding. The avail-
able VYR funding for the research was 
around EUR 5 million. The total funding of 
the research programme was reduced from 
the previous year for two reasons: firstly, 
the plant power level in an update of the 
decision-in-principle for Fennovoima’s Han-
hikivi 1 nuclear power plant project in December 
2014 was lower than in the previous decision, 
which reduced the licensee’s VYR fund contribu-
tion by almost EUR 450,000, and secondly, re-
search facilities reduced their share to close to the 
Publicly funded safety research on the use of nu-
clear energy has a key role in the development 
and maintenance of nuclear technology expertise 
in Finland. The previous publicly funded four-year 
safety research programmes on the use of nuclear 
energy, SAFIR2014 and KYT2014, were competed 
and a new four-year nuclear safety programme, 
SAFIR2018, and a four-year nuclear waste man-
agement programme, KYT2018, were launched in 
2015.
Without safety programmes like SAFIR and 
KYT, developing the expertise needed to support 
the authorities would not be possible in Finland. 
According to the Nuclear Energy Act, research 
funded by the Finnish State Nuclear Waste Man-
agement Fund (VYR) aims at ensuring that the 
authorities have access to comprehensive nuclear 
expertise. Both STUK and the licensees have hired 
several people who have obtained their training 
for expert positions in the field of nuclear energy 
use and oversight in publicly funded research pro-
Figure 3. Research areas of SAFIR2018 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2015.
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required own contribution. Research projects used 
to be larger and the goal has been to create multi-
disciplinary projects to promote multidisciplinary 
cooperation and achievement of an overall idea 
of safety. Volume of the SAFIR2018 research pro-
gramme is EUR 8.2 million, which is divided into 
three areas as illustrated in the image: 1) overall 
safety and management of design, 2) reactor safety 
and 3) structural integrity and materials. VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland and Lap-
peenranta University of Technology (LUT) will use 
around 17% of the entire public funding for safety 
research when reforming the national infrastruc-
ture. The research programme covers all issues 
integral to nuclear safety, and it will create and 
maintain expertise, analysis methods and experi-
mental readiness to resolve any surprising safety 
issues.
When the SAFIR2018 research projects had 
been selected, six steering groups were established 
in the programme in addition to the three research 
areas. The steering groups take care of the academic 
control of research. Members of the supporting 
groups were named from organisations important 
to the research of the use of nuclear energy in the 
summer of 2015. The supporting groups are: 1) 
I&C, organisation and human factors, 2) severe ac-
cidents and research of risks, 3) reactors and fuel, 
4) thermal hydraulics, 5) structural integrity and 
6) research infrastructure. The supporting groups 
were named based on the research areas. All of the 
projects included in one support group are usually 
part of a single research area. An exception to this 
is the second support group, which includes both 
projects pertaining to the determination of plant 
design bases and projects developing safety analysis 
methods. The infrastructure support group oper-
ates in the SAFIR2018 safety research organisation 
alongside the research areas (Fig. 4).
The projects included in the SAFIR2018 pro-
Figure 4. The administrative structure of SAFIR2018 research programme.
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gramme for 2015 meet the requirements set for 
VYR-funded research. Special challenges of the 
research programme include the reduced fund-
ing and the large share of infrastructure funding. 
High-class research on the use of nuclear energy 
requires a modern architecture.
Projects of the SAFIR2018 research programme 
also enable participation in extensive international 
research projects and thus obtaining information 
about research in which we could not otherwise 
participate. In Finland, a publicly funded safety 
research programme has traditionally included 
international nuclear power plant safety research 
projects that are conducted by authorities in coop-
eration. The projects have been required to actively 
participate in implementation of research. This has 
been a solid principle. The 2015 projects include a 
new international research project for Finland. The 
Fukushima Daiichi accident of 2011 is studied in 
this project. The SAFIR2018 research programme 
also includes projects that are performed by 
Finnish laboratories with the help of international 
cooperation or with the help of international fund-
ing. Active participation in international research 
projects and conducting international experiments 
in Finland are good and important characteristics 
of the programme. Results of the SAFIR2018 re-
search programme are public and the programme 
also implements, in its part, the international 
programme approved by the IAEA general as-
sembly in September 2011 after the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear accident on global improvement of 
the safety of the use of nuclear energy (the IAEA 
Action Plan).
The Nuclear Energy Act was amended in 2015 in 
such a manner that for the next ten years, licensees 
are obligated to provide funding for the equipment 
in the hot chambers of VTT’s Centre for Nuclear 
Safety and rent subsidy for the Centre for Nuclear 
Safety in addition to the funding they provide 
for nuclear research projects. The annual charge 
to be paid to the Finnish State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund is EUR 570 for 2016–2020 and 
EUR 390 for 2021–2025 per one megawatt of rated 
thermal power given in the licence or one megawatt 
of the maximum thermal power given in a decision-
in-principle or, if a construction licence has been ap-
plied based on a decision-in-principle, per one mega-
watt of rated thermal power given in the licence 
application. Cancellation of the decision-in-principle 
for the Olkiluoto 4 nuclear power plant unit of TVO 
meant that volume of the SAFIR2018 research pro-
gramme would decrease by 24% from the 2015 level 
as of the beginning of 2016. The competitive bid-
ding for 2016 and the proposal for the projects to be 
funded in 2016 were planned taking these boundary 
conditions into account.
Final report of the KYT2014 research pro-
gramme was finalised in the spring of 2015. A 
total of 39 research projects were ongoing during 
the research period. They were either separate or 
new projects, or continuation for previous projects. 
21 projects were ongoing for the entire duration 
of the research period. Most of the research pro-
jects involved assessment of the safety of nuclear 
waste management. During the research period, 
the Finnish State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund allocated a total of around EUR 7 million for 
the research projects. Around EUR 1.7 million was 
used in research every year (Table 1).
Around 90% of the funding for nuclear waste 
management research went to safety research, and 
a little less than a half of this share was allocated 
to the subject matters of safety cases, performance 
of buffer and backfilling materials, and long-term 
durability of canisters. The funding share of alter-
Table 1. Distribution of VYR funding of KYT2014 research areas in 2011–2014.
Research area/1000 € 2011 2012 2013 2014
New and alternative technological solutions 120 117 120 123
Safety case 140 155 50 –
Performance of buffer and backfilling materials 350 400 410 410
Long-term durability of the canister 280 300 350 341
Other safety relevant research 725 630 707 783
Social science studies related to nuclear waste 
management
28 28 45
Total 1615 1630 1665 1702
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native technologies has remained at around 7% 
and the share of social science research at around 
2–3%.
During the research period (2011–2014), the 
research programme’s research projects published 
a total of 50 valuable publications (academic arti-
cles), 174 conference publications or work reports 
and 47 theses, of which six were doctoral theses. 
A summary of the publications is available in the 
final report of the KYT2014 programme. KYT2014 
programme’s concluding seminar was arranged in 
March 2015.
The four-year KYT2018 research programme 
was launched in 2015. The programme’s key re-
search areas are more or less the same as the 
KYT2014 programme. The programme consists of 
research issues important to national expertise. 
It aims at extensive coordinated research projects. 
Such have been formed particularly regarding the 
research areas of performance of buffer and back-
filling materials as well as the long-term durability 
of disposal canisters.
The KYT management group provided its fund-
ing recommendations for 2015 to the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy based on as-
sessments by the support groups, applicability 
of the subject matter and content of the research 
project. In 2015, the total funding of the KYT2018 
programme from the National Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund (VYR) is about EUR 1.9 mil-
lion. In 2015, the research programme provided 
funding for 29 research projects representing new 
and alternative technologies for nuclear waste 
management (2 projects), safety research on nu-
clear waste management (26 projects), and social 
nuclear waste management research (1 project). 
The most important coordinated research subjects 
were buffer and backfilling materials, long-term 
durability of canisters and microbiology. Due to 
the legislative reform aiming at funding VTT’s 
Centre for Nuclear Safety, annual funding for the 
KYT2018 programme will decrease to around EUR 
1.56 million per year for the remaining years.
Figure 5. Research areas of KYT2018 programme and their shares 
of the total funding in 2015.
Safety assessment
Buffer and backfill materials
Long-term durability of the canister
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5 Oversight of nuclear 
facilities in figures
5.1 Processing of documents
A total of 3,138 documents were submitted to STUK 
for processing in 2015. Of these, 926 concerned the 
nuclear power plant unit under construction and 
115 the disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel. The 
reviewing process of a total of 3,306 documents was 
completed, including documents submitted in 2015, 
those submitted earlier and licences granted by 
STUK by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act, which 
are listed in Appendix 8. The average document re-
view time was 122 days. The number of documents 
and their average review times in 2011–2015 are 
illustrated in Figure 6. Figures 7–10 illustrate the 
Figure 7. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 8. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the operating plant units of Olkiluoto.
Figure 9. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 6. Number of documents received and reviewed 
as well as average document review time.
Figure 10. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Posiva.
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review time distribution among documents from the 
various plant units and documents about Posiva.
5.2 Inspections at nuclear power plant 
sites and suppliers’ premises
Inspection programmes
A total of 21 inspections at the Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant and 21 at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
were carried out under the 2015 periodic inspec-
tion programme (Appendix 4). STUK carried out 
13 inspections within the Olkiluoto 3 construction 
inspection programme (Appendix 5) and six inspec-
tions pertaining to the processing of Fennovoima 
construction licence application (Appendix 6). Two 
inspections of the encapsulation plant and disposal 
facility construction inspection programme were 
carried out in 2015 (Appendix 7). The key findings of 
the inspections are presented in the appendices and 
the chapters on regulatory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 1,209 inspections onsite or at suppli-
ers’ premises were carried out in 2014 (other than 
the above-mentioned construction inspection pro-
gramme inspections and nuclear safeguards in-
spections, which are separately described). An in-
spection comprises one or more sub-inspections, 
such as a review of results, an inspection of com-
ponent or structure, a pressure or leak test, a func-
tional test or a commissioning inspection. Of the 
inspections, 270 were related to the regulatory 
oversight of the plant under construction and 939 
to that of the units in operation.
The number of inspection days on site and 
at component manufacturers’ premises totalled 
2,826. This number includes not only inspections 
pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants 
but also those associated with nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear safeguards as well as audits 
and inspections of the underground research facil-
ity at Olkiluoto. Four resident inspectors worked 
at Olkiluoto NPP and three resident inspectors 
at Loviisa NPP. The numbers of onsite inspection 
days in 2011−2015 are illustrated in Figure 11.
5.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to a charge, as well as op-
erations not subject to a charge. Basic operations 
subject to a charge mostly consisted of the regula-
tory oversight of nuclear power plants, with their 
costs charged to those subject to the oversight. 
Basic operations not subject to a charge included 
international and domestic cooperation, as well as 
emergency response operations and communica-
tions. Basic operations not subject to a charge are 
publicly funded. Overheads from the preparation 
of regulations and support functions (administra-
tion, development projects in support of regulatory 
activities, training, maintenance and development 
of expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
In 2015, the costs of the regulatory oversight of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were EUR 19.4 
million. The total costs of nuclear safety regulation 
were EUR 21.8 million. Thus, the share of activi-
ties subject to a charge was 89.0%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation in 
2015 was EUR 19.4 million. Of this, EUR 4.5 mil-
lion and EUR 10.2 million came from the inspec-
tion and review of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs, 
respectively. In addition to the operating units, the 
income from Olkiluoto NPP includes income de-
rived from the regulatory oversight of the Olkiluoto 
3 construction project. Costs arising from the over-
sight of the Fennovoima nuclear power plant pro-
ject amounted to EUR 1.6 million. The regulation 
of Posiva Oy’s operations yielded EUR 2.9 million. 
Figure 12 shows the annual income and costs from 
nuclear safety regulation in 2011−2015.
Figure 11. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises. Overtime work 
is not included.
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The time spent on the inspection and review 
of Loviisa nuclear power plant was 17.8  man-
years, i.e. 11.8% of the total working time of the 
Figure 12. Income and costs of nuclear safety 
regulation.
regulatory personnel. The time spent on the Olki-
luoto nuclear power plant’s operating units was 
16.9 man-years or 11.2% of the total working time. 
In addition to the monitoring of the operation of 
the NPPs, these figures include the safeguards of 
nuclear materials. The time spent on the inspec-
tion and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 23.9 man-years 
or 15.9% of the total working time. Work related 
to new NPP projects amounted to 6.2 man-years 
or 4.1% of the total working time. A total of 10.7 
man-years or 7.1% of the total working time was 
spent on inspection and review of Posiva’s opera-
tions, and that spent on the FiR 1 research reactor 
was 0.3 man-years. Figure 13 shows the division of 
working hours of the personnel engaged in nuclear 
safety oversight (in person-years) by subject of 
oversight during 2008–2015.
Where necessary, STUK commissions independ-
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Figure 13. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel by subject of 
oversightin 2008–2015. Until 2011 the nuclear waste management includes both the oversight of the 
operating nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management as well as the oversight of Posiva, since 
2012 only the oversight of Posiva. The oversight of the operating nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste 
management is combined with the oversight of the power plants.
Figure 14. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 15. The costs of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
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Table 2. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Basic operations subject to a charge 70.2 68.9 69.7 72.0 76.6
Basic operations not subject to a charge 8.8 5.6 5.0 3.5 2.6
Contracted services 1.7 2.2 1.6 2.9 2.8
Rule-making and support functions 43.0 46.3 45.3 41.8 42.2
Holidays and absences 24.7 24.7 25.1 25.3 26.4
Total 148.4 147.7 146.7 145.5 150.5
ent safety analyses and research in support of reg-
ulatory decision-making. Figures 14 and 15 illus-
trate the costs of such assignments in 2011–2015. 
Expenses in 2015 were mainly related to compara-
tive analysis, independent assessments and third-
party consultants’ inspection work concerning the 
unit under construction, as well as to assessment 
work concerning the safety documentation for dis-
posal of nuclear waste. 
Distribution of the annual working time of the 
nuclear safety regulation personnel to the various 
duty areas is shown in Table 2.
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6 International cooperation
International conventions
In February 2015, STUK participated in an extra-
ordinary diplomatic conference regarding a pro-
posal by Switzerland on amending the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety. The proposal involved taking 
into account the severe accidents management in 
the design of new nuclear power plants and modifi-
cations of already operating nuclear power plants. 
The actual Convention on Nuclear Safety could not 
be amended, but the diplomatic conference pre-
pared a declaration whose contents correspond to 
the proposal by Switzerland.
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent 
Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management requires that a report is pre-
sented every three years on how the obligations 
stated in the Convention are met. STUK’s ex-
perts presented Finland’s national report at the 
review meeting of  the Joint Convention in the 
spring of 2015. Most important issues in Finland 
over the course of the past three years have been 
the construction licence application for the spent 
nuclear fuel encapsulation and disposal facility, 
revision of the licence conditions for the Olkiluoto 
operational waste repository to enable the dis-
posal of small amounts of radioactive waste from 
the Government, and a comprehensive reform of 
STUK’s nuclear safety requirements.
The reviews for both the reports and the pres-
entations were positive and Finland received par-
ticular praise for proceeding with the disposal pro-
ject in stages and developing the expertise of the 
organisations participating in waste management. 
Observed challenges included disposal of specific 
high activity radiation sources and solutions per-
taining to the dismantling of a research reactor.
The plenary session of the review meeting fo-
cused on common safety issues that were raised 
in the country group sessions. More than fifty of 
such issues were identified. The following were 
deemed the most important: resources, participa-
tion of citizens and their positive attitude towards 
the waste management operations, provisions for 
waste management after an accident, and manag-
ing decommissioned sealed sources and historical 
waste. Other discussed issues included possible 
multinational disposal facilities and development 
of a nuclear waste convention review process. 
Furthermore, some modifications of guidelines 
were approved.
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was established upon the initiative of the 
United States nuclear safety authority (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, NRC). It involves fifteen 
countries with the objective of improving coopera-
tion in the field of the assessment of new nuclear 
power plants and developing convergent regula-
tory practices. In addition to the United States of 
America, the following countries participate in the 
programme: South Africa, India, United Kingdom, 
Japan, Canada, China, Korea, France, Sweden, 
Finland, Turkey, Russia and the United Arab 
Emirates. In 2015, Hungary joined the programme.
Participants in the programme include only 
those countries with new nuclear power plants at 
some stage of assessment by the regulatory au-
thorities. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency func-
tions as the secretariat for the programme. The 
MDEP’s work is organised in design-specific and 
issue-specific Nuclear Reactor Regulation working 
groups. In addition, the MDEP has a management 
group and a steering group. Petteri Tiippana, the 
Director General of STUK, is the chair of the man-
agement group.
There are five Design-Specific Working Groups: 
the EPR Working Group, the AP1000 Working 
Group, the APR1400 Working Group, the VVER 
Working Group and the ABWR Working Group. Of 
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these, STUK has participated in the EPR Working 
Group and the VVER Working Group, because an 
EPR plant is under construction at Olkiluoto (the 
Olkiluoto 3 project) and Fennovoima has submit-
ted a construction licence application on construc-
tion of a VVER plant in Pyhäjoki (the Hanhikivi 1 
project).
The MDEP Working Groups independent of 
plant design deal with the following three subjects: 
plant and plant supplier inspections and reviews, 
pressure equipment standards and programma-
ble I&C. STUK participated in the activities of all 
three Issue-Specific Working Groups.
Cooperation within the IAEA
IAEA continued with the revision of its regula-
tory guides on nuclear safety and the utilisation 
of radiation, which started in 2009. STUK had 
representatives on the Commission on Safety 
Standards (CSS) managing the preparation of the 
regulatory guides as well as in the committees 
dealing with the content of the regulatory guides, 
i.e. the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee 
(NUSSC), the Waste Safety Standards Committee 
(WASSC), the Radiation Safety Standards Com-
mittee (RASSC), the Nuclear Security Guidance 
Committee (NSGC), the Transport Safety Stand-
ards Committee (TRANSSC) and the Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Standards Committee 
(EPReSC). By working in the committees, STUK 
actively participated in development of IAEA’s 
guides. STUK held presentations regarding appli-
cation of the IAEA guides in the Finnish regu-
lations at both the NUSCC and the WASSC. In 
addition to the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance 
Committee (NSGC), an expert of STUK was named 
in the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security to 
the Director General of the IAEA (AdSec) for the 
term 2013–2015.
Representatives of STUK were included in ex-
pert groups summoned by the IAEA; the groups 
reviewed the regulatory authorities’ operations 
in Switzerland, India, Slovakia and Hungary, and 
participated in international peer reviews of secu-
rity arrangements in Japan and Canada.
IAEA’s International Training Course on the 
Preventive and Protective Measures against 
Insider Threat was arranged in Finland. STUK 
hosted the course and acted as the trainer.
Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for cooperation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main 
committees’ fields of activity are:
•	Nuclear	safety	regulation	(CNRA,	Committee	on	
Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	Safety	research	(CSNI,	Committee	on	the	Safety	
of Nuclear Installations)
•	Radiation	safety	(CRPPH,	Committee	on	Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	Nuclear	waste	management	 (RWMC,	Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee).
In September, STUK arranged in Helsinki in coop-
eration with the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy and the NEA/RWMC an international 
meeting on challenges faced by authorities in the 
disposal of nuclear waste. More than seventy peo-
ple participated in the meeting. These included 
representatives of advanced countries and coun-
tries that are just planning their projects. Finnish 
nuclear waste management was well represented 
in the meeting agenda.
Cooperation within the EU
WENRA
STUK actively participated in the work of 
WENRA’s Reactor Harmonisation Working Group 
(RHWG) and Working Group on Waste and 
Decommissioning (WGWD) in 2015. WENRA pub-
lished new reference levels, updated based on les-
sons learned from the Fukushima accident, in late 
2014. In 2015, STUK conducted a self-assessment 
on coverage of national regulations when it comes 
to the reference levels and prepared a national 
plan on implementation of missing reference lev-
els. Over the course of the year, WGWD finalised a 
reference level report regarding decommissioning, 
started self-assessments and peer assessments of 
disposal reference levels, and started the prepara-
tion of a reference level report for nuclear waste 
treatment facilities.
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ENSRA
STUK participated in one meeting of the European 
Nuclear Security Regulators’ Association (ENSRA).
ENSREG
STUK participated in the activities of the European 
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and 
in three of its subgroups (nuclear safety, nucle-
ar waste management and communication). In 
July 2015, STUK prepared and submitted to the 
European Commission a report on compliance with 
the Nuclear Waste Directive and participated, with 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, in 
preparation of a national programme for manage-
ment of spent nuclear fuel and other forms of ra-
dioactive waste.
As a result of the Fukushima accident, the EU 
launched stress tests for existing nuclear power 
plants and for those under construction. The pur-
pose of these tests was to establish how the NPPs 
would cope with exceptional external events and 
other situations associated with the simultaneous 
loss of operability of several safety systems. In late 
2014, STUK updated the national action plan of 
Finland, which was reviewed by a review meet-
ing arranged by the ENSREG in Brussels in April 
2015.
Bilateral cooperation
STUK started regular cooperation with the French 
nuclear safety authority Autorité de Sûreté 
Nucléaire (ASN) and its support organisation 
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire 
(IRSN) when the Olkiluoto 3 project was launched 
in the early 2000s. Regulatory practices and statu-
tory requirements of the countries have been com-
pared, and challenges and problems pertaining to 
the EPR plants under construction in both coun-
tries (Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3) have been 
discussed.
Cooperation with the Russian nuclear safety 
authority Rostechnadzor (RTN) regarding safe-
ty assessments of AES2006-type VVER plants 
(Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 as well as units 1 and 2 
of the Leningrad 2 nuclear power plant in Russia, 
for instance) has also been started. In 2015, a 
meeting was held where RTN presented results of 
an assessment of the construction and operating 
licence for the new units in Leningrad and STUK 
presented results of the decision-in-principle phase 
safety assessment for Hanhikivi 1. Furthermore, 
events have been arranged with RTN where local 
inspection activities at the units under construc-
tion in both countries have been studied.
The Hungarian radiation and nuclear safety 
authority HAEA has also started preparation for 
a safety assessment of an AES-2006 nuclear power 
plant (PAKS-2 plant). In 2015, the necessary pre-
requisites for bilateral cooperation between STUK 
and the HAEA were achieved. STUK also agreed 
on starting cooperation with the Turkish nuclear 
safety authority TAEK.
STUK-B 203
39
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted Approx. 1,600 (net) Pressurized water reactor (PWR),
 17 Feb 2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and  
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 520/496 Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 520/496 Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
APPENDIX 1 Objects of regulation
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Plant Supplemented  Nominal electric power, Type,
unit Decision-In-Principle approved net (MW) supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014  Approx. 1200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR),
    ROSATOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
Hanhikivi nuclear facility project 
Olkiluoto encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility
In November 2015, the 
Government granted Posiva 
a construction licence for 
the Olkiluoto encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility. 
The planned facility consists 
of a surface facility for the 
encapsulation of spent nuclear 
fuel, an underground disposal 
facility, and supporting build-
ings. Posiva has already built 
an access tunnel, three shafts 
and a technical facility and 
research area at a depth of 
420–437 metres as parts of 
the underground research facility Onkalo. For the 
actual disposal facility, the underground facility 
will be expanded by two additional shafts and the 
disposal tunnels that will be excavated in stages. 
The construction of an underground research 
facility was a prerequisite for granting a construc-
Diagram of the encapsulation and disposal facility in Olkiluoto (Posiva Oy).
tion licence. Onkalo will provide an opportunity 
for more detailed study of the rock volumes best 
suited for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, and 
allow for the testing of disposal facility construc-
tion methods and installation of the disposal 
system components.
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APPENDIX 1 Objects Of regulatiOn
FiR 1 research reactor
Other uses of nuclear energy
The regulation also applies to mining and any 
preparation of ore aiming at obtaining uranium or 
thorium. Such operations are practiced at the pro-
duction plants of Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy and 
Freepoint Cobalt Oy. A planned uranium prepara-
tion plant at Talvivaara is also part of this regula-
tory group. There are small amounts of regulated 
materials at some laboratories. The regulation also 
applies to nuclear equipment, systems and nuclear 
information as well as nuclear fuel cycle research 
and development activities and the transport of 
nuclear materials and nuclear waste.
Facility Thermal power In operation Fuel TRIGA-reaktorin
    polttoainetyyppi
TRIGA Mark II 250 kW March 1962– Reactor core consists Uranium–zirkonium-
research reactor  June 2015 of 80 fuel rods which hybrid combination:
   contain 15 kg of uranium 8% uranium
    91% zirkonium and 
    1% hydrogen
The FiR 1 research reactor, operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, was commissioned in  
March 1962. VTT stopped using the reactor in June 2015 and placed in permanent shutdown. VTT is prepar-
ing an application on revising the reactor operating licence.
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Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operation 
of nuclear power plants. The power companies and 
STUK evaluate and oversee the safety and op-
eration of the plants in many ways. Along with in-
spections and safety assessments, indicators are a 
method of acquiring information on the safety level 
of the NPPs and on any changes to the safety level.
The objective of the indicator system is to recog-
nise changes in plant safety as early on as possible. 
If the indicators weaken, the underlying factors 
influencing the development must be determined 
and changes to plant operation and STUK’s over-
sight of the area must be considered. Indicators 
can also be used to monitor the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of corrective measures. Furthermore, the 
information yielded by the indicators is used when 
communicating nuclear safety.
In the indicator system, nuclear safety is divided 
into three sectors: 1) operation and maintenance, 
2) operational events and 3) structural integrity. 
STUK began the development of its own indicator 
system in 1995. Since 2006, indicator information 
has been managed in STUK’s INDI (INdicator 
DIsplay) information system. Nominated STUK 
representatives are responsible for the mainte-
nance and analysis of the indicators. Individual 
indicators, their maintenance procedures and the 
interpretation of results are presented at the end 
of this summary. A brief summary of the safety sta-
tus of each plant in 2015 is given below, followed by 
detailed results by indicator.
Nuclear safety
A.I Operation and maintenance of 
a nuclear facility A.II Operational events A.III Structural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events 1. Fuel integrity
2. Exemptions and deviations from 
the Operational Limits and 
Conditions
3. Risk-significance of events
2. Primary and secondary circuits 
integrity
3. Unavailability of safety systems 4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
3. Containment integrity
4. Occupational radiation doses
5. Number of fire alarms5. Radioactive releases
6. Investments in facilities
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Results of the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2015
Summary of indicator results for Loviisa NPP
Total number of maintenance tasks on components 
subject to the OLC (+6.2%), preventive mainte-
nance (+3.5%) and fault repairs (+22.9%) have all 
slightly increased from the previous years. Even 
though the number of fault repairs has increased 
relatively the most, the ratio between preventive 
maintenance and fault repairs (5.4) still indicates 
that the share of preventive maintenance of all 
maintenance work has remained high. Faults in 
components subject to the OLC that are important 
to safety and the number of operation restrictions 
due to such faults have remained at the same level 
as in the previous years. In the case of potential 
common-cause failures, one potential operational 
event was identified at the Loviisa power plant in 
2015. It involved relays in safety class 2 rectifiers 
where software common-cause failure could not be 
completely ruled out. The number of faults result-
ing in production losses remained low, as in the 
previous years. Detection and anticipation of faults 
have been continuously improved in the mainte-
nance operations of Loviisa nuclear power plant 
and components have been replaced, which is why 
there have been no faults that have a major impact 
on the safe operation of the plants. The average 
repair times of faults causing inoperability of com-
ponents subject to the OLC have become shorter, 
i.e. the development has been positive. The power 
company still needs pay attention to having the 
necessary resources available for fault repairs, and 
to carrying out the repairs without unnecessary 
delays. Based on the indicators, ageing manage-
ment and component maintenance at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant have been functional and the 
development measures taken have been correct.
The main purpose of the OLC exemption proce-
dure is to enable modifications and maintenance 
that will improve safety and plant availability with 
the approval of STUK. In 2015, the Loviisa NPP 
submitted six exemption applications to STUK 
for approval. This is a normal number of applica-
tions. Furthermore, the plant was in a state that 
was non-compliant with the OLC five times in 
2015. These events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3. They were isolated events and their 
Operation and maintenance are assessed on 
the basis of information concerning the radiation 
protection and the operation and maintenance of 
the plant. The operation and maintenance of the 
plant is monitored using the failure and mainte-
nance data for the components with an effect on 
the safe operation of the plant, as well as by moni-
toring compliance with the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC). The success of radiation protec-
tion is monitored on the basis of the employees’ 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment. Attention is also paid to investments 
to improve the plant and to the up-to-dateness of 
the plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational events 
are used to monitor special situations and signifi-
cant disturbances at the plant. Special situations 
include events with an effect on the safety of the 
plant, the personnel or the environment. A spe-
cial report is required for any special situations. 
Correspondingly, a transient report must be pre-
pared for any significant disturbances occurring 
at a plant unit. Such transients include reactor 
and turbine trips, and other operational transients 
leading to a forced reduction of more than 5% in 
the reactor power or average gross power. Risk 
indicators are used to monitor the safety effect of 
component unavailability and development of the 
plant’s risk level. The results provide insight into 
the operational activities at the plant and the effi-
ciency of the operating experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and sec-
ondary circuits, and the containment. The integrity 
must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control the integrity of the 
reactor coolant system and the secondary circuit. 
The monitoring is done by indices depicting the 
maintenance of water chemistry and by following 
selected corrosive impurities and corrosion prod-
ucts. Integrity of the containment is monitored by 
testing the leak tightness of isolation valves, pen-
etrations and air locks.
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safety significance was low. Fortum has prepared 
operating experience reports regarding the events 
and determined corrective measures.
In the STUK indicator system, the functional-
ity of safety systems is monitored on the basis of 
the unavailability of the high-pressure safety in-
jection system, emergency feedwater system and 
emergency diesel generators. As in previous years, 
condition and availability of the emergency feed-
water systems were high in 2015. Availability of 
the emergency diesel generators slightly improved 
from the previous years and remained at an ac-
ceptable level.
The main part of the radiation doses is received 
during outages. Due to improvements in radia-
tion safety, the radiation doses of employees have 
decreased, and the collective occupational dose in 
2015 was the lowest ever recorded. The radiation 
doses for employees at the Loviisa NPP remained 
below the individual dose limits. In 2015, the aver-
age of the ten largest doses was clearly lower than 
the average for the previous years. The threshold 
set for the collective occupational dose was not ex-
ceeded either. In 2015, radioactive releases into the 
air and water from the Loviisa NPP were slightly 
smaller than in the previous years. The releases re-
mained clearly below the limits set. Assessment of 
the radiation dose of the most exposed individual 
in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant is based on 
information about the NPP’s releases and mete-
orological measurements. The exposure routes that 
are taken into account include external radiation 
and internal radiation, i.e. radiation caused by ra-
dioactive materials ending up inside the body via 
air or food. In 2015, the radiation doses of the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity of the Loviisa 
NPP were normal. The radiation doses were less 
than 0.1% of the limit set in the Government 
Decree (100 µSv). According to the indicators, 
radiation safety is good and being developed in a 
determined manner.
Operational events
No reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant in 2015. The number of transient re-
ports remained at the normal level (3). The num-
ber of events warranting a special report slightly 
increased (5), but the safety significance of the 
events was low. The NPP submitted a total of 13 
operational event reports in compliance with the 
new Guide YVL A.10. In addition to special reports 
and transient reports, these reports include other 
plant events submitted to STUK for information.
The indicator for risk-significance of component 
unavailability is an increase of the conditional core 
damage probability (CCDP) in connection with 
each event. In 2015, this indicator was of the same 
magnitude as in the previous year when taking 
into account events that are most significant in 
terms of the risk. The number of risks due to opera-
tional activities has continued to decrease over the 
past four years, however.
Loviisa NPP’s accident risk has continued to 
decrease over the last ten years, and new risk fac-
tors, discovered as the scope of the PRA has been 
extended, have been efficiently eliminated. At the 
end of 2015, the annual probability of core dam-
age at Loviisa 1, calculated with the PRA model, 
was 26% lower than in 2014, and the annual 
probability of core damage at Loviisa 2 was 20% 
lower than in 2014. The difference between the 
plant units’ risk assessments is due to differences 
in ventilation and air conditioning systems that 
contain safety systems, for example. The risk has 
decreased from the previous year mainly because 
of new cooling towers that were commissioned in 
2015. They allow for the removal of residual heat 
in the long term also if seawater cooling is lost. No 
events classified as fires occurred at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant in 2015. The rescue personnel 
had one assignment in the parking area, which is 
located outside the actual power plant area: they 
had to extinguish a smouldering passenger vehicle. 
The number of fire detection system faults at the 
Loviisa NPP has remained at the same level for 
the past ten years.
Structural integrity
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of the 
Loviisa units in 2015, which means that the maxi-
mum iodine (I-131) activity value of the primary 
coolant remained low. In the past few years, the 
chemistry index has also remained at a good level 
at the Loviisa plant units. In 2015, the maximum 
Co-60 activity levels associated with shutdowns 
were around the same as in the previous years, 
which indicates successful compliance with the 
ALARA principle. All of the chemistry indicators 
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show that the integrity of the reactor coolant sys-
tems at the Loviisa plant units was good in 2015.
Integrity of the containment has remained good 
at both plant units. Total leakage of the outer isola-
tion valves has remained the same as before and 
the total as-found leakage rate has remained clearly 
below the set limit at both plant units. Furthermore, 
the number of isolation valves that passed the leak 
test at first attempt has increased in both plant 
units. Overall as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations and airlocks is low at both plant units.
According to the indicators, the plant’s fuel, pri-
mary circuit and containment integrity are good.
Summary of indicator results for Olkiluoto NPP
Operation and maintenance
In 2015, the number of fault repairs that caused 
inoperability of components remained at the same 
level as in the previous years. The number of pre-
ventive maintenance operations somewhat in-
creased at Olkiluoto 1 and decreased by half at 
Olkiluoto 2. Based on the development of the ratio 
of preventive maintenance work to fault repairs 
and an assessment of the work on which the fig-
ures are based, the maintenance strategy can be 
considered successful even though the value for 
2015 at Olkiluoto 2 was the lowest in the past few 
years (0.65). The number of faults occurring during 
load operation that cause unavailability of compo-
nents subject to the operational limits and condi-
tions (OLC) remained at around the 2014 level in 
2015. The unavailability times of OLC components 
were short. At OL1, the number of immediate oper-
ation restrictions and operation restrictions start-
ing at the beginning of the repair work remained 
at the same level as in the previous years. When 
compared to 2014, immediate operations restric-
tions decreased by half at Olkiluoto 1 but increased 
at Olkiluoto 2. The observed faults in OLC compo-
nents did not occur in a particular system alone. In 
2015, the average repair time of failures causing 
the unavailability of components subject to the op-
erational limits and conditions (OLC) was around 
seven hours at both plant units. This is around the 
long-term average and at around the same level as 
in the previous years. Based on the 2015 indicators 
and the data on which they are based, ageing man-
agement, maintenance and fault repairs of compo-
nents important to safety at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant have been appropriate.
The main purpose of the OLC exemption proce-
dure is to enable modifications and maintenance 
that will improve safety and plant availability 
with the approval of STUK. In 2015, TVO sub-
mitted seven exemption applications to STUK 
for approval. This is a normal number of applica-
tions. Furthermore, the plant was in a state that 
was non-compliant with the OLC five times in 
2015. These events are described in more detail in 
Appendix 3. TVO has submitted operational event 
reports regarding all the events to STUK for ap-
proval. In these reports, the causes of the events 
are analysed and corrective measures are deter-
mined. Unintentional deviations from the OLC did 
not compromise nuclear or radiation safety.
Functionality of safety systems is monitored on 
the basis of the unavailability of the containment 
spray system, the auxiliary feedwater system and 
the emergency diesel generators. The condition and 
availability of safety injection systems and emer-
gency diesel generators were good in 2015.
Radiation doses received by employees and 
releases into the environment remained low and 
clearly below the limits set in official regulations. 
The collective occupational dose of the employ-
ees of Olkiluoto NPP was higher in 2015 than in 
2012–2014, but lower than the prevailing level 
before 2012. In 2015, the average of the ten largest 
doses was the second lowest ever recorded during 
the operation of the plant. The radiation doses 
have clearly decreased after the installation of 
new moisture separators in 2005–2007. The radia-
tion level in the turbine buildings has continued 
to decrease after the installation of the moisture 
separators, which has also decreased the collective 
occupational dose. Furthermore, improvements 
aiming at reducing the employees’ radiation doses 
have also been made in radiation protection of the 
NPP.
The releases of substances with gamma activ-
ity into the sea from Olkiluoto have decreased in 
recent years. In 2015, releases of radioactive mate-
rials into the air were of the same magnitude as in 
the preceding years. Releases into the environment 
were low, well below the set limits. Assessment of 
the radiation dose of the most exposed individual 
in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant is based on 
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information about the NPP’s releases and mete-
orological measurements. The exposure routes that 
are taken into account include external radiation 
and internal radiation, i.e. radiation caused by ra-
dioactive materials ending up inside the body via 
air or food. In 2015, the radiation doses of the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto 
NPP were normal. The radiation doses were less 
than 0.1% of the limit set in the Government 
Decree (100 µSv). Based on the indicators, radia-
tion safety at Olkiluoto has been appropriately ar-
ranged.
Operational events
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant in 2015. The plant submitted a total of 
five transient reports, which is a normal amount. 
The number of events warranting a special re-
port slightly increased (5), returning to the level 
of 2012. The most important events are described 
in Appendix 3. TVO analysed the events and de-
fined corrective measures to prevent recurrence 
of the events. The NPP submitted a total of 18 op-
erational event reports in compliance with the new 
Guide YVL A.10. In addition to special reports and 
transient reports, these reports include other plant 
events submitted to STUK for information.
The indicator for risk-significance of component 
unavailability is an increase of the conditional core 
damage probability (CCDP) in connection with 
each event. In 2015, this indicator for the Olkiluoto 
plant units was slightly higher than in the previ-
ous years when taking into account events that are 
most significant in terms of the risk. In addition to 
preventive maintenance of diesel generators, key 
issues were single failures in the core spray system 
323 and the emergency feedwater system 327. The 
number of risks due to operational activities re-
mained at around the same level as in the previous 
years, however.
Accident risk was around the same as in 2014 for 
both of the Olkiluoto plant units. The minor changes 
in core damage frequency are due to specifications 
made in the PRA models and updated reliability 
information. The difference between the plant units 
is mainly caused by the fact that Olkiluoto 1 under-
went modifications in 2014 that ensured operability 
of the auxiliary feedwater system, which is used 
to cool the reactor, in case seawater cooling is lost 
because of a blockage at the seawater intake or com-
ponent failures. Such modifications have not been 
implemented at Olkiluoto 2 yet.
No events classified as fires occurred at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (OL1/OL2) in 2015.
Three events classified as fires occurred out-
side the plant area, at the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit 
construction site. The fire events were minor and 
the fires could be extinguished with a dry powder 
extinguisher.
No fire detection system faults were observed 
at the Olkiluoto NPP (OL1/OL2) in 2015. Correct 
alarms of the fire detection system have remained 
at a fairly low level over the past ten years.
Structural integrity
Based on water chemistry indicators, integrity of 
the reactor coolant systems at the Olkiluoto plant 
units was good in 2015. There were no leaking fuel 
assemblies in the reactors of Olkiluoto 1 and Olki-
luoto 2 in 2015. This is reflected in the fact that 
the maximum iodine (I-131) activity value of the 
primary coolant has reduced at Olkiluoto 1 since 
2011 and at Olkiluoto 2 since 2014. The impurity 
and corrosion product levels in reactor water and 
feedwater remained below the OLC limits at both 
plant units. In 2015, the chemistry index for Olki-
luoto 1 was the best possible or 1. The chemistry 
index at Olkiluoto 2 was higher due to a condens-
er seawater leak. The plant units’ reactor water 
iron, sulphate and chloride contents were normal 
in 2015. There were no essential changes in the 
Co-60 activity concentration which is connected to 
shutdowns when compared to previous years. This 
indicates successful compliance with the ALARA 
principle.
The reactor coolant system was relatively 
leak-proof during the 2014–2015 fuel cycle. At 
Olkiluoto  1, controlled and unidentified leaks re-
mained at the low level of the previous years. The 
level was higher at Olkiluoto 2 in 2014 and 2015. 
The number of unidentified leaks in the primary 
circuit decreased to around half of the 2014 level 
at Olkiluoto 2, however. The ratio of the largest 
daily leak volume within the containment to the 
maximum leakage allowed in the OLC was low at 
both plant units, as in the previous years (0.7% 
and 2.3%). The total as-found leakages of outer iso-
lation valves at both plant units remained clearly 
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below the limit set in the OLC. The percentage of 
isolation valves that passed the leak test at first 
attempt has remained high for both plant units. 
Total as-found leakage rate of penetrations (such 
as personnel airlocks) has remained low at both 
plant units.
According to the indicators, the plant’s fuel, pri-
mary circuit and containment integrity are good.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Operation and maintenance
A.I.1 Faults and repairing them
A.I.1a Faults in components subject to the OLC
Definition
The number of faults causing the unavailability of 
components during load operation defined in the 
operational limits and conditions (OLC) is moni-
tored as an indicator. The faults are divided by 
plant unit into two groups: faults causing an im-
mediate operation restriction, and faults causing 
an operation restriction in connection with repair 
work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and the operational documents of NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to assess nuclear power plant 
lifecycle management and development of the con-
dition of components.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Petri Vastamäki (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The total number of faults causing an operation 
restriction of components subject to the OLC in 
2015 was 186. The average number of faults during 
the four previous years was 167, which means that 
there was no significant change in the number of 
faults in 2015 or in the fault trend.
The number of faults per year remained stable. 
Any variation therein has been caused by the ran-
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on plant safety, and the management of component 
availability has been successful.
Based on the above, it can be stated that the 
indicator or the underlying fault data do not show 
any significant negative effects associated with the 
ageing of the facilities, which is an indication of 
well-functioning component lifecycle management 
and component maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of faults occurring during load opera-
tion and causing the unavailability of components 
subject to the OLC has been increasing since 2009. 
In 2011, the number of faults was nearly double 
the number of faults in 2009. In 2012, the number 
of faults decreased back to the level of 2010, and 
the number of faults did not change in 2013 or 
2014. According to this indicator, the year 2015 
was similar to the year 2014. The number of faults 
indicates that maintenance has been successful.
The unavailability times of OLC components 
in OL1 during all four quarters of 2015 were brief. 
Number of faults leading to an immediate opera-
tion restriction at OL1 somewhat decreased from 
2014.
In OL2, most of the unavailability times of OLC 
components were brief in 2015. Furthermore, the 
observed faults in OLC components did not occur 
in a particular system alone.
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A.I.1b Maintenance of components 
subject to the OLC
Definition
The indicator is used to follow the number of fault 
repairs and preventive maintenance work orders 
for components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) by plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the NPP work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
operations and fault repairs are retrieved.
Purpose
The indicator describes the volumes of fault repairs 
and preventive maintenance, and illustrates the 
condition of the NPP and its maintenance strategy. 
The indicator is used to assess the maintenance 
strategy implemented at the NPP.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Petri Vastamäki (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When considering the annual variation in the vol-
ume of fault repairs and particularly in the num-
ber of preventive maintenance jobs, the scheduling 
of various annual outages (refuelling outage, short 
annual outage, four-year annual outage, eight-year 
annual outage) included in the maintenance strat-
egy of the Loviisa NPP during a four-year cycle 
should be considered, since it can have a significant 
impact on the annual figures. In 2015, a short an-
nual outage (a refuelling outage) was implemented 
at both LO1 and LO2.
According to the data on which the indicator is 
based, the year 2015 showed no major deviation 
from the average numbers of fault repairs and pre-
ventive maintenance volumes of the four previous 
years. In 2015, the number of maintenance tasks 
on components subject to the OLC was 6.2% higher 
than the average. The volume of preventive main-
tenance was 3.5% higher than the average, and the 
number of fault repairs 22.9% higher.
The ratio of preventive maintenance to fault 
repairs was 5.4. The ratio is 16.4% lower than 
the 6.4 average of the four previous years, which 
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means that the share of preventive maintenance of 
all maintenance work has remained at almost the 
same level as in the previous years.
The large share of preventive maintenance 
operations reflects the selected maintenance strat-
egy, the purpose of which is to keep the number of 
faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level.
The large share of preventive maintenance 
operations reflects the selected maintenance strat-
egy, the purpose of which is to keep the number of 
faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of maintenance works causing inop-
erability of components, included in the indicator, 
decreased in 2007–2009 due to the lower number 
of fault repairs. In 2010, the number of faults re-
paired increased while the number of preventive 
maintenance operations decreased.
In 2015, the number of fault repairs that caused 
inoperability of components remained at the level 
of 2011–2014. The number of preventive mainte-
nance tasks slightly increased, improving the ratio 
of preventive maintenance and fault repairs from 
2011. The number of faults repaired at OL2 some-
what increased and the relative number of preven-
tive maintenance tasks also increased more than 
at OL1, and thus the maintenance ratio increased 
to 1.7 at OL1 and decreased to 0.65 at OL2. This is 
close to the values of 2010 and 2011.
Based on the development of the ratio of pre-
ventive maintenance work to fault repairs and an 
assessment of the work on which the figures are 
based, the maintenance strategy can be considered 
successful.
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A.I.1c Repair times of components 
subjectto the OLC
Definition
As an indicator, the average repair time of faults 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the operational limits and conditions (OLC) is 
monitored. With each repair, the time recorded is 
the time of inoperability. In the case of a fault that 
causes an immediate operation restriction, it is cal-
culated from the detection of the fault to the end of 
the repair work. If the component is operable until 
the beginning of repairs, only the time it takes to 
complete the repairs is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the nuclear power plants 
work order systems as well as maintenance and 
operation documentation.
Purpose
The indicator shows how quickly failed components 
subject to the OLC are repaired when compared to 
the repair time allowed in the OLC. The indicator 
is used to assess the strategy, resources and effec-
tiveness of NPP maintenance.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Petri Vastamäki (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The OLC define the maximum allowed repair times 
for components based on the components’ safety 
significance. The times vary from four hours to 21 
days. Furthermore, faults in OLC components are to 
be repaired within the allotted time without undue 
delay.
Due to the small amount of work requiring 
operation restrictions and the varying allowed 
repair times, an individual operation may have a 
significant effect on the indicator, even if it is com-
pleted within the allotted time. This aspect of the 
indicator is taken into account in the interpreta-
tion of the indicator by evaluating the significance 
of individual long-term fault repairs in terms of 
maintenance strategy, resources and efficiency of 
operations.
The average repair times of faults causing 
unavailability of components have remained stable 
at the Loviisa NPP for several years. In 2015, the 
average repair time for the plant units was 14.5 
hours, while the average of the four previous years 
was 21.8.
Based on the 2015 indicators and the underlying 
data, the plant’s maintenance operations can be con-
sidered appropriate. Despite the positive develop-
ment in repair times, attention still needs to be paid 
to the NPP’s maintenance on having the necessary 
resources available for fault repairs, and for carry-
ing out the repairs without unnecessary delays.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The indicator is used to monitor the repair times 
of components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC). The repair time allowed in 
the OLC is usually 30 days for faults concerning 
one train and three days for faults concerning two 
trains. Depending on the system and the compo-
nent, other allowed repair times may also be de-
fined in the OLC.
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In the long term, the average repair time has 
varied between six to ten hours. In 2015, the aver-
age repair time of faults causing inoperability of 
components subject to the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC) at OL1 was around 10 h and at 
OL2 around 7 h. In the case of both plant units, 
the average repair time of faults causing inoper-
ability of components subject to the OLC was at 
around the same level as in the previous years, 
even though the time decreased to the level of 2013 
at OL1.
On the basis of the 2015 indicators and the un-
derlying data, the NPP’s maintenance operations 
were appropriate.
A.I.1d Common-cause failure
Definition
As the indicator, the number of common-cause fail-
ures of components or systems defined in the op-
erational limits and conditions (OLC) is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the power companies of works causing an opera-
tion restriction.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the quality of main-
tenance.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Simo Verta (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When a fault is observed in a safety-critical sys-
tem, component or structure in connection with 
maintenance, inservice testing or other monitor-
ing operations, the corrective measures include an 
investigation of whether the fault is a single fault, 
or whether there might be other similar faults in 
the system. One potential operational event was 
identified at the Loviisa power plant in 2015. It 
involved relays in safety class 2 LARA rectifiers 
where software common-cause failure could not be 
completely ruled out.
Olkiluoto
Four common-cause failures were identified at 
Olkiluoto in 2015. Safety significance of all the 
identified common-cause failures was low.
A failure in a shared cooler of a pressurised 
nitrogen system caused the failure of two compres-
sors. Pressurised nitrogen to achieve the safety 
function was still available from a backup system, 
which means that the failure did not have any 
safety significance.
Two minimum flow valves in the turbine island 
feedwater system failed because of failures in elec-
tric winding. The minimum flow valves are needed 
when starting up the feedwater pumps. The failure 
could have compromised the starting of the pumps, 
but the safety significance is very low because the 
turbine island feedwater system does not fulfil any 
safety functions.
Cracks were observed in the hooks of hoists at 
both plant units. The failures were observed in con-
nection with regular inspections. It was estimated 
that the cracks had not caused any risk of a load 
drop.
Cracks were observed in the surface coating of a 
boom in the hoisting tool for the fuel transport cask 
at the plant units and in the interim storage facil-
ity for spent nuclear fuel. The cracks in the surface 
coating were detected in connection with a regular 
inspection. There was a risk of loose components 
falling into the fuel pool, but the incident did not 
have any actual safety significance.
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A.I.1g Production losses due to faults
Definition
As the indicator, the loss of production caused by 
faults in relation to rated power (gross) is moni-
tored.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is obtained from the annual 
and quarterly reports submitted by power compa-
nies.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the significance of 
faults from the point of view of NPP production.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Simo Verta (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Production losses due to faults have been small at 
both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, which is also indicated 
by the nuclear power plants’ high load factors.
Loviisa
The number of faults resulting in production losses 
typically varies a great deal year by year. A signifi-
cant failure of a single component may require a 
cold shutdown of the plant, which inevitably caus-
es major production losses. On the other hand, 
several minor failures may occur over the course of 
the year without having any major impact on the 
annual production volume.
In 2015, Loviisa 1 experienced only a few faults 
resulting in production losses. The most production 
losses arose from the separation of an HP heater to 
repair a leak in October.
Most of the faults resulting in production losses 
at Loviisa 2 (around half of them) in 2015 resulted 
from the loss of the holding current of a control rod, 
which made the rod drop into its lower position 
in November. The plant was placed into a repair 
outage to repair the control rod drive mechanism. 
Around one quarter of the production losses were 
caused by increased vibration of a reactor coolant 
pump. The pump had to be shut down because of 
the vibration.
Olkiluoto
The number of faults resulting in production losses 
typically varies a great deal year by year. A signifi-
cant failure of a single component may require a 
cold shutdown of the plant, which inevitably caus-
es major production losses. On the other hand, 
several minor failures may occur over the course of 
the year without having any major impact on the 
annual production volume.
In 2015, Olkiluoto 1 experienced fewer faults 
resulting in production losses than on average. 
There were only a few faults resulting in produc-
tion losses also in the two previous years.
An unplanned maintenance outage of three 
weeks took place at Olkiluoto 2 in February 2015. 
It was caused by a water leak in the main genera-
tor. This incident is also the underlying reason be-
hind the clearly higher number of faults resulting 
in production losses than in the previous years. 
Other faults resulting in production losses at OL2 
were minor.
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A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from the OLC
Definition
As indicators, the number of non-conformances 
with the operational limits and conditions (OLC), 
as well as the number of exemptions granted by 
STUK, are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from applications 
for exemption orders by the power companies and 
from event reports.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the power compa-
nies’ activities in accordance with the operational 
limits and conditions: compliance with the OLC 
and identified situations during which it is neces-
sary to deviate from the OLC; conclusions regard-
ing the appropriateness of the OLC can also be 
made based on this data.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Simo Verta (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The main purpose of the OLC exemption procedure 
is to enable modifications and maintenance that 
will improve safety and plant availability.
Non-conformance with the OLC refers to a situ-
ation where the NPP or a system or component of 
the NPP is not in a safe state as required by the 
operational limits and conditions. The objective is 
to have zero non-conformance events at the NPPs. 
The licensee must always prepare a special report 
on each non-conformance and any corrective meas-
ures, and submit it to STUK for approval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
Based on the last ten years (2005–2014), the Loviisa 
NPP applies for STUK’s approval for exemptions 
from the OLC six times per year on average. The 
number of applications in 2015 (six applications) 
was in line with the average. Five of the applica-
tions involved modifications and one an inservice 
inspection of a piece of pressure rated equipment. 
As the planned deviations had no significant safety 
implications, STUK approved the applications.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2015, four events during which the plant did not 
comply with the OLC without an advance safety 
analysis and approval were detected at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant. Such events have occurred 
three times per year on average during the past 
ten years (2005–2014). All events that were non-
compliant with the OLC in 2015 are described in 
Chapter 4.1.2 of this annual report and Appendix 
3.
The Loviisa NPP analyses all non-conformances 
with the OLC within a month of detection. The 
analysis includes finding out the underlying caus-
es, assessing the safety significance of the event 
and determining corrective measures to prevent 
reoccurrence of the deviations. The results of the 
analysis are documented in a special report (indi-
cator A.II.1). One key issue is identifying the possi-
bility of reoccurrence, i.e. studying whether a simi-
lar event has occurred in the past and whether the 
corrective measures implemented at the time were 
sufficient. One issue in common to several (eight) 
of the events in 2012–2015 was non-compliance 
with the OLC during the changing of a plant unit’s 
operating mode, i.e. either when switching the unit 
from load operation to shutdown or from shutdown 
to load operation. The shutdown or startup of a 
plant unit is implemented in stages. Before mov-
ing on to the next stage, it must be verified that 
all the requirements for the next stage have been 
met. These inspections were not fully successful in 
the case of these events. One must make sure that 
there are no defects that could lead to an inadvert-
ent deviation in people’s knowledge of the OLC, 
procedures related to compliance with the OLC or 
the formatting of the OLC themselves.
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Olkiluoto
Based on data from the last ten years (2004–2015), 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applied for 
STUK’s approval for exemptions from the OLC 
seven times per year on average. Hence, the num-
ber of applications in 2015 (seven) was in line 
with the average. Five of the applications involved 
modification of a radiation measuring system and 
two modification of an auxiliary feedwater system 
recirculation line. STUK approved all the applica-
tions, except for one. STUK did not approve TVO’s 
application for a deviation from the OLC to imple-
ment a modification in the auxiliary feedwater sys-
tem recirculation line at OL2. STUK rejected the 
application because vibration whose cause could 
not be identified was observed in the piping when 
the implementation of a similar modification was 
being tested at OL1. STUK stated that the modifi-
cation may only be implemented at OL2 if the un-
derlying cause for the vibration at OL1 is detected 
and corrective measures are determined.
In 2004 and 2005, the number of deviations was 
increased by work and installations related to the 
modernisation of OL1 and OL2 and the construc-
tion of OL3. Similarly, major modifications were 
carried out in 2010 and 2011.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2015, TVO reported five events during which the 
NPP was non-compliant with the OLC without an 
advance safety analysis and STUK’s permission. 
This number of events is higher than the average 
number of events during the past ten years (3). A 
non-conformance with the fuel evacuation require-
ment took place at the interim storage facility for 
spent nuclear fuel because the refuelling machine 
was not able to grab some of the unchanneled as-
semblies in the storage pools. Inservice testing of 
containment flooding valves with a mobile diesel 
aggregate power supply at OL1 was unsuccessful. 
Weekly iodine sampling, which is part of the radio-
active release monitoring, was unsuccessful at OL1 
for a period of three weeks/sampling periods, be-
cause there was no air flow in the sample line. The 
remote shutdown station at OL2 was inoperable in 
breach of the OLC. A pipeline of the auxiliary feed-
water system was separated without a work per-
mit at OL1. Special reports on all five deviations 
from the OLC were submitted to STUK. In these 
reports, TVO analysed the causes of the events and 
determined corrective measures to prevent their 
reoccurrence.
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is monitored separately for each plant unit. 
The systems monitored at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant are the containment spray system 
(322), the auxiliary feedwater system (327) and the 
emergency diesel generators (651–656). Those fol-
lowed at the Loviisa nuclear power plant are the 
high-pressure safety injection system (TJ), emer-
gency feedwater system (RL92/93, RL94/97) and the 
emergency diesel generators (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavail-
ability hours and its required availability hours 
is used as the indicator. Unavailability hours are 
the combined unavailability of redundant trains 
divided by the number of trains.
Annual plant criticality hours are the avail-
ability requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL 
systems. For diesel generators, the requirement is 
continuous, i.e. equal to annual operating hours.
The unavailability hours of a train include 
the time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to faults. The 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior 
to fault detection. If a fault is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test but to have 
escaped detection, the time between inservice tests 
is added to the unavailability time. If a fault has 
occurred between tests but its date of occurrence 
is unknown, half of the time period lapsed between 
tests will be added to the unavailability time. If the 
fault clearly occurred during an operational, main-
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tenance, testing or other event, the time between 
the event and the defection of the fault is added to 
the unavailability time.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensee’s representatives submit 
the necessary data to the relevant person in charge 
at STUK.
Purpose
The indicator indicates the unavailability of safety 
systems. The indicator is used to track the condi-
tion of safety systems and any identifiable trends.
Responsible units/persons
Resident inspectors
Petri Vastamäki (Loviisa NPP)
Jukka Kallionpää (Olkiluoto NPP)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
Analysis of the unavailability figures of the high 
pressure safety injection systems of the plant units 
in 2015 and their background information shows 
that no faults occurred at Loviisa 1 and two faults, 
the repairs for which caused the system to be una-
vailable for 13 hours, occurred at Loviisa 2.
The unavailability of the high pressure safety 
injection systems was low in 2015, i.e. their condi-
tion and availability were good.
RL system
In Loviisa 1, the total unavailability time of the 
emergency feedwater systems was 80 hours, of 
which a total of two faults were being repaired for 
a total of 10 hours during load operation. The rest 
of the unavailability (70 hours) was caused by the 
periodic maintenance of a diesel generator of the 
emergency feedwater system RL94 during the an-
nual outage of Loviisa 1, which is done every two 
years.
At Loviisa 2, the total unavailability time was 
221 hours, of which a total of eight hours were 
used to repair a fault (one fault) during load opera-
tion. The rest of the unavailability (213 hours) was 
caused by the periodic maintenance of a diesel gen-
erator of the emergency feedwater system RL97 
during the annual outage of Loviisa 2, which is 
done every two years.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater 
systems was low in 2015, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
EY system
In 2015, the unavailability time of the eight emer-
gency diesel generators was a total of 343 hours. 
Maintenance of the diesel generator 22EY03 that 
is implemented every 17 years accounted for 142 
hours of the unavailability.
In 2015, there were a total of 13 emergency die-
sel generator faults causing unavailability.
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Of these faults, 6 caused an immediate op-
eration restriction and 7 an operation restriction 
starting at the beginning of the repair work.
The unavailability rate of the emergency diesel 
generators in 2015, 0.45%, is still clearly lower 
than the value for the previous year (2014), which 
was 1.13%. This is because problems caused by 
defective control circuit auxiliary relays that were 
replaced in 2014 had been eliminated.
This means that the unavailability of the diesel 
generators returned to a low level, i.e. availability 
was acceptable.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The unavailability of the containment spray sys-
tem in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2013 was zero 
for both plant units, and almost zero in 2009 and 
2012.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater 
system increased significantly from 2014, but the 
unavailability was practically zero (0.13). The in-
creased unavailability of Olkiluoto 1 in 2006 was 
due to faults in the recirculation and safety valves 
in system 327. There were no significant faults in 
2007, 2008 or 2009, and the unavailability of the 
auxiliary feedwater system decreased to nearly 
zero in 2009 at both plant units. In 2010, unavail-
ability of OL1 was still zero but unavailability of 
OL2 increased slightly from the previous year, 
mainly as a result of several new faults discovered 
during the outage. In 2011, the figure for OL1 
was multiplied many times over as the result of 
a latent fault in one auxiliary feedwater system 
valve that remained inoperable for 504 hours (cf. 
Chapter A.II.3). In 2013, the unavailability of the 
auxiliary feedwater system returned to the level 
of prior to 2011. This level was retained in 2015 at 
OL1, and the unavailability of OL2 was almost 0.
The unavailability of the emergency diesel gen-
erators decreased in 2006 and 2007, and was very 
low as a result. In 2008, the value increased by 
nearly 95% compared to the previous year. The 
increase was due to latent faults in the compressed 
air motors of the diesels in both plant units. In 
2009, the unavailability of the diesel generators 
decreased considerably from the 2008 figures. In 
2010, unavailability increased somewhat from the 
previous year as a result of faults occurring in con-
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nection with inservice testing. At OL1, the stator 
winding of a diesel generator failed in connection 
with a periodic test in August 2010, and the gen-
erator was replaced with an overhauled unit. In 
2011, the unavailability of the emergency diesel 
generators was more than four times higher than 
in 2010, the highest figure ever recorded while the 
parameter has been monitored. The reason for the 
increase was the above-mentioned diesel genera-
tor fault, which may have lasted as long as from 
August 2010 to May 2011. In addition, there were 
faults in exhaust manifolds and exhaust pipes 
in 2011. In 2012, the unavailability of the diesel 
generators was zero. The unavailability of the die-
sel generators slightly increased in 2014 but still 
remained very low. The unavailability increased 
again to 0.96 in 2015.
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A.I.4 Radiation exposure
Definition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure of 
NPP employees by plant site and plant unit is 
monitored, together with the annual average of the 
ten highest occupational doses.
Source of data
The data on the collective occupational dose is re-
ceived from the quarterly and annual reports of 
the NPPs as well as the national dose register. The 
data on individual radiation doses is obtained from 
the national dose register.
Purpose
The indicators are used to control the radiation ex-
posure of employees. In addition, compliance with 
the YVL Guide’s calculated threshold for one plant 
unit’s collective occupational dose averaged over 
two successive years is monitored. The threshold 
value, 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net electri-
cal power, means a radiation dose of 1.24 manSv 
for one Loviisa plant unit and 2.20 manSv for one 
Olkiluoto plant unit. The collective occupational 
doses describe the success of the NPP’s ALARA 
programme. The average of the ten highest doses 
indicates how close to the 20 manSv dose limit the 
individual occupational doses at the NPPs remain. 
It also indicates the effectiveness of the NPP’s ra-
diation protection unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Tuomas Valmari
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and the 
amount of work having significance on radiation 
protection affect the annual radiation doses. Both 
Loviisa plant units have more extensive annual 
outages every four and eight years (the four-year 
annual outage and the eight-year annual outage) 
so that both plant never have a major annual out-
age during the same year. Four-year and eight-year 
outages have been held in even years and normal 
annual outages in odd years. In 2015, there was a 
short annual outage at both plant units. The effect 
of annual outages on collective occupational doses 
can be seen in the Collective occupational dose, 
Loviisa  graph. Due to improvements in radia-
tion safety, the radiation doses of employees have 
decreased, and the collective occupational dose in 
2015 was the lowest ever recorded.
The radiation doses for employees of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant remained below the individual 
dose limits. In 2015, the average of the ten largest 
doses was clearly lower than the average for the 
previous years. The Radiation Decree (1512/1991) 
stipulates that the effective dose for a worker from 
radiation work may not exceed the 20 manSv/year 
average over any period of five years, or 50 manSv 
during any one year.
The threshold set for the collective occupational 
dose was not exceeded in 2015 either. If, at one 
plant unit, the collective occupational radiation 
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dose averaged over two successive years exceeds 
2.5 manSv per one GW of net electrical power, the 
power company is to report to STUK the causes of 
this and any measures required to improve radia-
tion safety (Guide YVL 7.9).
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Loviisa NPP
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Most doses are incurred through work done dur-
ing outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and 
the amount of work having significance on radia-
tion protection affect the annual radiation doses. 
The annual outages of Olkiluoto plant units are 
divided into two groups: refuelling outages and 
maintenance outages. The refuelling outage is 
shorter in duration (approximately 7 days). Length 
of the maintenance outage depends on the amount 
of work to be done (2–3 weeks). Annual outages are 
scheduled so that in the same year, one plant unit 
undergoes a maintenance outage and the other a 
refuelling outage. Olkiluoto 1 was subject to a re-
fuelling outage and Olkiluoto 2 to a maintenance 
outage in 2015.
The radiation doses have clearly decreased af-
ter the installation of new moisture separators at 
the plant units in 2005–2007. The radiation level 
in the turbine buildings has continued to decrease 
after the installation of the moisture separators, 
and this has also decreased the collective occupa-
tional dose. Furthermore, improvements aiming 
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Olkiluoto NPP
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at reducing the employees’ radiation doses have 
also been made in radiation protection of the NPP.
The collective occupational dose of the employ-
ees of Olkiluoto NPP was higher in 2015 than in 
2012–2014, but lower than the prevailing level 
before 2012. In 2015, the average of the ten largest 
doses was the second lowest ever recorded during 
the operation of the plant.
The dose limits set in the Radiation Decree 
(1512/1991) were not exceeded. The threshold set 
for the collective occupational dose was not ex-
ceeded in 2015 either.
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A.I.5 Releases
Definition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the air from the NPPs are monitored, together 
with the calculated dose due to releases to the most 
exposed individual in the vicinity of the NPP.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies’ quarterly and annual reports. From 
this data, the calculated radiation dose for the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the NPP 
is defined.
Purpose
The indicator is used to monitor the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and assess factors 
having a bearing on any changes in them.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT), Tuomas Valmari
A.I.5a Releases into the air
Interpretation of the indicator
In 2015, radioactive releases into the air from the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants were 
of the same magnitude as in previous years. The 
releases clearly remained below the limits set. 
The most major change in Loviisa over the past 
few years is a marked decrease in the releases of 
particulate radioactive aerosols in 2014 and 2015. 
Radioactive noble gas releases from the Olkiluoto 
NPP remained below the detection limit in 2014 
and 2015.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate from leaking fuel rods, 
from the minute amounts of uranium left on the 
outer surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel fabrica-
Noble gas releases (Bq 87Kreq), 
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tion and from reactor surface contamination from 
earlier fuel leaks. At both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, 
there have been very few leaking fuel rods and the 
leaks have been small. Aerosol nuclides (including 
activated corrosion products) are released during 
maintenance work.
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A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
Releases of radioactive substances emitting gam-
ma radiation into the environment from the Lovi-
isa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants remained 
clearly below the set limits. In 2009 and 2013, 
the Loviisa NPP released low-activity evaporator 
bottom into the sea as planned. Consequently, the 
releases of substances with gamma activity were 
larger than the average in those years. Releases 
of substances with gamma activity into the sea 
from both nuclear power plants have decreased in 
recent years.
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A.I.5c Population exposure
Interpretation of the indicator
Assessment of the radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power 
plant is based on information about the NPP’s re-
leases and meteorological measurements. The ex-
posure routes that are taken into account include 
external radiation and internal radiation, i.e. ra-
diation caused by radioactive materials ending up 
inside the body via air or food.
In 2015, the radiation doses of the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the Loviisa and Olki-
luoto nuclear power plant were normal. Larger 
radiation doses in 2004 and 2009 in Loviisa were 
caused by the discharge of evaporator bottom into 
the sea. The radiation doses of both NPPs were less 
than 0.1% of the limit of 100 microsieverts that is 
established in the Government Decree (733/2008).
The calculated dose (µSv) of the most exposed individual 
in the environment of Loviisa NPP
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A.I.6 Investments in facilities
Definition
Investments in nuclear power plant maintenance 
and modifications in the current value of money 
adjusted by the building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the indicator.
The indicator demonstrates the relative fluc-
tuation of investments. The amounts given in 
euros are confidential information of the power 
companies involved, and not to be published here. 
Furthermore, the scales of the investment and 
modernisation graphs for Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plants are not mutually comparable.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the amount of in-
vestments in plant maintenance and their fluctua-
tions.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Simo Verta (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
The variation of the indicator clearly shows the in-
vestments related to the power upgrades and mod-
ernisation projects of the nuclear power plants. Both 
NPPs have paid great attention to lifecycle manage-
ment, which also shows as continuous long-term 
investment plans. The renewal of the operating li-
cence of the Loviisa NPP in 2007 and the interme-
diate assessment carried out at Olkiluoto in 2008 
have also had an impact on the investment plans.
Loviisa
Many modification projects and other projects span 
over the course of several years, which means that 
their total costs are also divided between several 
years. For example, investments in the Loviisa I&C 
renewal started in 2007. Other major investments 
in 2015 included modernisation of the reactor cool-
ant system pressure control system, a reheater up-
grade, a turbine modernisation project, an upgrade 
of a maintenance data system and modernisation 
of the service water system piping.
Olkiluoto
Investments in 2015 are close to the nuclear power 
plant’s average value for 1981–2015. Slightly more 
investments than during the three previous years 
were made in 2015, but the investment level is still 
clearly below the top level of 2010 and 2011 when 
LP steam turbine of both units were replaced, for 
example.
Most major investments in 2015 included re-
placement of low voltage switchgear and auxiliary 
transformers, construction of a remote shutdown 
station and replacement of the emergency diesel 
generators. Replacement of the reactor coolant 
pumps and their frequency converters started in 
2015.
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As the indicators, the number of operational event 
reports is monitored in compliance with Guide 
YVL A.10. The new Guide YVL A.10 entered into 
force in late 2015, which is why the old terms in 
compliance with YVL 1.5 are still used in the indi-
cators. In addition to special reports and transient 
reports, the new operational event reports include 
other plant events submitted to STUK for informa-
tion. A special report corresponds to an operational 
event report submitted for approval in the new 
Guide YVL A.10.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is obtained from the STUK 
document management system (SAHA).
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the number of safe-
ty-significant events.
Responsible unit/person
Operational safety (KÄY)
Simo Verta (Loviisa)
Mikko Heinonen (Olkiluoto)
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
No reactor trips occurred at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant in 2015.
Based on data from the previous ten years 
(2005–2014), the average number of annual events 
warranting a special report is three to four per 
year, while the average number of events warrant-
ing a transient report is five per year. The number 
of events warranting a special report was normal 
in 2015 (five in total) and the number of events 
warranting a transient report (three in total) was 
below the average. Many of the events warranting 
a special report are deviations from the operational 
limits and conditions (OLC). The development of 
events non-compliant with the OLC is considered 
under indicator A.I.2.
Events warranting a special report in 2015 are 
described in Appendix 3.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, the reports that concern both 
plant units have been entered for Loviisa 1 alone. 
In 2015, one event warranting a special report con-
cerned both plant units.
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Olkiluoto
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant in 2015. Based on the data from the 
last ten years, an average of zero to one reactor 
trips per year occurs at the Olkiluoto NPP. During 
the previous decade (1993–2001), an average of al-
most three to four reactor trips occurred each year. 
The larger number of trips is explained by the fact 
that it also includes reactor trips during annual 
outages that occurred, for example, in connection 
with testing of the reactor protection system.
Based on data from the previous ten years 
(2005–2014), the average number of annual events 
warranting a special report is three to four per 
year, while the average number of events war-
ranting a transient report is five per year. The 
number of events warranting a special report 
slightly higher than the average in 2015 (five in 
total) and the number of events warranting a tran-
sient report (five in total) was close to the annual 
average. Many of the events warranting a special 
report are deviations from the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC). The development of events 
non-compliant with the OLC is considered under 
indicator A.I.2.
Events warranting a special report in 2015 are 
described in Appendix 3.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, reports that concern both plant 
units or the interim storage facility for spent nu-
clear fuel have been entered for Olkiluoto 1 alone. 
One special report in 2015 concerned the interim 
storage facility for spent nuclear fuel.
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A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
As the indicator, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is monitored. 
An increase in the conditional core damage prob-
ability (CCDP) associated with each event is used 
as the measure of a risk. CCDP takes the dura-
tion of each event into consideration. Events are 
divided into three categories: 1)  unavailability 
due to component faults, 2) planned unavailability 
and 3)  initiating events. Furthermore, events are 
grouped into three categories according to their 
risk-significance (CCDP): the most risk-significant 
events (CCDP>1E–7), other significant events (1E-
8 ≤ CCDP < 1E–7) and other events (CCDP < 
1E–8). The indicator is the number of events in 
each category.
Unavailability caused by work for which STUK 
has granted an exemption is included in category 
2. Any non-conformances with the OLC that can be 
applied to this indicator are included in category 1. 
Non-compliances with the OLC are also dealt with 
in Chapter A.I.2.
Calculations concerning the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant have been made with FinPSA software 
and those concerning Loviisa nuclear power plant 
with RiskSpectrum software. For the Loviisa NPP, 
calculations of a simultaneous fault in several 
components are based solely on the load opera-
tion model, which means that the results are not 
as exact as for single faults which have been cal-
culated for all operating modes. The modelling of 
simultaneous faults across all operating modes (17 
of them) would be possible, but the calculation time 
would be too long when compared to the benefits 
gained. This year, no simultaneous faults of several 
components with the highest risk-significance oc-
curred.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators is col-
lected from the power companies’ reports and ap-
plications for exemptions.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-sig-
nificant initiating events and planned unavailabil-
ity. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
common cause faults, simultaneously occurring 
faults and human errors. Another objective of the 
event analysis is to systematically search for any 
signs of a deteriorating organisational and safety 
culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi 
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) (fault data)
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
A brief description of the most significant events 
regarding risks is provided below.
Loviisa 1:
1. The maintenance of the startup and shutdown 
pump system of LO2 took 199 hours during the 
annual outage of LO2. This caused a risk for 
LO1 that was in power operation because the 
startup and shutdown pump system of LO2 can 
also be used to cool LO1. The calculated CCDP 
was 3.3E-7.
Loviisa 2:
1. The maintenance of the startup and shutdown 
pump system of LO1 took 68 hours during the 
annual outage of LO1. This caused a risk for 
LO2 that was in power operation because the 
startup and shutdown pump system of LO1 can 
also be used to cool LO2. The calculated CCDP 
was 1.1E-7.
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A brief description of the significant events is given 
below.
Olkiluoto 1:
1. Venting and filling nozzles were installed in a 
new  recirculation line of the emergency feed-
water system train 327 D. The unavailability 
time was 56.1 h. CCDP: 1.1E-07.
2. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the B train took 110 h. CCDP: 1.0E-07.
3. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the D train took 112 h. CCDP: 1.1E-07.
Olkiluoto 2:
1. The flow measured during inservice testing of 
the emergency feedwater system train 327 A 
was too low. A hidden fault. The unavailability 
time was 1,009 h. CCDP: 9.0E-07
2. A diesel generator switch did not close dur-
ing the inservice testing of a diesel generator 
in train B. A hidden fault. The unavailability 
time was 330 h. When the diesel generator was 
unavailable, train 712 A of the service water 
system was unavailable due to planned mainte-
nance (replacement of a flow measurement) for 
30 hours. Combined CCDP of these events was 
4.8E-7.
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
 LO1
 LO2
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
3.15 3.10 0.90 1.50 4.30 9.70 5.30 3.80 1.40 3.20 1.00
 4.14 1.60 1.95 2.40 3.00 5.20 8.60 1.80 1.00 0.50 1.80
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk
 OL1
 OL2
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180%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
9.64 7.60 6.00 26.10 4.00 171.40 13.10 5.90 2.80 7.90 8.00
 10.95 5.00 6.00 1.30 5.40 6.30 5.40 29.00 11.00 6.40 20.50
3. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the B train took 109 h. CCDP: 1.0E-07.
4. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the D train took 102 h. CCDP: 1.0E-07.
5. Isolation valve V214 in the minimum circula-
tion line of train B of the core spray system 323 
was triggered by torque. The minimum circula-
tion line is used when starting up and shutting 
down the system. A hidden fault. The unavail-
ability time was 386 h. CCDP: 2.1E-7.
6. A switchgear fault occurred in train C of the 
emergency feedwater system 327 during start-
up. A hidden fault. The unavailability time was 
256 h. CCDP: 3.9E-7.
7. Flow measurement of a pump in train B of the 
core spray system was unavailable. The I&C 
requires the flow measurement when starting 
up and shutting down the pump. A hidden fault. 
CCDP: 4.1E-7.
The combined total CCDP of all three categories di-
vided by the probability of a severe accident gives 
an overview of the risk-significance of operational 
events. To facilitate analysis, risk calculation is 
based on conservative assumptions and simplifica-
tions, which materially weakens the applicability 
of the results for trend monitoring. If the risk-sig-
nificance remains at the same average level year 
after year, the annual fluctuation does not warrant 
particular attention.
At Loviisa 1, Loviisa 2 and Olkiluoto 1, the 
risk caused by operational activities remained at 
around the same level as in the past years in 2015. 
Four hidden faults in emergency core cooling sys-
tems and one hidden fault in an emergency diesel 
generator at Olkiluoto 2 increased the additional 
risk from operational activities to a fairly high 
level (20.5%).
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A.II.4 Accident risk at nuclear facilities
Definition
As the indicator, the annual probability of an acci-
dent leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel (core 
damage frequency) is monitored. The accident risk 
is presented per plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained as the result of probabilis-
tic risk assessments (PRA) of the nuclear power 
plants. The PRA is based on detailed calculation 
models, which are continuously developed and 
complemented. A total of 200 man-years have been 
used at Finnish NPPs to develop the models. The 
basic PRA data includes globally collected reliabil-
ity information of components and operator activi-
ties, as well as operating experience from Finnish 
NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the development of 
the nuclear power plant’s accident risk. The objec-
tive is to operate and maintain the NPP in such 
a manner that the accident risk decreases or re-
mains stable. Probabilistic risk assessments can 
assist in detecting a need to make modifications to 
the NPP or revise operating methods.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Jorma Rantakivi  
(PRA computation)
Operational safety (KÄY) (fault data)
Interpretation of the indicator
When assessing the indicator, one must keep in 
mind that it is affected by both the development 
of the NPP and the development of the calcula-
tion model. Plant modifications and changes in 
methods, carried out to remove risk factors, will 
decrease the indicator value. An increase in the 
indicator value may be due to the model being ex-
tended to new event groups, or the identification of 
new risk factors. Furthermore, developing more de-
tailed models or obtaining more detailed basic data 
may change the risk estimates in either direction. 
For example, an increase in the Loviisa indicator 
in 2003 was due to the PRA being extended to 
cover exceptionally harsh weather conditions and 
oil accidents at sea during a refuelling outage. In 
the following year, the indicator value decreased, 
partly as a result of a more detailed analysis of 
these factors.
Loviisa NPP’s accident risk has continued to 
decrease over the last ten years, and new risk fac-
tors, discovered as the scope of the PRA has been 
extended, have been efficiently eliminated. The 
indicator decreased in 2007 due to the new service 
water line completed during the period. The new 
line allows for the alternative intake of seawater 
from the outlet channel to cool the NPP when it 
is at a shutdown. The change decreases the risks 
in situations where algae, frazil ice or an oil spill 
endangers the availability of seawater via the con-
ventional route. The decrease of the indicator in 
2008 and in the following years result from more 
detailed assessments performed in conjunction 
with the renewal of the operating licence, as well 
as changes at the NPP planned to be carried out 
earlier or in connection with the licence renewal. 
Such changes include decreasing the probability 
of a criticality accident using, for example, boron 
analysers, and decreasing the probability of an 
external leak.
At the end of 2015, the core damage frequency 
or annual probability of core damage calculated 
Fluctuation of the calculated annual core damage frequency 
for Loviisa plant units during 2006–2015
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with the PRA model of Loviisa 1 was around 1.7 
× 10-5/year, which is around 26% lower than in 
2014 (2.3 × 10-5 /year). The core damage frequency 
of Loviisa 2 was 2.0 × 10-5/year, which is 20% less 
than in 2014 (2.5 × 10-5/year). The difference be-
tween the plant units’ risk assessments is due 
to differences in ventilation and air conditioning 
systems that contain safety systems, for example. 
The risk has decreased from the previous year 
mainly because of new cooling towers that were 
commissioned in 2015. They allow for the removal 
of residual heat in the long term also if the service 
water systems are blocked due to a major oil leak 
at sea, for example.
The indicator for the Olkiluoto NPP decreased 
by approximately 30% in 2008 compared to previ-
ous years’ relatively stable values. The decrease 
was mainly due to the more detailed modelling of 
earthquake events and changes carried out at the 
NPP to improve seismic qualification. The increase 
in 2009 was due to the fact that a heat exchanger 
in the screening system could not be used for re-
sidual heat removal after all, contrary to earlier 
assessments. The decrease of the risk in 2010 was 
due to changes in the modelling of DC systems 672 
and 679 (inclusion of battery diversity), while the 
increase in 2011 resulted from reassessment of fire 
frequencies. At Olkiluoto NPP, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal events during power operation (compo-
nent failures and pipe ruptures leading to an op-
erational transient).
At the end of 2015, the calculated core dam-
age frequency of Olkiluoto 1 was 0.895 x 10-5/year, 
which is around 6% higher than in 2014 (0.84 x 
10-5/year). At the end of 2015, the calculated core 
damage frequency of Olkiluoto 2 was 1.46 x 10-5/
year, which is around 4% higher than in 2014 (1.4 
x 10-5/year). The minor changes in core damage 
frequency are due to specifications made in the 
PRA models and updated reliability information. 
The difference between the plant units is mainly 
caused by the fact that Olkiluoto 1 underwent 
modifications in 2014 that ensured operability of 
the auxiliary feedwater system, which is used to 
cool the reactor, in case seawater cooling is lost 
because of a blockage at the seawater intake or 
component failures. Such modifications have not 
been implemented at Olkiluoto 2 yet.
A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As indicators, the number of fire alarms and actual 
fires are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at STUK.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the effectiveness of 
fire protection at the NPPs.
Responsible unit/person
Civil engineering and fire protection (RAK)
Pekka Välikangas
Interpretation of the indicator
No events classified as fires occurred at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant (LO1/LO2) in 2015. The rescue 
personnel had one assignment in the parking area, 
which is located outside the actual power plant 
area: they had to extinguish a smouldering pas-
senger vehicle. The number of fire detection system 
faults and the number of actual alarms made by 
fire detectors at the Loviisa NPP have remained 
stable for the past ten years. Alarms from the fire 
detection systems have also remained at a rela-
tively low level. Most of the alarms were caused by 
dust, smoke or humidity.
No events classified as fires occurred at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant (OL1/OL2) in 2015. 
Three events classified as fires occurred outside 
the plant area. One of the events occurred in the 
lorry gate area of the OL3 unit: an electric outlet 
Number of fire alarms, Loviisa NPP
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Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 3.91E+02 1.90E+02 2.00E+02 2.60E+02 3.80+02 3.90E+02 3.70E+02 4.00E+02 3.50E+02 3.40E+02
2.72E+02 2.10E+02 4.90E+04 2.40E+04 1.20+03 8.50E+02 4.71E+03 5.40E+03 4.60E+03 3.90E+03
LO1
LO2
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 6.70E+02 7.06E+02 6.30E+02 7.60E+02 7.20E+02
 1.40E+03 4.10E+03 3.41E+05 5.00E+03 4.40E+03 
1.00E+03
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 1.90E+03 8.10E+02 1.20E+03 1.54E+03 4.97E+04 1.49E+03 2.80E+03 8.50E+02 2.43E+03 1.12E+03
5.20E+02 5.00E+02 1.30E+05 3.85E+06 3.20E+03 6.64E+03 1.27E+04 3.41E+05 1.58E+04 3.88E+04
LO1
LO2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit 7E+05 kBq/m3
at the bottom of the gate caught fire. TVO’s plant 
fire brigade extinguished the fire with a dry pow-
der extinguisher. The second fire event took place 
at OL3 construction site area 13 where an IBC 
container caught fire. TVO’s plant fire brigade ex-
tinguished the fire with a dry powder extinguisher. 
The third fire event took place in the parking area 
of the OL3 construction site where an insulating 
sheet below a vehicle’s body caught fire. The driver 
of the vehicle extinguished the fire with a dry 
powder extinguisher. The plant fire brigade was 
appropriately called to the scene. No fire detec-
tion system faults were observed at the Olkiluoto 
NPP (OL1/OL2) in 2015. No faults were observed 
during the six past years, either. Correct alarms of 
the fire detection system have remained at a fairly 
low level over the past ten years. This lower trend 
started after the year 2007.
The fire detection system of Loviisa NPP was 
renovated in 2000 and the fire detection system 
of Olkiluoto NPP in 2001. After the renovation of 
the fire alarm systems, the number of alarms in-
creased at both NPPs due to more sensitive detec-
tors. Advance alarms issued by the fire detection 
system are no longer included in these statistics.
Fire safety at Loviisa and Olkiluoto remained 
at around the same level as before. There have 
been four events classified as fires in the Loviisa 
plant area in the past ten years. The trend for 
Olkiluoto is decreasing: the last event classified 
as a fire occurred five years ago. The number of 
alarms from the fire detection system is affected by 
the amount of maintenance and repair work per-
formed at the NPPs. Fire detection systems are not 
always disconnected in a wide enough area during 
maintenance work.
A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Definition
As indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum 
level and the highest maximum activity value of 
the iodine-131 activity concentration (I-131 activ-
ity concentration) in the primary coolant in steady-
state operation (startup operation or load opera-
tion for Loviisa and load operation for Olkiluoto) 
are followed. The change in activity concentration 
of I-131 in primary coolant due to depressurisation 
in conjunction with shutdowns or reactor trips, 
as well as the number of leaking fuel assemblies 
removed from the reactor, is also followed as an 
indicator.
Number of fire alarms, Olkiluoto NPP
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Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available 
in the quarterly reports submitted by the power 
companies.
Purpose
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the fuel cycle. The indica-
tors for shutdown situations also describe the suc-
cess of the shutdown in terms of radiation protec-
tion.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Dina Solatie
A.III.1a Reactor coolant system activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the reactor 
of Loviisa 1 in 2015. The last time a leaking fuel as-
sembly was removed from the Loviisa 1 reactor was 
in 2013 and the last time a leaking fuel assembly 
was removed from Loviisa 2 was during the annual 
outage of 2013. As a result of these measures, the 
maximum activity (I-131) of the primary coolant 
has remained low. After removal of the leaking fuel 
assemblies, the maximum activity values associated 
with shutdowns also returned to the level before the 
leaks. The actual reason for the fuel leak in Loviisa 
2 is still unknown, as examination of the damaged 
fuel assemblies has not been possible due to prob-
lems with the pool inspection equipment. All in all, 
the fuel integrity at both Loviisa plant units was 
good in 2015. Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the re-
actor of Olkiluoto 1 in 2015. Thus, the primary 
coolant activity caused by iodine-131 at Olkiluoto 
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³), Olkiluoto NPP
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 6.90E+02 3.50E+01 3.70E+01 3.60E+01 3.12E+04 1.40E+02 6.76E+01 5.90E+01 3.16E+01 2.24E+01
 7.03E+03 9.99E+02 2.30E+02 1.00E+02 2.01E+04 4.84E+03 9.45E+02 9.51E+01 2.53E+01 2.38E+01
OL1
OL2
1.00E+07
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
OLC limit 2.2 MBq/l
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) related to shutdowns, Olkiluoto NPP
 OL1
OL2
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
 3.93E+03 6.19E+04 1.00E+06 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
1.00E+06
1.00E+05
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Fuel integrity: 
Iodine (I-131) maximum activity concentration level of primary 
coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2.00E+02 2.70E+01 3.00E+01 3.50E+01 2.45E+03 5.50E+01 5.58E+01 3.92E+01 2.55E+01 1.94E+01
4.00E+03 2.30E+02 2.10E+02 9.10E+01 1.87E+03 1.46E+03 3.03E+02 3.43E+01 2.13E+01 1.94E+01 
OL1
OL2
1.00E+04
1.00E+03
1.00E+02
1.00E+01
1.00E+00
Number of leaking fuel bundles removed from the reactor, 
Loviisa NPP
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 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
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1 has continued to decrease since 2010. On the ba-
sis of other inspections carried out during the an-
nual outage, the fuel types at both plant units have 
mostly behaved normally. Several fuel leaks have 
occurred in the 2000s at Olkiluoto 2. Most of the 
leaks have been caused by small loose objects en-
tering the reactor during maintenance operations. 
The coolant flow may cause the loose objects to vi-
brate and break the fuel cladding. To minimise the 
problem, new Triple Wave+ foreign object sieves 
have been adopted at Olkiluoto 2.
A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel assemblies
All leaking fuel assemblies are removed during an-
nual outages. Both licensees use an external party 
when identifying leaking assemblies. This means 
that a subcontractor handles the actual equipment 
and provides the operators, but the plant’s own 
radiochemistry laboratory analyses the water sam-
ples from the reactor. The leaking fuel assembly is 
identified based on the analysis results.
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of Loviisa 
1 or Loviisa 2 during the period under review.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of Olki-
luoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 in 2015.
A.III.2 Reactor coolant system integrity
A.III.2a Water chemistry conditions
Definition
As indicators, the water chemistry conditions for 
each plant unit are followed.
The water chemistry indicators are:
•	 Chemistry	 performance	 indices	 used	 by	 the	
licensees, depicting the effectiveness of water 
chemistry control in the secondary circuits of 
PWRs and in the reactor circuits of BWRs. The 
chemical conditions in the secondary circuit of 
a pressurized water reactor affect the integrity 
of the interface between the reactor coolant sys-
tem and the secondary circuit. The indicator for 
Loviisa is a new index developed at the NPP to 
be used together with the international index. 
The new index describes the water chemistry 
conditions in the secondary circuit at Loviisa 
with a higher degree of sensitivity than the 
corresponding international index for VVER 
plants. The indicator for Olkiluoto is the inter-
national index used by the NPP. The Loviisa 
index observes corrosive factors and the concen-
trations of corrosion products in the steam gen-
erator blowdown and the feedwater. For steam 
generator blowdown, the calculation includes 
the chloride, sulphate and sodium concentra-
tions and acid conductivity. For feedwater, it 
includes the iron, copper and oxygen concentra-
tions. The chemistry index of Olkiluoto consists 
of the chloride and sulphate concentrations of 
the reactor water and the iron concentration in 
the feedwater. The indices for both NPPs only 
cover the aforementioned parameter values 
during load operation.
•	 The	 maximum	 chloride	 concentration	 of	 the	
steam generator blowdown at the Loviisa plant 
units and the reactor water at the Olkiluoto 
plant units during operation compared with the 
OLC limit in the monitoring period. At Olki-
luoto, the maximum sulphate content of reactor 
water during steady-state operation is also fol-
lowed.
•	 Corrosion	 products	 released	 from	 the	 surfaces	
of the reactor coolant system and the secondary 
circuit into the coolant. For the Loviisa NPP, 
the iron concentration of the reactor coolant 
and the secondary circuit feedwater (maximum 
values for the monitoring period) are followed. 
For Olkiluoto NPP, the iron concentration of 
feedwater (maximum value for the monitoring 
period) is followed. In addition, the maximum 
Co-60 activity concentration in the reactor cool-
ant while bringing the plant to a cold shutdown 
or after a reactor trip is followed for both NPPs.
Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing water 
chemistry control to the respective responsible per-
son at STUK. The approximate concentration lev-
els of corrosive substances and corrosion products 
can also be obtained from quarterly reports sub-
mitted by the licensees.
Purpose
The water chemistry indicators are used to monitor 
and control the integrity of the reactor coolant sys-
tem and the secondary circuit. The monitoring is 
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done by indices depicting the maintenance of water 
chemistry and by following selected corrosive im-
purities and corrosion products. The water chem-
istry indices combine a number of water chemistry 
parameters and thus give a good overview of the 
water chemistry conditions. STUK’s indicators are 
also used to monitor the fluctuation of certain pa-
rameters in more detail. The corrosive substances 
monitored include chloride and sulphate. The cor-
rosive products followed are iron and radioactive 
Co-60. The activity concentration of Co-60 isotope 
while bringing the plant to a cold shutdown is 
used to describe the access of cobalt-containing 
structural materials into the reactor circuit and 
the success of the water chemistry control and 
the shutdown procedures. In addition to the pa-
rameters described here, the licensees use several 
other parameters to monitor the water chemistry 
conditions of the plant units.
Responsible units/persons
Reactor and safety systems (REA),  
Dina Solatie
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
In the past few years, the chemistry index has re-
mained at a good level at the Loviisa plant units.
The blowdown water chlorine content was slightly 
higher than during the previous year at Loviisa 
1 due to a seawater leak. The leaking tube was 
plugged quickly, however. The iron content of the 
secondary circuit feedwater was normal in 2015. 
The figures show that the most clearly discern-
ible change from previous years is the high iron 
concentration in the secondary side feedwater at 
Loviisa 2. This was a brief transient (one meas-
uring result) and thus it does not have a major 
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Integrity of the secondary circuit: 
Chemistry index, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
 LO2
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 1.03 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.13 1.03 1.03 1.11
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Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; 
Maximum chloride concentration of a steam generator blow-down 
(µg/kg) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
 LO1
LO2
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 1.93E+01 1.98E+01 1.36E+01 1.81E+01 2.24E+02
 1.10E+01 3.19E+01 4.30E+01 3.00E+01 3.17E+01
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OLC limit ≤ 100 µg/kg
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; 
Maximum iron concentration in the feed water (µg/l) 
(RL30 / RL70) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
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impact on the corrosion behaviour of the steam 
generator pipes in the long term or the integrity 
of the reactor coolant system. The iron content in 
the secondary side feedwater returned to normal in 
2014 and 2015. The maximum Co-60 activity levels 
associated with shutdowns were measured during 
shutdowns for annual outages. In 2015, the concen-
trations were around the same as in the previous 
years, which indicates successful compliance with 
the ALARA principle. The indicator shows that the 
integrity of the reactor coolant systems of the Lovi-
isa plant units was acceptable in 2015
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
The impurity and corrosion product levels in reactor 
water and feedwater, followed in STUK’s indicator 
scheme, remained below the OLC limits at Olkiluoto 
2. In 2015, the chemistry index for Olkiluoto 1 was 
the best possible: 1. The chemistry index for Olki-
luoto 2 was higher due to a seawater leak in a con-
denser. Iron, sulphate and chloride contents of the 
reactor coolant did not deviate from their regular 
values at Olkiluoto 1 in 2015, which is also shown 
by the achieved chemistry index value. The monitor-
ing and optimisation of Olkiluoto 2 water chemistry 
was also successful in 2015. At both plant units, the 
shutdown-related maximum value of Co-60 activity 
concentration occurred during shutdowns for an-
nual outages. There were no essential changes in 
the Co-60 activity concentration compared to pre-
vious years, which indicates successful compliance 
with the ALARA principle. The indicator shows that 
reactor coolant system integrity was good at the 
Olkiluoto plant units in 2015.
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A.III.2b Reactor coolant system 
leakages (Olkiluoto)
Definition
The indicators below are used to follow identified 
and unidentified reactor coolant system leakages 
at the Olkiluoto plant units:
•	 Total	 volume	 (m3)	 of	 identified	 (from	 contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentified (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the con-
trolled floor drainage system, 345 T33) internal 
leakages in the containment during the fuel 
cycle.
•	 Highest	 daily	 internal	 leakage	 volume	 in	 the	
containment during the fuel cycle in relation to 
the leakage volume allowed in the OLC (outflow 
water volume of water condensing in the air 
coolers of the containment cooling system 725/
OLC limit).
Source of data
The licensee submits data on reactor coolant sys-
tem leakages at the Olkiluoto NPP to the person 
responsible at STUK.
Purpose
The indicator describing reactor coolant system 
leakages is used to follow and monitor the leak 
rate of the reactor coolant system within the con-
tainment.
Responsible units/persons
Operational safety (KÄY), Jukka Kallionpää
Interpretation of the indicator, 
fuel cycle 2013–2014
One of the purposes of controlled leakage K352 is 
to collect leakages from valves, pumps and other 
similar components. The drains from the seal boxes 
of the valves within the containment are equipped 
with temperature sensors to locate any leaks. Tem-
perature sensors installed on the drains above the 
main lines will detect any leakage in the specific 
line. Other methods must then be used to locate the 
actual leaking object. Identified leaks within the con-
tainment increased to some extent at OL1 in 2009, 
2010 and 2011. They decreased in 2012, continued to 
decrease in 2013 and remained at the same level in 
2015. The number of identified leaks at OL2 some-
what increased in 2014 and 2015. The leakage vol-
umes do not include the drainage of process systems 
during annual outages and other outages. The identi-
fied leaks include sampling flows of approximately 
100–1,500 m³ from the reactor building.
At the lowest point of the containment drywell, 
there is the drain water pit T33, which collects the 
drain water from the containment drywell floor 
drains and any leakage from the control rod ac-
tuator seals. The volumes of unidentified reactor 
coolant system leaks during the operating cycle 
2010–2011 decreased at both plant units. In 2012, 
they increased slightly from the 2011 level at both 
plant units, only to fall back to the previous level 
in 2013. Unidentified leaks at OL1 remained at the 
2013 level in 2014, but unidentified leaks at OL2 
increased to the level of 2010. In 2015, unidentified 
leaks at OL2 decreased to approximately half of 
the 2014 level.
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One of the purposes of containment gas cooling 
system 725 is to remove moisture from the contain-
ment atmosphere. Moisture may originate from 
steam leaking from the reactor coolant system. 
During the fuel cycle of 2013–2014, the ratio of the 
containment’s largest internal daily leak volume to 
the maximum allowable volume, as specified in the 
OLC, was low at both plant units.
The reactor coolant system was relatively leak-
proof during the 2014–2015 fuel cycle.
A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
As indicators, the following parameters are moni-
tored:
•	 Total	as-found	leakage	of	outer	isolation	valves	
following the first integrity tests compared with 
the maximum allowed total leakage from the 
outer isolation valves.
•	 Percentage	of	isolation	valves	tested	during	the	
year in question at each plant unit that passed 
the leak test at the first attempt (i.e. as-found 
leakage smaller than the acceptance criteria of 
the valve and no consecutive exceeding of the 
attention criteria of a valve without repair).
•	 Combined	as-found	leakage	rate	of	containment	
penetrations and airlocks in relation to their 
maximum allowed total leakage. The combined 
leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes leaks from 
personnel airlocks, the maintenance dome and 
the containment dome. At Loviisa, the combined 
leakage rate comprises the leak test results from 
personnel airlocks, the material airlock, cable 
penetrations of inspection equipment, contain-
ment maintenance ventilation systems (TL23), 
main steam piping (RA) and feedwater system 
(RL) penetrations; seals of blind-flanged penetra-
tions in ice-filling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is obtained from the power companies’ leak-
tightness test reports that are submitted by the 
licensees to STUK for information within three 
months from the completion of an annual outage. 
STUK calculates the total as-found leakages, since 
the reports give total leakages as they are at the 
end of the annual outage (i.e. after the completion 
of repairs and re-testing).
Purpose
This indicator is used to monitor the integrity of 
containment isolation valves, penetrations and air-
locks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and safety systems (REA),
Päivi Salo
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Total leakage of the outer isolation valves com-
pared to the maximum allowed total leakage re-
mained unchanged at both plant units. The as-
found leakage of both units remains clearly below 
the set limit.
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The number of isolation valves that passed the 
leak test at first attempt has increased in both 
plant units.
Overall as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations and airlocks is low at both plant 
units.
Olkiluoto
The total as-found leakages of outer isolation valves 
at the Olkiluoto 1 plant unit has somewhat de-
creased. It was clearly below the as-found leakage 
limit set in the operational limits and conditions.
The overall as-found leakage of the outer iso-
lation valves of Olkiluoto 2 increased when com-
pared to the previous year, but remained clearly 
below the limit set in the OLC.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at first attempt remained high for 
both plant units.
The total as-found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations, in which TVO includes leakages in 
the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the main-
tenance dome and the containment dome, has in-
creased but is still small for both plant units.
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APPENDIX 3 Significant events at 
nuclear power plants in 2015
Loviisa NPP
Wrong relays in rectifiers at Loviisa
An electromechanical switch (i.e. relay) of the 
wrong type was observed in a rectifier at the 
Loviisa NPP during the four-year annual outage 
on 13 January 2015. During an inspection con-
ducted after the observation, it was noted that 
similar relays of the wrong type had been installed 
in five other rectifiers as well. The rectifiers were 
installed in 2008 and 2009, and no deficiencies in 
their operation have been observed.
The relays protect rectifiers from power grid 
transients. The rectifiers charge safety-relevant 
battery banks, which are used to provide redun-
dant power supply for I&C components. In case 
of a rectifier failure, the battery banks will supply 
power to the I&C components for several hours.
Loviisa NPP immediately replaced the wrong 
relays with relays of the correct type. However, 
the new relays still include components which 
have not been approved. In terms of these deficien-
cies, Loviisa NPP submitted a detailed further 
action plan to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority for approval. Most of the relays were 
replaced during the 2015 annual outage according 
to plan. The rest of the relays in the rectifiers of the 
Loviisa 2 emergency diesel generator system will 
be replaced during the 2016 annual outage.
The wrong relay type has not compromised the 
safe operation of the plant. The event did not have 
any safety significance and on the INES scale it is 
rated as a level 0 event.
Failures in Loviisa 2 control 
rod drive mechanisms
On Thursday, 5 November 2015, one of the con-
trol rods in Loviisa 2 dropped into the reactor, 
which decreased reactor power. The control rod 
dropped because of a motor failure in the control 
rod mechanism. Fortum shut down the unit on 
Friday, 6 November to perform additional checks 
and repairs. Based on measurements carried out 
on the other motors, Fortum finally decided to 
replace four control rod mechanism motors with 
Figure A3.1. INES classified events at the Loviisa plant 
(INES Level 1 or higher).
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Figure A3.3. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa 2 plant unit in 2015.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1
MW Loviisa 1, 2015
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1
MW Loviisa 2, 2015
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Figure A3.2. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa 1 plant unit in 2015.
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spare motors approved by STUK. STUK inspected 
and approved the modification, and ensured that 
the necessary tests were completed and approved 
during unit startup. The unit was restarted on 9 
November 2015 once the repairs were complete.
The event did not influence the ability to shut 
down the reactor or compromise plant safety.
Annual outage 2015 of Loviisa 1
The refueling outage of Loviisa 1 was completed 
safely and all scheduled work was completed. The 
only work that was postponed according to plan 
was the radiation measuring (RA measuring) of 
the main steam line, which will be completed be-
fore the 2016 outage. Approximately one-quarter of 
the fuel was replaced. The outage took around 21.5 
days, i.e. around three days more than planned. 
The delay was caused by a delay in the replace-
ment of reheaters in the turbine island steam lines.
A hydrogen leak was observed in one of the 
turbine-generators (TG2 SP50) during the startup. 
The leak was repaired. Hydrogen had leaked dur-
ing the two previous fuel cycles.
In addition to the refueling, major modifications 
included installation of steam generator surface 
level measuring nozzles and modernisation of tur-
bine reheaters. Plenty of preparatory work for the 
Loviisa I&C renewal project (ELSA) was completed 
in anticipation of changes to be realised during the 
2016 annual outage.
Furthermore, cooling towers built in 2014–2015 
were commissioned during the annual outage. In 
case seawater supply is lost, the cooling towers can 
be used to cool safety-relevant systems and remove 
residual heat from the reactor. The towers are one 
of the renewals to be completed because of the 
Fukushima accident.
During the annual outage, the power company 
reported three events to STUK where work was not 
completed fully in compliance with the operational 
limits and conditions at Loviisa 1. In the first event, 
an acoustic alarm that is used as an additional 
alarm for the refueling machine was switched off 
for a short period of time at the beginning of refu-
eling, because the switch had not been turned to the 
right position. In the second event, a shield plate 
of one of the recombiners (that are used in case of 
an accident to exhaust hydrogen from the contain-
ment) was accidentally left in place during startup. 
In the third event, the maintenance of a pump in a 
safety system shared by Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 was 
started before Loviisa 1 was switched to load opera-
tion (Loviisa 2 had already been shut down) – the 
separation in itself is not the problem, but the op-
erational limits and conditions state that all safety-
relevant devices must be ready for operation when 
switching to load operation. None of the events com-
promised the safety of the plant, the environment or 
the employees, and the events were rated as level 0 
events on the INES scale.
The total radiation dose at Loviisa 1 was 237.85 
man-mSv, which is the lowest total radiation dose 
ever measured during the history of the unit. The 
largest measured individual dose was 3.9 mSv. The 
employee received this does when installing the YB 
surface level measuring nozzles.
Annual outage 2015 of Loviisa 2
The maintenance outage of Loviisa 2 was complet-
ed safely and all the scheduled works were com-
pleted. Approximately one-quarter of the fuel was 
replaced. The outage took around 17 days, which 
complied with the action plan.
In addition to the refueling, major modifications 
included installation of steam generator surface 
level measuring nozzles and modernisation of tur-
bine reheaters. Plenty of preparatory work for the 
Loviisa I&C renewal project (ELSA) was completed 
in anticipation of changes to be realised during 
the 2016 annual outage. New main steam piping 
radiation measurements (RA measurements) were 
installed at Loviisa 2. During commissioning tests 
at the unit, it was observed that the setpoints of 
the new measurements are such that the measure-
ments may fail to detect minor primary-secondary 
leaks. STUK required that the issue involving the 
operability of the measurements be processed as 
an application for an exemption from the OLC. 
More work on the primary circulating pumps than 
normal was performed. One of the diesel gen-
erators in Loviisa 2 underwent a “17-year mainte-
nance” (where the motor was also replaced).
Vibration of one of the reactor coolant pumps in 
Loviisa 2 increased on 17 August 2015 and the pump 
was switched off a little less than two weeks prior to 
the start of the annual outage. YD14 pumps in both 
plant units were replaced with pumps that had un-
dergone maintenance during the annual outage. The 
internals of the YD14 pump removed from Loviisa 1 
were dismantled and inspected during the annual 
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outage of Loviisa 2. Based on the damage observed, 
one can state that some of the pump’s internal com-
ponents that should not rotate had started to rotate. 
The damage observed in the internals of the YD14 
pump from Loviisa 2 was more extensive than the 
damage observed in the YD14 pump of Loviisa 1. Due 
to the damage, STUK requested an assessment from 
Fortum of the safety significance of the event, includ-
ing the causes of the damage, the probability of such 
damage occurring during the next fuel cycle, as well 
as how the event influenced radiation safety and the 
integrity of the nuclear fuel (due to loose components 
in the primary circuit after the event, for example). 
The matter was processed as part of the Loviisa 2 
startup permit application. STUK did not have any 
remarks about the report and the plant unit could 
be started. The pump was repaired and Fortum 
removed any excess solids from the primary circuit 
with a cleaning cycle during the beginning of the 
startup. The pumps and the wearing of their spare 
parts will be reviewed as part of the ageing manage-
ment surveys required by STUK.
The total radiation dose at Loviisa 2 was 223.28 
man-mSv, which is the second lowest total radia-
tion dose ever measured during the history of the 
unit. The largest measured individual dose was 
4.5  mSv. The employee received this does when 
installing the YB surface level measuring nozzles.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Olkiluoto 2 shut down due to 
humidity in a generator
A water leak was observed in a water-cooled gen-
erator at Olkiluoto 2 on 4 February 2015, which 
is why the plant unit was disconnected from the 
national grid. Despite joint efforts of TVO and 
the generator supplier, the water leak could not 
be located and a decision to initiate a cold shut-
down was made. During the shutdown, it was de-
cided that the generator rotor would be replaced. 
Verifying the leak in the rotor in the field was not 
possible, but all other potential leak sources could 
be excluded with high probability by means of he-
lium testing. The rotor was sent to the generator 
supplier factory for further studies. After the fairly 
extensive work on the generator, the plant unit was 
reconnected to the national grid on 24 February 
2015. It reached full power on 25 February 2015.
Open penetrations in containment 
during annual outage work done 
on the reactor coolant pumps
In December, TVO submitted to STUK for approval 
an operational event report regarding an excep-
tional event that influenced safety. It was connect-
ed to work done during the annual outages of Olki-
luoto nuclear power plant in 2013–2015.
At both currently operating units of Olkiluoto 
NPP, preparations have been made in case of a 
very unlikely situation during work done on a re-
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Figure A3.4. INES classified events at the Olkiluoto 
plant (INES Level 1 or higher).
Figure A3.5. Daily average gross power of  
the Olkiluoto 1 plant unit 2015.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1
MW Olkiluoto 1, 2015
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1
MW Olkiluoto 2, 2015
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Figure A3.6. Daily average gross power of  
the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit 2015.
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actor coolant pump in connection with an annual 
outage where a leak occurs at the bottom of the re-
actor through the bushing of the reactor coolant 
pump’s shaft. The units’ operational limits and con-
ditions demand the opportunity to pump a sufficient 
amount of make-up water in case of a leak under 
such conditions to ensure cooling of the fuel in the 
reactor.
In October 2015, TVO observed that some elec-
trical penetrations in the containment were re-
placed when performing work on the reactor cool-
ant pumps during the annual outages of 2013–
2015. Had there been a leak at the bottom of 
the reactor through the shaft bushing when the 
electrical penetrations were open, more pumps to 
supply make-up water than required by the units’ 
operational limits and conditions would have been 
needed to ensure cooling of the fuel in the reactor. 
Other systems would have been available to sup-
ply the required make-up water, however. In the 
future, TVO will change its instructions in such a 
manner that one of the prerequisites for starting 
work on the reactor coolant pumps is not having 
any open penetrations or any other routes at the 
reactor coolant pump level or below the reactor 
coolant pump level through which water could leak 
to the area below the lower drywell.
The event did not cause any immediate nuclear 
or radiation safety risks. On the seven-tier Inter-
national Nuclear Event Scale (INES), the event is 
rated as level 1, i.e. it is classified as an anomaly, an 
incident affecting safety.
Crack in a feedwater nozzle at Olkiluoto 2
The crack in a feedwater nozzle at Olkiluoto 2 is 
located in a weld in between the reactor pressure 
vessel nozzle butt weld and its joint (safe-end) on 
the inside of the nozzle. The crack may be a manu-
facturing fault that was originally left undetected 
and whose actual depth could not be determined 
until before new inspection techniques were intro-
duced. On the other hand, the crack may also be 
a fault caused by stress corrosion that has grown 
over time and may continue to grow. The crack 
was detected in 2003 and has been monitored ever 
since. During the 2013 annual outage, TVO had 
the area of the crack inspected from the outside 
by means of phased array ultrasonic testing. The 
depth of the internal crack was determined as 23 
mm (wall thickness 33 mm). The inspection result 
was a surprise: the depth of the crack was given as 
23 mm compared to the 10–15 mm that had been 
determined with the inspection techniques used 
before. During the 2013 annual outage, STUK ap-
proved a strength analysis submitted by TVO and 
a procedure where the crack would be monitored 
for the next three years.
According to inspections made during the 2015 
annual outage, the crack has not grown. TVO has 
installed a leak detection system that is based on 
temperature in the area during the annual outage. 
TVO has already made preparations for repairing 
the crack. According to the submitted repair plan, 
the feedwater nozzle will be plugged from the reac-
tor side and the feedwater piping will be cut at a 
pipe bend outside the biological shield before repair-
ing the crack.
Cracks at pipeline mixing points
In an inspection implemented during the 2014 an-
nual outage of Olkiluoto 2, several cracks were 
detected in feedwater line 1 and one crack was 
detected in feedwater line 2. Several cracks at a 
similar mixing point were also found during an 
inspection of feedwater line 2 at Olkiluoto 1. In 
its decisions, STUK required replacement of the 
cracked pipe sections during the 2015 annual out-
ages. These pipeline mixing points were replaced 
in 1986.
The cracks are at a mixing point of pipelines 
from the feedwater system and the reactor coolant 
system where flows at different temperatures mix. 
The mixing flows cause continuous temperature 
fluctuation of the structural material when the unit 
is in hot standby or low power feedwater control 
mode. This means that the mixing point is subjected 
to fatigue.
During the 2015 annual outages, both mixing 
points were replaced at Olkiluoto 2 and one of the 
two mixing points was replaced at Olkiluoto 1. The 
cracked mixing point at Olkiluoto 1 was replaced 
and the other mixing point was inspected. No new 
indications were found in the inspected mixing 
point, and it will be replaced during the 2016 an-
nual outage.
STUK oversaw the planning of the replacement, 
manufacture and installation. During the annual 
outage, STUK’s mechanical equipment inspectors 
performed inspections at the worksite in compliance 
with the inspection plan and oversaw the work in 
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general. The installation work was successful and 
the installations were mostly completed on sched-
ule. The final result complies with the plans both 
structurally and in terms of quality.
Annual outage of Olkiluoto 1 (3–14 May 2015)
The refueling outage of Olkiluoto 1 was completed 
safely and all the scheduled works were completed. 
Approximately one-fifth of the fuel was replaced. 
The outage took around 10.5 days, i.e. it was 1.5 
days longer than expected. The delay was caused 
by disassembly of the reactor and problems when 
performing a pressure test during the replacement 
of a feedwater line mixing point.
In addition to the refueling, major maintenance 
work included replacement of mixing points in the 
feedwater line and reactor cooling line, as well as re-
placement of one reactor coolant pump. The replace-
ment of the mixing point proceeded well up until the 
pressure test. According to the mixing point’s qual-
ity plan, the new mixing point had to be pressure 
tested at 110.5 bar. However, leaktightness of the 
feedwater line maintenance valves, which formed 
the pressure boundary of the pressure test, was not 
sufficient to raise the pressure to the required level: 
the pressure could only be increased to around 52 
bar. STUK was of the opinion that completing the 
pressure test as planned was the primary operating 
model in this case and required that TVO come up 
with a solution to perform the test. TVO was finally 
able to successfully perform the pressure test with 
a new pump.
Initial inspections of two new ATRIUM 11 test 
fuel assemblies and channels revealed a problem 
connected to re-channeling of the assembly after the 
inspections. Due to a faulty contact between a guide 
installed in the channel and the assembly gripper 
of the refueling machine, the assembly that was 
inspected first could not be completely lowered back 
into the channel, which is why the assembly was 
placed in the fuel pool without the channel. Only one 
of the planned test fuel assembly inspections could 
be completed due to this event. The corresponding 
symmetry assembly was also removed from the re-
actor and these assemblies were replaced with other 
fuel assemblies.
Annual outage of Olkiluoto 2 
(17 May – 4 June 2015)
The maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 2 was com-
pleted safely and all the scheduled works were 
completed. Approximately one-fifth of the fuel was 
replaced. The outage took around 17.5 days, i.e. 
it was around 2.5 days longer than expected. The 
delay was caused by problems during work on the 
reactor, fuel transfer and testing during startup.
In addition to the refueling, major maintenance 
and modifications included replacement of mixing 
points in the feedwater line, replacement of low 
voltage switchgear in trains B and C (SIMO pro-
ject) and realisation of a remote shutdown station. 
The mixing points of both lines were replaced at 
OL2. The work went well: there were no problems 
with the pressure test like at OL1. The replacing 
of the low voltage switchgear was also completed 
as planned. The emergency control room was com-
missioned in compliance with the implementation 
decision regarding Guide YVL 5.5 and decisions 
made based on the periodic safety review. During 
the annual outage, STUK completed inspections 
of the remote shutdown station connection and 
commissioning. The Olkiluoto 1 remote shutdown 
station will be commissioned during the 2016 an-
nual outage.
When inspecting the internals of the reactor 
pressure vessel, cracks were observed in a welded 
joint between a reactor core spray system nozzle 
and a safe-end. Fault indications regarding the 
welded joint of said nozzle were already made in 
2011 and 2013, and the fault indication was classi-
fied as an internal failure. During the inspections 
made in 2015, it was observed that the failure 
extends to the inner surface of the nozzle, which 
means that the threshold value laid down in the 
approval standard has been exceeded. STUK ap-
proved a procedure proposed by TVO where the 
weld will be inspected more often for at least the 
next three years by means of both a qualified eddy 
current method and the traditional phased array 
ultrasonic testing method. STUK also required 
that TVO must continue to study the causes of the 
cracks in the reactor pressure vessel nozzles and 
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continue its work on preventing new indications 
and preventing the old indications from spreading. 
At the end of 2015, TVO submitted to STUK for ap-
proval a plan on related further measures, repair 
plans and a review on the adequacy of the current 
nozzle inspection programme. The review applies 
to all nozzles in the reactor pressure vessels of both 
plant units that have been manufactured in the 
same manner.
When inspecting the internals of the reactor 
pressure vessel, cracks were also observed in a 
welded joint between the back plates and end 
plates of two feedwater dividers. Potential causes 
include a manufacturing fault and stress corrosion, 
or a combination of the two. TVO decided to replace 
the two feedwater dividers with feedwater divid-
ers that have already been used before. Their flow 
characteristics are slightly different than those of 
the new dividers. Based on analyses made, TVO has 
determined that replacing two of the total of four 
feedwater dividers will not have a major impact 
on the distribution of flow or the thermal loads of 
the reactor pressure vessel. To resolve the cracking 
problem, TVO completed after the annual outages a 
study on the opportunity to modify the construction 
of the dividers to achieve an optimal thermal service 
life. Based on the survey results, TVO has decided to 
purchase new dividers. Their installation will take 
place in 2017 and 2018.
During visual fuel inspections, rods that had 
bent in such a manner that they were very close to 
the adjoining rods were observed in the outermost 
row at the bottom ends of two bent GNF2 test fuel 
assemblies. The phenomenon was somewhat more 
moderate in one of the studied assemblies, but TVO 
decided to remove all four GNF2 test assemblies 
from the reactor and replace them with other as-
semblies with a similar burnup. Nothing out of the 
ordinary was observed in the visual inspections of 
four Optima2 and Optima3 test fuel assemblies or 
during the length measurements of the fuel chan-
nels and fuel rods.
Ultra HD control rods delivered by General 
Electric were commissioned during the 2015 annual 
outage. The manufacturer has designed them to 
replace Marathon control rods.  The first inspections 
of the new type of rods will take place after two fuel 
cycles. Twenty control rods were ordered from West-
inghouse, and half of the ordered rods were deliv-
ered during the spring of 2015. Manufacture of the 
remaining ten rods started in November and will be 
delivered in 2016. The inspection and replacement 
criteria of all the control rod inspections completed 
during the 2015 annual outage were acceptable.
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APPENDIX 4 Periodic inspection programme 
of nuclear power plants 2015
Inspections included in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety 
management, operational main processes and procedures, as well as the 
technical acceptability of systems. The compliance of safety assessments, op-
erations, maintenance and protection activities (radiation protection, fire pro-
tection and security) with the requirements of nuclear safety regulations are 
verified by the inspections.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2015, Loviisa
Personnel resources and 
competence, 6–7 October 2015
The inspection covered the training team organisa-
tion at the Loviisa nuclear power plant, as well as 
the maintenance and development of the expertise 
of people working in safety functions. Based on the 
results, there is still room for improvement in the 
monitoring of the refresher training of people work-
ing in safety functions. This is why STUK required 
that Fortum assess and implement the necessary 
measures to ensure that all people working in safety 
functions participate in refresher training.
Functionality of management system and 
quality assurance, 19–20 November 2015
The 2015 inspection focused on the licensee’s non-
conformance management system. Special atten-
tion was paid to how STUK’s requirements are 
processed in the requirement and non-conformance 
management system. Other inspected issues in-
cluded the quality assurance organisation, as well 
as requirements on supplier supervision in Guides 
YVL A.3 and A.5 and their impact. These issues 
were studied by reviewing safety culture issues 
pertaining to topical major modification projects, 
the processing of non-conformances and the cur-
rent status of delivery supervision plans.
Fortum is still improving the manner in which 
the impact of corrective measures is processed. 
STUK did not pose any requirements on the licen-
see based on the inspection.
Assessment and improvement of 
safety, 25 November 2015
The inspection on the assessment and improve-
ment of safety involved design operations at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant. The inspection cov-
ered electricity and process design procedures, 
available resources and processing of non-conform-
ances at different design stages. An additional in-
spected issue was the commissioning of the Design 
Authority function. The function aims at ensuring 
that all effects are taken into account when modi-
fying the plant or its systems to prevent a situa-
tion where a modification causes problems with 
another system or component.
No non-conformances that would give rise to a 
requirement were observed in the case of electric-
ity and process design. The requirements of the 
new YVL Guides are currently being implemented 
into the design guidelines. Commissioning of the 
Design Authority function is at a testing stage: 
the procedures are being tested and developed. 
This stage will end at the end of March 2016, and 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant will make a deci-
sion about the future of the function at this point. 
STUK did not pose any requirements based on the 
inspection.
PRA and safety management, 
2 December 2015
STUK assessed the use of the probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) in a safety management inspec-
tion that covered the current status of PRA models 
and applications, prepared expansions and devel-
opment of PRA results. The inspection covered the 
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licensee’s PRA organisation, resources and guide-
lines. Processing of non-conformances within the 
PRA organisation was also assessed. Covered spe-
cial issues included modelling of fires in specific 
rooms and hauling of the HP safety injection sys-
tem during the 2016 annual outage in terms of the 
annual outage risk assessment.
The PRA model has been extensively updated 
over the course of the past year, and the model for 
Loviisa 2 has been developed. Applications for the 
needs of plant modification projects and the 2015 
annual outage, among others, have been prepared. 
STUK did not pose any requirements on the licen-
see based on the inspection. The PRA is used as 
planned and in a versatile manner to support the 
management of safety, and no major deficiencies 
were observed in the inspected issues.
Plant maintenance, 13–14 October 2015
The inspection covered implementation of Guide 
YVL A.8 (Ageing management of a nuclear facil-
ity). During the inspection, compliance with the 
requirements of the new Guide YVL A.8 at the 
Loviisa plant units was verified by means of inter-
views and document reviews. The reference ma-
terials included a licensee assessment on compli-
ance with the requirements of the Guide YVL A.8, 
Ageing management of a nuclear facility, prepared 
by Fortum. In the assessment, Fortum comments 
compliance one requirement at a time, including 
references to plant documentation and proposing 
measures to be taken to ensure future compliance 
with the requirements.
Based on the inspection results, one can state 
that the nuclear power plant’s procedures meet the 
requirements of YVL A.8, at least in principle. No 
major non-conformances were observed. The issue 
will be studied in more detail once Fortum has sub-
mitted the ageing management programme as laid 
down in the Guide by the end of 2016.
Based on the inspection, STUK posed two re-
quirements on measures launched based on the 
previous inspection. Fortum has developed the 
identification and monitoring process of ageing 
products (spare parts, supplies) and the monitoring 
of batches, and these features have been taken into 
use in the new Lomax system but not in a compre-
hensive manner yet.
Electrical engineering, 3–4 November 2015
The inspected areas included monitoring and man-
agement of the ageing of electrical engineering 
components, management of diesel generator and 
battery bank loads during modifications, manage-
ment of non-conformances in connection with elec-
trical modifications, use and maintenance of an 
emergency power supply connection, and installa-
tion inspections of electrical equipment and cables.
STUK performed the inspection by verifying the 
licensee’s documentation, by assessing functional-
ity of electrical design and by assessing guidelines. 
Procedures and their functionality were verified in 
the inspection with example cases. Furthermore, 
events and reporting were verified.
Based on the inspection, STUK posed a re-
quirement on the licensee regarding delivery of 
emergency diesel generator condition monitoring 
measurement results to STUK.
I&C engineering, 3–4 November 2015
The inspected areas included management of I&C 
requirements and configuration, management of 
the validity of equipment qualifications, an I&C 
renewal programme, identification of programma-
ble technology, up-to-dateness of inservice testing 
instructions, and management of measuring ac-
curacy.
Due to the correction and supplementation 
needs observed during the inspection, STUK posed 
a requirement on the licensee to update the meas-
uring accuracy review from the past decade.
Information security, 26 May 2015
The inspection involved technical and administra-
tive information security – information security 
training and subcontractors’ information security 
practices in particular – as well as procedures to 
manage maintenance, installation and non-con-
formances and their documentation.
Based on the inspection, STUK provided ob-
servations and posed seven requirements. The re-
quirements involved information security training, 
layout provisions and management of information 
security. Requirements from the previous inspec-
tions had been properly implemented and well 
executed.
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Mechanical engineering, 28–29 October 2015
The inspection covered the licensee’s activities 
pertaining to the verification of the integrity and 
performance of selected mechanical engineering 
components. This year, one of the areas inspected 
was the procedures used to verify operability and 
long-term operational safety of piping and pumps 
important to safety. These issues were studied from 
the viewpoint of responsibilities, resources, compe-
tence and monitoring procedures, taking into ac-
count operating experience and the utilisation of 
operating experience. A special issue covered in 
the inspection was recent faults observed in the in-
ternals of the reactor coolant pumps and whether 
there is a link between these faults and the previ-
ous problems with vibration.
Based on the inspection, STUK posed three 
requirements on the licensee. The requirements 
request reports on inspections of the piping for the 
external containment spray system (XU), the op-
portunity to develop the load monitoring system 
in terms of thermal fatigue and primary circuit 
vibration.
Annual outage, 5 August – 24 September 2015
The purpose of STUK’s annual outage inspections 
is to verify that the licensee plans and implements 
annual outages in a safe manner in terms of radia-
tion and nuclear safety and that the licensee uses 
sufficient competence and resources. The Loviisa 
nuclear power plant annual outage 2015 inspec-
tion focused on work on the reactor coolant pumps. 
An oversight issue regarding organisations that 
was used in all the inspections in 2015 was tak-
en into account: processing of non-conformances. 
Furthermore, an inspection of outage risks and 
onsite inspection visits of the facilities and work-
sites were performed.
STUK realised the inspection by monitoring the 
performance of work, verifying related documenta-
tion and interviewing employees. With this inspec-
tion, STUK verified that there are instructions for 
the operations, the instructions are being followed 
and the instructions are up to date.
No significant non-conformances in the opera-
tion of the NPP were detected. Based on the obser-
vation, STUK provided eleven observations to be 
assessed by the Loviisa nuclear power plant as po-
tential development areas and issues to be contin-
uously improved. The NPP receives observations 
regarding its operations also from other sources 
(such as internal audits and event investigations). 
This way, the NPP is able to see the whole picture 
to assess whether the inspection observations in-
clude any new or recurring issues that require 
improvements or additional measures.
Radiation protection, 21–22 October 2015
The radiation protection inspection was mainly tar-
geted at dosimetry. The inspected areas included 
functionality of the dosimetry service, quality as-
surance and processing of non-conformances. The 
inspection also included a review of the results of a 
blind test. Based on the inspection results, one can 
state that radiation doses are determined in a man-
ner that complies with the set goals. Results of blind 
tests of dosimeters have been good, in both Finnish 
and international tests.
It was noted, however, that Fortum used finger 
dosimeters whose applicability for use at a nuclear 
power plant has not been verified. Because of this, 
STUK required that Fortum submit suitability 
analyses for all devices that are to be used when 
determining the eye or finger dose rate in the con-
trolled area of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
It was noted during the inspection that the 
transfer of dose data to the dose register functions 
properly and the practices comply with the proce-
dures laid down in STUK’s current ST Guides. The 
procedures used in the transfer of dose data had 
been erroneously described in Fortum’s internal 
guidelines, however. This is why STUK required 
that Fortum take into account the renewed ST 
Guides and the proposed changes when updating 
the radiation protection guidelines.
Fluctuation was observed in the relative differ-
ence between the surface dose and the deep dose 
in some cases. To be completely sure that the dif-
ference was not caused by a contaminated measur-
ing instrument, STUK required that practices for 
quality assurance of dosimetry must be created to 
be able to study the underlying causes of the most 
major differences before sending the dose data to 
the dose register.
Emergency preparedness, 
3–4 November 2015
The emergency preparedness inspection compre-
hensively covers the nuclear power plant’s emer-
gency preparedness arrangements. Issues that are 
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regularly inspected include emergency prepared-
ness guidelines, emergency preparedness facilities, 
emergency preparedness equipment, the emer-
gency preparedness organisation and training for 
the emergency preparedness organisation. Special 
inspection area in the 2015 inspection was the 
nuclear power plant’s evacuation arrangements. A 
brief survey about evacuation issues was arranged 
in connection with the annual outage.
Based on the inspection, STUK required that 
the emergency response plan be updated to take 
into account the commissioning of the new envi-
ronmental monitoring system and the decommis-
sioning of the old system.
In addition, more minor observations were 
made and two good practices were recorded during 
the inspection.
Final disposal facilities, 24–25 September 
2015
The inspection involved maintenance procedures 
of the final disposal facility (the concrete and rock 
structures of the VLJ repository) and monitoring 
of the bedrock onsite. Implemented repairs and 
modifications and results of the power company’s 
measurements, which also included measurement 
and analysis results for the hydrogeochemistry of 
the bedrock in the VLJ repository, as well as hydro-
logical and rock mechanics monitoring measure-
ments were studied during the inspection. With 
these monitoring measurements, the licensee as-
sesses the impact of the construction of the VLJ re-
pository and its operation on the hydrological, rock 
mechanics and hydrogeochemical properties of the 
bedrock at Hästholmen. Condition of the structural 
engineering structures in the disposal facility was 
studied during an inspection visit.
Following the inspection, STUK posed four re-
quirements on the delivery of the currently ongo-
ing guideline updates; these pertained to a visual 
inspection of the VLJ repository structures and 
packages, monitoring of the bedrock (setting result 
assessment criteria/limit values), interpretation 
of the VLJ repository’s hydrogeochemistry and de-
scription of its normal state.
Operating experience feedback, 28 May 2015
The inspected areas included the nuclear power 
plant’s operating experience feedback processes 
and their organisation as well as related guidelines 
and procedures. Procedures and their functional-
ity, processing of events, reporting and sufficiency 
of resources were verified in the inspection with 
example cases. In the field of management of non-
conformances, results of internal and external as-
sessments were verified.
Operating experience feedback and related in-
structions at the Loviisa nuclear power plant have 
been developed due to the requirements of the new 
YVL Guides, for example. Communication between 
different technical offices and the processing of 
events have been improved by naming contact 
persons. Procedures connected to the assessment 
of the impact of corrective measures and results of 
corrective measures will be further monitored in 
connection with annual reports.
Operational waste, 21–22 May 2015
The inspection covered the processing and final 
disposal of radioactive operational waste at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant. Low- and interme-
diate-level operational waste is generated during 
maintenance and repairs as well as during the 
treatment of circulating water. Issues studied dur-
ing the inspection included the processing of non-
conformances, HR planning and occupational ra-
diation doses. The condition of facilities in which 
waste is processed and stored, radiation levels in 
these facilities, their classification and their mark-
ings were inspected during the site visit.
No major non-conformances or development 
needs were detected in the inspection. STUK posed 
a requirement in the inspection that the power 
company must prepare a plan on emptying of an 
onsite waste storage site and processing of waste 
packages that are in poor condition. In 1978–1998, 
low activity operational waste was packaged into 
barrels. Some of the waste was very humid and has 
caused the barrels to corrode from the inside out. 
According to the current procedure, Fortum pack-
ages operational waste into barrels whose inside is 
coated and whose walls are thicker than that of the 
previous barrels, and the humidity level of opera-
tional waste has been minimised.
Management and safety culture, 
2 February 2015 and 17 April 2015
The inspection covered the licensee’s management 
of nuclear operations and safety culture. STUK 
focused especially on monitoring and assessing 
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how the licensee manages its management system 
development projects as a whole and how the dif-
ferent goals and actions of different projects are 
interwoven from the viewpoint of overall safety.
The inspection covered specific development 
projects selected based on a safety culture survey 
by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland and 
a report by a special report workgroup. Current 
status of the management system development 
project (JOJO) was also studied. Based on the 
inspection results, the licensee’s manager is more 
powerfully present at the nuclear power plant than 
before and the manager’s role in the development 
of operations at the Loviisa NPP has been pro-
moted. The inspection results indicated that the 
licensee is strongly committed in the development 
of nuclear safety. During the inspection, STUK ver-
ified that development projects that are important 
for the plant have been included in the plant’s ac-
tion plans and monitoring, and they are proceeding 
as planned. STUK noted, however, that the man-
agement review records of the NPP do not comply 
with all of the NPP’s guidelines on records: it is not 
possible to verify systematically from the records 
what conclusions have been made and measures 
carried out on the basis of the made observations.
Operational activities, 7 April 
2015 and 15–16 April 2015
The inspected areas included the procedure used 
to monitor the status of the plant, launching of a 
12-hour shift system trial, follow-up of corrective 
actions decided on the basis of operational events 
and the processing of non-conformances.
During the inspection, STUK verified the nu-
clear power plant’s documentation, monitored the 
performance of work and interviewed employees. 
In terms of the inspected areas, it was noted that 
there are instructions for the procedures, the in-
structions are up to date and the instructions are 
being followed. STUK observed some potential 
development areas in the division of labour among 
the shifts and required that the Loviisa NPP as-
sess the significance of these observations.
Structures and buildings, 8–9 April 2015
In the inspection of structures and buildings at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant, the maintenance 
procedures of structures, buildings as well as sea-
water channels and tunnels were assessed. In ad-
dition, the results of inspections carried out by the 
power company and completed modifications were 
studied.
The most important species in terms of the 
biofouling of the service water system are dark 
false mussel, freshwater hydroid and bay barnacle, 
all being species that already occur in the area. 
According to studies by the nuclear power plant, 
annual reproduction of the dark false mussel and 
the number of mussels in the sea area adjacent to 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant vary a great deal. 
At present, no new invasive species have been ob-
served in the Gulf of Finland that pose a clear dan-
ger to the operation of the Loviisa NPP. The service 
water systems are operational as a whole, and 
they are inspected in compliance with the monitor-
ing programme. Most cracks found in buildings 
and concrete structures are caused by wear and 
tear, such as superficial damage and cracks in the 
surface coating. Loviisa NPP renewed its dam-
age monitoring and reporting method in 2013. 
New damage is now detected more efficiency than 
before. Roof renovation projects and projects to 
improve the already existing flood protection and 
residual heat removal with the air-cooled cooling 
towers are currently ongoing at the plant. STUK 
required that Loviisa NPP submit to STUK repair 
plans for the roof of the cooling water tunnel.
Chemistry, 28–29 April 2015
In its inspection, STUK assessed the power com-
pany’s procedures applied to the maintenance of 
the chemical conditions in systems important to 
safety, as well as the monitoring of the radionuclide 
content of the reactor coolant system. Operations 
of the chemical laboratory are of a high quality 
and its personnel are committed to their work. 
Management of the laboratory encourage the em-
ployees to make observations and further develop 
the operations.
STUK required that Fortum submit to STUK a 
report on how resins released in the water purifi-
cation process at the condensate scrubbing plant 
can be prevented from getting into the steam 
generators. Resins have been released from said 
system into the secondary circuit water repeatedly 
over the past few years. Due to these problems, 
new faults in the steam generator heat transfer 
tubes are more likely and already existing faults 
can spread more quickly. The tubes are one of the 
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interfaces in the spreading of radioactivity, which 
means that the integrity of the tubes has high 
safety significance. Fortum is currently planning 
measures to make it substantially harder for un-
wanted substances to enter the steam generators.
Furthermore, STUK provided six observations 
regarding measurements during process tran-
sients, more efficiently reviewing operating experi-
ence reports at the laboratory, preventing contami-
nation at sampling points, monitoring surface con-
tamination at sampling points and functionality of 
fume chambers used during sampling.
Fire protection, 5–6 March 2015
The fire protection inspection covered effectiveness 
of the plant units’ fire protection arrangements 
and the operations of the power company, as well 
as plans on modifying the fire protection arrange-
ments.
It was verified with the inspection that the 
nuclear power plant’s fire alarm and fire preven-
tion systems have been inspected in compliance 
with the maintenance programme and the work 
order practices. Performance of the fire protec-
tion arrangements has been assessed with regular 
internal audits and also by the Eastern Uusimaa 
Fire and Rescue Services, the Finnish Safety and 
Chemicals Agency (Tukes) and the Nordic Nu-
clear Insurers insurance pool. In these inspections, 
STUK studied observed improvement proposals. 
STUK required that the licensee submit to STUK 
for information a repair plan prepared based on 
a condition survey of the fire water piping and a 
report on how penetrations in the service water 
system fibreglass tube meet the compartmentalisa-
tion requirements.
Observations regarding the following were also 
made: management of requirements, defective fire 
compartment penetration markings and potential 
risks involving a new fire water system and the 
service water system piping.
Nuclear security, 31 March 2015
The nuclear security inspection covered the use 
of key cabinets and the management of keys, the 
processing of non-conformances, training for the 
security organisation and successor planning.
Based on the inspection, STUK required mark-
ing of a limited area in the immediate vicinity of 
the gate building. STUK’s observations involved 
on-the-job learning descriptions by responsible 
persons, logs and planning of a successor for the 
person responsible for security arrangements. The 
measures resulting from remarks made in the 
course of earlier inspections were considered to be 
appropriately implemented.
Periodic inspection 
programme 2015, Olkiluoto
Human resources and competence, 
15–16 September 2015
The personnel resources and competence inspec-
tion covered HR resource management in compli-
ance with the organisation and operations model 
implemented by the TVO Group in April 2015 and 
the HR organisation. Several employees in the new 
roles in compliance with the service and compe-
tence centre operations model (such as a service 
manager, a competence centre manager and a busi-
ness partner) were interviewed during the inspec-
tion.
The new operating model of the TVO Group is 
now in use. The first service agreements are valid 
until the end of the year and people have been 
given new roles. In connection with the organisa-
tional change, HR functions were divided into a 
HR competence centre and a service centre. Based 
on the inspection and the interviews, STUK found 
that the service- and role-based operating model 
of the TVO Group has been taken into use, but 
some work to establish the practices is still needed. 
STUK will actively monitor the change. STUK did 
not pose any requirements based on the inspection.
Functionality of management system and 
quality assurance, 28–29 October 2015
The management system functionality and qual-
ity assurance inspection covered TVO’s document 
management, recording of non-conformances and 
processing of non-conformances. Another inspected 
area was a service verifying compliance of licens-
ing documentation in compliance with TVO’s new 
operating model. Seven field interviews regarding 
the non-conformance reporting and recording pro-
cedures were performed during the inspection.
STUK verified up-to-dateness of instructions 
included in a variety of TVO manuals from the 
guideline database. Based on the inspection, the 
procedures applied to keeping the instructions up 
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to date seem to be functional. Based on the inter-
views on the management of non-conformances, 
STUK noted that TVO has good prerequisites 
for highlighting non-conformances. However, more 
communication about the importance of systematic 
recording of observations and non-conformances in 
different parts of the organisation is still needed. 
TVO does not have any documented guidelines 
on how observations should be processed and 
communicated in joint meetings of the responsi-
ble organisation. Biannual management reviews 
mainly focus on quantities and the efficiency of the 
processing of single non-conformances.
Observations made by STUK when reviewing 
documentation on covering letters, cover pages, 
delivery of documents as logical entities and miss-
ing approval markings were studied during the 
inspection with the help of examples. On the basis 
of the inspection, STUK posed a requirement ac-
cording to which TVO must assess and implement 
measures to eliminate the possibility to maintain 
a document simultaneously in two databases. TVO 
has a currently ongoing licensing documentation 
development project that aims at creating clear 
and standardised procedures for the preparation of 
licensing documentation in the entire TVO Group. 
According to the plans, training regarding docu-
mentation requirements will be arranged in late 
2016.
Safety assessment and improvement 
of safety, 25 November 2015
The inspection on the assessment and improve-
ment of safety covered design activities by TVO. 
The inspection covered electricity and process de-
sign procedures, available resources and process-
ing of non-conformances at different design stages. 
An additional inspected area was current status 
of the modification work process. No non-conform-
ances that would give rise to a requirement were 
observed in the case of electricity and process de-
sign. The modification work process is basically the 
same as before, but the changed organisation has 
introduced some changes in the practical opera-
tions. The new organisational structure is still at 
the transition stage. It is a fairly major change in 
the organisation’s manner of organising and man-
aging work. Furthermore, the new YVL Guides and 
the need to update procedures and plant guidelines 
to comply with the new YVL Guides must be taken 
into account during the change. STUK will actively 
monitor the progress of the change. STUK did not 
pose any requirements based on the inspection.
Use of PRA, 6 October 2015
STUK assessed the use of the probabilistic risk as-
sessment (PRA) in a safety management inspection 
that covered the current status of a PRA update, 
the development of PRA results, the organisation, 
resources and guidelines. Processing of non-con-
formances within the PRA organisation was also 
assessed. It was noted during the inspection that 
TVO will comprehensively assess the need to up-
date the PRA applications by the end of 2016. Over 
the course of the past year, PRA assessments have 
mainly been completed in connection with plant 
modification projects and to support the planning 
of the 2015 annual outages. TVO has performed 
quarterly risk follow-ups of operational events. No 
requirements were posed by STUK following the 
inspection. The PRA is used as planned and in a 
versatile manner to support the management of 
safety, and no major deficiencies were observed in 
the inspected issues.
Structures and buildings, 21–22 October 2015
In the inspection of the structures and buildings 
at Olkiluoto NPP, STUK focused on the mainte-
nance procedures and management of ageing of 
the structures, buildings, seawater channels and 
tunnels, spent fuel storage and handling pools, con-
densate pools, fuel racks and piping supports. The 
inspection covered the power company organisa-
tion, the power company’s inspection instructions, 
the power company’s inservice inspections, repairs 
and modifications, building ageing management 
projects, as well as other inspections within the 
area of responsibility. STUK verified the execution 
and results of the power company’s internal inspec-
tions and related reporting. As observations, STUK 
noted that some structural engineering guidelines 
have not been reviewed on time. STUK did not 
pose any requirements based on the inspection.
Chemistry, 11–12 November 2015
In the chemistry inspection, STUK assessed the 
power company’s procedures applied to the main-
tenance and supervision of the chemical conditions 
in systems important to safety, as well as the moni-
toring of the radionuclide content of the reactor 
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coolant system. The 2015 inspection covered the 
following: status of requirements and observations 
from the previous years, organisational units in 
chemistry and radiochemistry and their opera-
tions, chemical conditions and migration of radio-
activity, quality assurance of the laboratory’s tech-
nical operations, processing of non-conformances, 
and an inspection visit.
STUK did not pose any requirements based 
on the inspection. STUK issued four observations 
regarding validation measurements, taking into 
account job rotation risks, approval of quality as-
surance results, and marking of malfunctioning or 
damaged components. In addition, STUK identified 
one good practice: job rotation broadens the em-
ployees’ competence and thus reduces dependence 
on specific employees. It also improves wellbeing 
and coping at work.
Fire protection, 16–17 September 2015
In the inspection of fire protection at Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant, the efficiency of the NPP’s fire 
protection arrangements and the power company’s 
operations was assessed, and plans on modifying 
the fire protection arrangements and fire protec-
tion instructions were reviewed. Furthermore, man-
agement of non-conformances was studied, as well 
as fire inspection observations recorded over the 
course of the year and their processing status was 
reviewed. An inspection visit was performed to ver-
ify fire protection modifications and procurements. 
An observation regarding the organisation made 
during the inspection was that a management-level 
employee acting as the substitute of another em-
ployee may carry the responsibility linked to several 
duties at the same time. No goods causing extra fire 
loads along access routes were observed during the 
inspection visit. STUK did not pose any require-
ments based on the inspection.
Nuclear security, 8–10 April 2015
The first nuclear security inspection in 2015 cov-
ered security arrangement processes as part of the 
management system, as well as technical and func-
tional implementation of security arrangements. 
The management system section focused on physi-
cal protection and information security, as well as 
issues pertaining to the interface between security 
arrangements and nuclear safeguards. The prac-
tical implementation section focused on physical 
security arrangements. Inspected areas included 
management of non-conformances and risks, self-
assessments and practical implementation of se-
curity arrangements. The implementation of meas-
ures determined based on the requirements and 
observations of previous inspections is proceeding 
acceptably.
Following the inspection, STUK posed two re-
quirements. The first requirement was about con-
tinuous development of the management of non-
conformances: STUK required that the coverage, 
prioritisation and reporting of observations per-
taining to potentially illegal activities or security 
arrangements be improved. As the second require-
ment, STUK required that nuclear safeguards risk 
management procedures must be standardised 
with the comprehensive company-level risk man-
agement process.
Nuclear security, 26–27 October 2015
The second nuclear security inspection in 2015 cov-
ered practical implementation of physical security 
arrangements. Inspected areas included training 
and drills linked to the maintenance of security 
arrangements, security arrangement events and 
non-conformances. The 2015 training and drill 
plan was realised as planned. TVO is currently 
developing the procedure it uses when processing 
the results of training and drills, security arrange-
ment assessments based on these, monitoring of 
further measures and their reporting. Surveillance 
statistics for 2015 were reviewed during the in-
spection. Non-conformances were studied from 
the viewpoint of the processing and recording of 
observations made by the security organisation. 
STUK noted that in line with the requirements 
on non-conformance management in the previous 
nuclear security inspections, processing of observa-
tions and non-conformances should be continued to 
achieve an overall picture of the situation. STUK 
did not pose any new requirements based on the 
inspection.
Operational waste, 5–6 October 2015
STUK regulates and inspects the processing and fi-
nal disposal of radioactive operational waste at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. Low- and interme-
diate-level waste is generated during maintenance 
and repairs as well as during the treatment of cir-
culating water. An inspection of operational waste 
STUK-B 203
97
APPENDIX 4 periodic inSpection programme of nuclear power plantS 2015
focused on remarks made during the last inspec-
tion, development since the last inspection and any 
important issues that have occurred. The inspec-
tion focused on waste management processes, HR 
planning and the occupational radiation dose. The 
condition of facilities in which waste is processed 
and stored, the condition of final disposal facilities, 
radiation levels in these facilities, as well as their 
classification and their markings were studied dur-
ing the inspection visit.
No major non-conformances or development 
needs were detected in the inspection. TVO is plan-
ning general training on measures to reduce the 
amount of waste. Markings at operational waste 
collection points have been made clearer and fire 
protection in the collection and storage of waste 
has been improved at the Olkiluoto NPP. The oc-
cupational radiation dose is incurred when employ-
ees process waste during annual outages, transport 
waste, package waste and solidify liquid radioac-
tive waste. The radiation doses have remained low 
when compared to the plant’s total radiation doses. 
They have remained clearly below the individual 
dose limits set for employees doing radiation work.
Annual outage, 3 May – 4 June 2015
The annual outages at Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 
took place from 3 May to 4 June 2015. During the 
annual outage, STUK implemented an inspection 
on the operations of the nuclear power plant to 
maintain safety and manage operations during an-
nual outages. During this inspection, STUK moni-
tored the work done onsite, conducted inspection 
visits and interviewed employees. A special inspec-
tion area in this year’s inspection was replace-
ment of a feedwater line mixing point. The mixing 
point is located at the junction of piping from the 
feedwater system and piping from the reactor cool-
ant system of the shut down reactor where flows 
mix. The mixing point was replaced because cracks 
were detected during the 2014 annual outages. 
Other inspected areas included electricity and I&C 
work, outage risks, radiation protection, structural 
engineering and fire protection, the plant’s operat-
ing chemistry and implementation of Olkiluoto 2 
emergency control room. Nothing to remark was 
observed in most of the inspected areas. Based 
on the inspection, STUK posed one requirement 
regarding radiation protection procedures at the 
actuator level in the containment.
Mechanical engineering, 15 –16 June 2015
The areas inspected in the mechanical engineer-
ing inspection included procedures used to verify 
operability and long-term operational safety of pip-
ing important to safety. These issues were studied 
from the viewpoint of responsibilities, resources, 
competence and monitoring procedures, taking into 
account operating experience and the utilisation of 
operating experience. The inspection focused on vi-
bration problems that occurred in connection with 
a modification of an auxiliary feedwater system 
recirculation line at Olkiluoto 1. Structural issues 
important for the modification, expert estimates 
on the underlying reasons of the problems, studies 
conducted to resolve the problems and trial runs 
were inspected.
It was noted that TVO’s operations and report-
ing during the studying of the difficult vibration 
problem have been active and systematic. However, 
normal operation of the system was not analysed 
as carefully as would have been necessary when 
planning the system modification when taking into 
account the fact that the system was known to be 
problematic based on previous operating experi-
ence. Following the inspection, STUK posed four 
requirements. For example, STUK requires that 
TVO study procedures and available resources for 
hydrodynamic dimensioning calculations and anal-
yses for piping system modification projects. Fur-
thermore, STUK requires that TVO studies ade-
quacy and functionality of measuring programmes 
used to verify long-term availability of piping and 
fatigue monitoring systems.
Emergency preparedness, 9–10 June 2015
The emergency preparedness inspection compre-
hensively covers the nuclear power plant’s emer-
gency preparedness arrangements. Issues that are 
regularly inspected include emergency prepared-
ness guidelines, emergency preparedness facilities, 
emergency preparedness equipment, the emergen-
cy preparedness organisation and training for the 
emergency preparedness organisation. A special 
inspection area in the 2015 inspection was the nu-
clear power plant’s evacuation arrangements.
Following the inspection, STUK posed three 
requirements. Emergency response plan updates 
have not been properly submitted to STUK. STUK 
requires that TVO submit the missing plans to 
STUK and specify the future emergency response 
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plan delivery procedures. In Finland and Sweden, 
nuclear power plant introductory training need 
not be separately completed at each NPP. TVO 
must specify the plant-specific written emergency 
response training materials that supplement in-
troductory training and that has been provided 
by other NPPs. STUK also required that assembly 
points used during evacuation must be clearly and 
consistently marked, and communication proce-
dure for the assembly points must be checked and 
corrected in the emergency response plan.
Management and safety culture, 
3–4 February 2015
The management and safety culture inspection fo-
cused on TVO’s changed operating model and its 
potential effects on nuclear safety and the safety 
culture. TVO’s plans and measures to ensure safety 
during the change were studied during the inspec-
tion. No interviews were conducted during the in-
spection.
TVO will implement the new operating model 
during the spring of 2015. The new operating 
model standardises procedures and strives to use 
resources in a flexible manner: general tasks are 
centralised to service centres and tasks requiring 
special expertise are managed by competence cen-
tres. Responsibilities on the overall management 
of safety are determined more clearly than before. 
Many employees of TVO have participated in the 
planning of the change, and TVO has invested in 
openness when implementing the change.
An independent assessment must be completed 
for such a major organisational change. It will 
be done by a party outside of TVO. STUK also 
required that TVO assess the change after imple-
mentation and submits an assessment report to 
STUK for information by the end of 2015.
Operating experience 
feedback, 8–9 April 2015
In the operating experience feedback inspection, 
STUK verified operating processes and the organi-
sation, as well as related guidelines and procedures. 
Utilisation of internal and external operating expe-
rience feedback and results of new safety analyses 
were studied during the inspection. Processing and 
reporting of events and utilisation of operating ex-
perience feedback from other plants were verified 
with the help of example cases.
No requirements were posed by STUK following 
the inspection, but some observations regarding 
the processing of non-conformances were made 
in the inspection. Communication of information 
within the organisation has been slow in the case 
of some events. STUK also pointed out that the 
annual reporting of operating experience feedback 
in 2014 did not comply with all of the YVL Guide 
requirements. The annual reporting in 2015 will be 
assessed based on the new Guide YVL A.10.
Conduct of operations, 12–13 March 2015
The operational activity inspection aimed at verify-
ing the operating organisation’s non-conformance 
management procedures. STUK focused on three 
inspection areas: inspection rounds in compliance 
with an inspection list by the operating shift at the 
plant, TVO’s internal operational activity audits 
and management of non-conformances in the op-
erational organisation.
STUK participated in the inspection rounds in-
cluded in the inspection list with the morning shift. 
Inspection rounds in the inspection list aim at a 
systematic verification of compliance of the plant’s 
rooms and equipment with the requirements. It 
was verified during the inspection that the inspec-
tion rounds were completed in compliance with the 
plant’s own guidelines. TVO has a current develop-
ment project whose goal is to include monitoring 
of a variety of operating observations as part of 
the inspection rounds in the inspection list. Fur-
thermore, more detailed instructions about the is-
sues field operators must inspect with special care 
(such as fire loads and earthquake risks) will be 
given. In terms of the processing of the operating 
organisation’s non-conformances, it was noted that 
all measures had been completed on time and the 
operations complied with the instructions.
All the inspected areas were deemed fine. STUK 
made some observations but did not pose any re-
quirements based on the observations.
Plant maintenance, 30–31 March 2015
During the inspection, compliance with the re-
quirements of the new Guide YVL A.8, Ageing 
management of a nuclear facility, at the currently 
operating Olkiluoto plant units was verified by 
means of interviews and document reviews. A pre-
vious statement of TVO on compliance with said 
Guide was also used as reference material. Another 
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area that was inspected was the means used to 
prevent the procurement of counterfeit products.
Compliance with some of the requirements on 
ageing management could not be verified. Clear 
proof of, for instance, the ability to verify the oper-
ability of a train included in a system realised us-
ing the redundancy principle independently from 
other systems could not be verified and no proof 
about instructions to verify that key information 
and competence needed to take care of duties will 
be retained in case employees are replaced could 
be obtained. TVO’s ageing management will be 
revisited in later inspections once the Guide YVL 
A.8 has entered into force. To prevent counterfeits, 
TVO will provide training to its personnel and 
update its instructions regarding the following 
issues: procurements, supplier assessment and in-
spection manual. Counterfeits can be identified by, 
for instance, a visual inspection where the product 
is compared with a similar product or by verifying 
quality certificates of the entire subcontracting 
chain. Based on the inspection, TVO has access to 
the means needed to prevent counterfeit products 
from entering the plant (or reduce the risk caused 
by the use of counterfeits).
Electrical engineering, 10–11 March 2015
The electrical engineering inspection covered the 
effects of the Fukushima and Forsmark events on 
the electricity and diesel systems of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant, monitoring of the ageing of 
electrical equipment, power distribution system 
in case of a severe reactor accident, processing of 
non-conformances, programmable electrical equip-
ment and electrical equipment commissioning in-
spections. Based on the inspection results, STUK 
required from TVO for information reports on de-
tected unqualified electrical equipment and man-
agement of the ageing of electrical equipment.
I&C engineering, 10–11 March 2015
The I&C engineering inspection covered unfinished 
issues pertaining to measuring accuracy from the 
previous inspections, the I&C design and imple-
mentation process in connection with the transfer 
to the new YVL Guides, results on studies about 
devices that do not comply with their markings, 
management of non-conformances in I&C technolo-
gy and change design, and the management of age-
ing. Based on the inspection, development of the 
I&C design and implementation process in connec-
tion with the application of the new YVL Guides is 
an issue to be monitored.
Information security, 28–29 April 2015
The information security inspection covered prac-
tical implementation of information security. 
Inspected areas included classification of data 
systems, nuclear information security, impact of 
the organisational change on information security, 
plant modifications to be implemented during the 
annual outage, assessment of systems’ information 
security and information security control selection 
procedures. The status of requirements and ob-
servations from previous inspections was also re-
viewed. Their implementation has proceeded in an 
acceptable manner.
Based on the inspection, STUK issued two 
requirements. The first requirement was about 
hardware configuration management and the sec-
ond was about the assessment and reporting of 
information security events.
Radiation protection, 18–19 March 2015
The radiation protection inspection was mainly 
targeted at dosimetry. The inspected areas includ-
ed functionality of the dosimetry service, quality 
assurance and processing of non-conformances. 
Based on the inspection results, one can state that 
radiation doses are determined in a manner that 
complies with the set goals.
Radiation doses of employees exposed to ra-
diation are determined with passive and real-time 
electronic dosimeters. Official radiation doses are 
determined with passive dosimeters. This is not 
possible at all times, however, in which case ra-
diation doses are assessed with the help of infor-
mation obtained from real-time dosimeters. The 
underlying reason in most cases is that employees 
fail to return their passive dosimeters right after 
their shift. The number of assessed doses has re-
mained high over the past few years. On the basis 
of the inspection, TVO was requested to prepare a 
report on which measures could be used to reduce 
the number of assessed radiation doses.
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APPENDIX 5 Construction inspection 
programme of Olkiluoto 3 in 2015
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction in-
spection programme is to verify that the operations 
required by the construction of the unit ensure a 
high quality implementation according to the ap-
proved plans and are compliant with official regu-
lations, without compromising the operating units 
within the site. The inspection programme assesses 
and oversees the licensee’s operations in construct-
ing the unit, implementation of procedures in vari-
ous technical disciplines, the licensee’s competence 
and use of expertise, the processing of safety is-
sues, as well as quality assurance and control. The 
inspection programme of Olkiluoto 3 was launched 
in 2005 when construction of the unit started. The 
number of annual inspections has varied between 
nine and fifteen.
In 2015, 13 inspections included in the construc-
tion inspection programme were implemented, one 
of which was an unannounced inspection. Special 
focus areas of the construction inspection pro-
gramme included commissioning procedures and 
activities at the construction site. Below is a brief 
description of the inspection findings for which 
STUK required improvements from TVO. On the 
whole, the inspections have led to the conclusion 
that the procedures and resources of TVO’s organi-
sation are adequate.
The nuclear security inspection focused on 
security arrangements during commissioning and 
practical implementation of nuclear security. As a 
result of the inspection, STUK required delivery 
of a schedule for commissioning activities that are 
important in terms of nuclear security to STUK. 
Furthermore, TVO was requested to provide re-
ports on installation supervision information se-
curity inspection procedures, reporting practices 
and experiences, as well as methods used to protect 
rooms important to safety.
The I&C inspection covered installation, test-
ing and change management practices. No require-
ments were posed by STUK following the inspection; 
TVO’s activities were appropriate and the inspectors 
received a positive image during the inspection. 
Activities regarding change management procedures 
during commissioning were still at their early stages 
and will be revisited in later inspections.
Subject of inspection Inspection date
Nuclear security 25–26 February 2015
PACS I&C system supervision procedures 3 March 2015
Quality assurance: implementation of YVL Guides 14–15 April 2015
Installation supervision 21 April 2015
Management and processing of safety issues 18–19 August 2015
Nuclear security in management system and technical implementation of 
security arrangements 16–17 September 2015
Testing of safety functions and their supporting functions during commissioning 22 September 2015
Commissioning of ventilation and air conditioning systems 23 September 2015
Unannounced installation supervision inspection 29 August – 5 September 2015
Electrical engineering 15–16 October 2015
Quality assurance 4–5 November 2015
Radiation safety 17–18 November 2015
Utilisation of PRA 26 November 2015
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The quality assurance inspection covered the 
organisational reform, development of guidelines 
and studies required for implementation of the 
new regulatory guidelines. One requirement was 
issued during the inspection on delivery of a plan 
concerning the plant guidelines to STUK.
The installation supervision inspection cov-
ered TVO’s readiness for installation supervision 
as the construction site becomes busier. It was 
noted that TVO has established installation super-
vision practices and practices for the orientation of 
new contractors. Based on the inspection results, 
TVO’s resources are sufficient. No requirements 
were posed in the inspection.
The unannounced installation supervi-
sion inspection covered installation supervision 
resources once the installation activities have be-
come busier. Site visits were conducted to verify 
the adequacy of installation supervision resources 
in different engineering disciplines both during 
and after normal working hours. The possibility 
of TVO’s installation supervision organisation to 
react to changing resource needs in the future and 
the size of installation supervision resources when 
compared to the installation workload were also 
assessed. The resources were deemed sufficient, 
but TVO was requested to make preparations for 
the changing resource needs.
The electrical engineering inspection cov-
ered change management, preparation for the com-
missioning phase, orientation of the subcontractor 
doing electrical installation work in the contain-
ment and installation supervision resources. No 
defects in the licensee’s operations were observed 
during the inspection. One requirement was issued 
during the inspection on presenting a work report 
on the mapping of software-based components to 
STUK.
The management and safety issue process-
ing inspection covered the effects of TVO’s organi-
sational reform on resource management and the 
clarity of roles, in particular. In addition, process-
ing of safety issues and communication within the 
TVO organisation were verified by means of exam-
ples. No defects in the licensee’s operations were 
observed during the inspection.
Two inspections on commissioning were per-
formed. One of the inspections involved coverage 
of safety function testing, assessment of testing 
coverage, managing of larger entities in testing 
programs and during actual testing. As part of the 
inspection, STUK interviewed experts in commis-
sioning testing, reviewing testing programs and 
nuclear safety. The second commissioning inspec-
tion focused on ventilation and air conditioning 
system trial runs. The inspection covered mainte-
nance during commissioning, change management, 
special air conditioning requirements in specific 
rooms and orientation of new employees partici-
pating in commissioning. TVO’s procedures were 
deemed sufficient and STUK did not pose any re-
quirements in these inspections.
The year’s second nuclear security inspection 
focused on security arrangements during commis-
sioning. Practical implementation of security ar-
rangements was verified during an site walk-down. 
The status of observations and requirements from 
previous inspections was also reviewed. All re-
quirements from previous inspections were closed. 
The site walk-down covered the reactor building, 
outdoor areas and the logistics chain in the nuclear 
power plant area. Based on the inspection, STUK 
posed one requirement regarding the plant data-
base.
The quality assurance inspection in the au-
tumn covered effects of TVO’s organisational re-
form, preparation for the submission of the oper-
ating licence application and the management of 
open issues. No requirements were posed in the 
inspection.
The radiation safety inspection covered re-
sources of the radiation protection organisation, 
preparation for commissioning of the controlled 
area and radiation protection acquisitions. In addi-
tion, TVO’s measures in assessing the correctness 
of the N16 source term were studied. The inspec-
tion included an site walk-down, during which 
future locations of water and air effluent monitors 
and sampling points were verified, for example. 
Based on the inspection, TVO was requested to as-
sess sufficiency of its radiation protection person-
nel resources.
The inspection on utilisation of the probabil-
istic risk assessment (PRA) covered the current 
status and verified TVO’s inspection and supervi-
sion actions in relation to the plant supplier’s PRA 
work. No requirements were posed by STUK fol-
lowing the inspection.
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APPENDIX 6 Inspections pertaining 
to the processing of Fennovoima’s 
construction licence application
During the processing of the application documen-
tation linked to the construction licence application 
of the Hanhikivi 1 plant project, STUK assesses 
both technical compliance of the plant and ability 
of the organisations of the licensee, the plant sup-
plier and the main service providers to construct 
and ultimately operate a nuclear power plant.
In addition to studying the management sys-
tems of these actors, STUK conducts inspections 
to verify that the operations of the organisations 
comply with the requirements in practice. STUK 
launched the inspections included in the regula-
tory inspection programme (RKT) in September 
2015. Inspections are planned biannually. In 2015, 
STUK carried out a total of six inspections. The 
inspection results will be used when preparing 
STUK’s safety assessment for the construction 
licence.
Management and processing of safety issues
An inspection on Fennovoima’s management and 
the processing of safety issues, arranged on 14–
15 September 2015, covered the role and actions 
of Fennovoima’s management in the identifica-
tion, monitoring and processing of safety issues. 
As a result of the inspection, STUK stated that 
Fennovoima has allocated resources to guide the 
plant supplier’s design in such a manner that it 
will meet the Finnish safety requirements, but 
Fennovoima’s internal procedures to prove com-
pliance of design, such as design inspection pro-
cedures, are still partially unfinished. STUK re-
quired that Fennovoima develop the procedures 
so that nuclear safety and radiation safety issues 
will be taken into account to a sufficient extent 
in design inspections and approvals. Furthermore, 
STUK required that independent workgroups be 
utilised to support and assess Fennovoima’s work 
when preparing the permit applications laid down 
in the Nuclear Energy Act.
Management system and key processes
The inspection on the management system and 
key processes took place from 29 September to 
2 October 2015. The inspection covered readi-
ness of Fennovoima’s management system and 
Fennovoima’s work on further improving nuclear 
safety in a manner compliant with the plant pro-
ject’s needs. Fennovoima’s risk management and 
readiness to manage the project’s supply chain in 
compliance with the Finnish requirements were 
also assessed. Both Fennovoima’s own procedures 
and requirements posed by Fennovoima for the 
organisations involved in the project were assessed 
in the inspection.
Since this was STUK’s first inspection of 
Fennovoima’s management system, several de-
velopment areas were observed, such as aware-
Subject of inspection Inspection date
Management and processing of safety issues 14–15 September 2015
Management system and key processes 29 September – 2 October 2015
Fennovoima’s safety culture 16–18 November 2015
Nuclear security 30 November – 1 December 2015
Resources and competence management 8–9 December 2015
Principal designer inspection 16–18 December 2015
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ness of the management system, supplier supervi-
sion procedures, processing of non-conformances, 
and assessment and development of the manage-
ment system. In addition, STUK required from 
Fennovoima a long-term development plan that 
takes into account different construction phases 
and future operation of the nuclear power plant.
Fennovoima’s safety culture
The inspection, arranged on 16–18 November 2015, 
covered Fennovoima’s safety culture and actions 
of the management to promote the safety culture. 
Importance of issues influencing safety in the op-
erations of Fennovoima, the management’s actions 
when communicating safety issues and the general 
atmosphere at the company, particularly in terms of 
the processing of safety defects and safety concerns, 
were studied during the inspection. Furthermore, 
Fennovoima’s procedures in assessing and devel-
oping the safety culture were assessed. The pro-
cedures of Fennovoima’s own organisation in the 
assessing and developing safety culture as well as 
Fennovoima’s own actions to ensure good safety cul-
ture in the supply chain were studied.
As a result of the inspection, STUK stated 
that safety has not always been the primary 
guiding factor in the processing of documents at 
Fennovoima; instead, adherence to schedules has 
been deemed more important than comprehensive 
processing. STUK required from Fennovoima an 
action plan for the implementation of a safety cul-
ture development programme to improve manage-
ment practices and make the atmosphere open and 
transparent. Furthermore, STUK required from 
Fennovoima a report on nuclear sector expertise 
and experience of the company management and 
an assessment of the company’s strategic goals and 
future challenges when taking into account prepa-
ration for operation of the nuclear power plant and 
the actual operational phase.
Nuclear security
The nuclear security inspection took place from 
30 November to 1 December 2015. The inspection 
covered Fennovoima’s structural, technical, opera-
tive and organisational arrangements to detect 
and prevent illegal and unauthorised activities. 
Fennovoima’s arrangements and procedures were 
deemed mostly appropriate in the inspection.
Resources and competence management
The inspection, arranged on 8–9 December 2015, 
covered Fennovoima’s resources and competence 
management. In the inspection, Fennovoima 
presented its procedures to develop the nuclear 
and radiation safety competence of its organisa-
tion. Fennovoima’s competence development prin-
ciples were deemed appropriate in the inspec-
tion. STUK posed a requirement in the inspec-
tion that Fennovoima name positions important 
to safety within its organisation as laid down in 
the Government Degree on the Safety of Nuclear 
Power Plants (717/2013). Furthermore, STUK re-
quired that orientation plans for new employees 
be prepared, their realisation be monitored and 
implementation of planned orientation be verified.
Principal designer inspection
On 16–18 December 2015, STUK assessed proce-
dures of the principal designer of the Hanhikivi 1 
project, Atomproekt, in an inspection in St. 
Petersburg. STUK’s inspection verified develop-
ment of the principal designer’s management sys-
tem and whether the design operations of AP com-
ply with the Finnish requirements. The inspection 
focused especially on Atomproekt’s design man-
agement procedures and guidelines. Configuration 
management and requirement management proce-
dures were verified during the inspection, among 
others. Following the inspection, STUK posed re-
quirements on further development of said pro-
cesses and the designer’s management system for 
open issues. Furthermore, STUK required a report 
on design and project management resources al-
located to the FH1 project. STUK also posed a 
requirement on preparing instructions specific to 
the FH1 project for the preliminary safety analysis 
report. Requirements regarding the preparation 
of system quality plans and system qualification 
plans were also posed. In its summary, STUK em-
phasised the analysis of the observations made in 
the preliminary safety assessment in the principal 
designer’s organisation and traceability in plant 
and system design.
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APPENDIX 7 Construction inspection programme 
for the encapsulation plant and disposal facility
When the construction licence was granted in late 
2015, the oversight project launched the construc-
tion inspection programme (RTO). Inspections in-
cluded in the programme assess the functionality 
of Posiva’s management system, the sufficiency of 
procedures and their ability to guide design, manu-
facture, construction and installation operations, 
as well as the taking into account of safety re-
quirements at different stages of the nuclear waste 
disposal facility project. The programme aims at 
assessing Posiva’s procedures to ensure that a safe 
nuclear facility of a high quality will be construct-
ed. Inspections included in the programme may 
also be targeted to Posiva’s suppliers important to 
safety.
Since the programme was launched in late 2015 
once the construction licence had been granted, 
there were only two inspections in 2015. Below 
are brief descriptions of the inspections, as well as 
the key observations made based on which STUK 
had required improvements and development ac-
tions from Posiva. A total of twelve requirements 
on correcting deficiencies or further developing its 
operations were submitted to Posiva in the inspec-
tion decisions.
Monitoring effects of underground 
construction activities
The inspection area was limited as the hydrol-
ogy, hydrogeology, hydrogeochemistry and rock me-
chanics of research facility Onkalo and the future 
disposal facility, as well as monitoring of foreign 
materials. Purpose of the inspection on the moni-
toring of the effects of underground construction 
activities was to verify how the Posiva organisation 
implements the monitoring programme published 
in 2012. The inspection covered the monitoring 
organisation, instructions for different monitor-
ing areas and assessment procedures for the effect 
of the underground construction activities on the 
safety features of the nearby bedrock. Quality as-
surance of monitoring results and reporting, as 
well as the reporting itself, were also studied.
One goal of the monitoring by Posiva is to moni-
tor the effects of the construction of the research 
facility Onkalo and later on the underground dis-
posal facility on the bedrock at Olkiluoto. Posiva 
aims at proving that the properties of the bedrock 
surrounding the disposal facility that are favourable 
towards long-term safety of final disposal will be 
retained. Furthermore, the monitoring will provide 
data to be used when describing properties of the 
final disposal location and specifying of a variety 
of models and the verification of forecasts based on 
these models. The monitoring data can also be used 
in the Olkiluoto EIA procedure and environmental 
radiation monitoring.
As a result of the inspection, STUK required that 
Posiva develop procedures to minimise the delays 
observed in the annual reporting of hydrogeochem-
istry and foreign material monitoring. The inspec-
tion also proved that Posiva still needs to develop 
the analysis methods of the rock mechanics moni-
toring programme and its results. Furthermore, 
Posiva needs to verify in the future that the pro-
cedures used when reviewing and approving quar-
terly memorandums comply with the requirements 
of Posiva’s document management process.
Management
The management inspection covered actions by 
Posiva’s management regarding preparation for 
Subject of inspection Inspection date
Monitoring effects of underground construction activities 26–27 November 2015
Management 9–11 December 2015
STUK-B 203
105
the construction phase, verification of sufficient 
personnel resources and competence, as well as 
assessment and further development of the Posiva 
safety culture. The inspection also covered the cur-
rent status of Posiva’s organisational reform and 
related changes in responsibilities and policies.
As part of the inspection, STUK interviewed 
eight people within the Posiva organisation. Some 
of them are employees of TVO. The interviews were 
conducted in order to obtain information about 
what the employees of Posiva think about the new 
organisational model and its impact on their duties. 
A summary of the interview observations was pre-
sented during the inspection, and representatives 
of Posiva stated that the observations made were 
consistent with their own experiences and person-
nel survey results.
Goals of the organisational reform implemented 
by Posiva in November 2015 and the updated strat-
egy on which the change is based were studied dur-
ing the inspection. Posiva has submitted to STUK 
management and organisation manuals updated 
to comply with the new organisational model. The 
manual describes, at a general level, the utilisation 
of TVO’s resources and new programmes, among 
others.
Posiva previously submitted to STUK a plant 
project resource plan as part of the construction 
licence application documentation. Current status 
of personnel resources and competence could not be 
verified in the inspection because the organisational 
reform and planning are still unfinished. Posiva’s 
personnel resource plan is being updated due to the 
project plans of the new organisation, preparation 
for production and the Group’s resource planning. 
This is why STUK required that Posiva submit to 
STUK resource plans for the different programmes 
and plant projects, and a report on the resources and 
competence available in 2016. Furthermore, STUK 
required that Posiva submit long-term resource 
plans for these programmes and plant projects.
When processing the construction licence appli-
cation, STUK has verified, as part of the inspection 
programme, that Posiva’s procedures for the con-
struction phase are sufficient. A draft of Posiva’s up-
dated project plan was reviewed during the inspec-
tion. The project plan describes the goals of Posiva’s 
operations from the present to the closing of the first 
disposal tunnel. Based on the inspection, Posiva’s 
management and implementation during the con-
struction phase will be described in the project plan, 
the project steering plan and the programme plans. 
The inspection focused especially on how Posiva has 
planned to assign responsibilities, duties and oper-
ating methods from the previous plant project to the 
new organisational model to the required extent. 
Posiva’s preliminary plan, presented during the 
inspection, is to expand the project process descrip-
tions and procedures used in the plant project to 
cover Posiva’s project management or all of Posiva’s 
operations via the management system.
As one of the requirements based on the inspec-
tion, STUK required that Posiva submit to STUK 
a plan on key management system guidelines that 
need to be updated due to the organisational reform. 
The plan must cover the necessary issues needed to 
include the requirements, processes and procedures 
described in the plant project instructions into the 
documents guiding the project and the implemen-
tation of programmes and projects. Furthermore, 
Posiva must submit to STUK a project plan, a pro-
ject steering plan, plans for the programmes and 
plant projects, as well related quality and risk man-
agement plans in compliance with the requirements 
of the YVL Guide.
A safety culture programme prepared by Posiva 
in early 2015 states that Posiva needs to, taking into 
account the special characteristics of the project 
stage, obtain the support of TVO, which has oper-
ated nuclear power plants for a long time. In the 
inspection, Posiva stated that it will close its own 
safety culture programme and participate in the 
Group-level safety culture programme in the future. 
In this respect, STUK required that Posiva assess 
how well the Group-level safety culture programme 
and the safety culture workgroup correspond with 
Posiva’s management manual, Posiva’s safety cul-
ture programme and the policy of Posiva’s safety 
culture workgroup.
With this requirement, STUK required that 
Posiva document the Group-level management sys-
tem development and assessment procedures, re-
sponsibilities and obligations due to the changed 
operating model.
According to the policy of Posiva’s safety culture 
workgroup, the workgroup prepares an annual re-
port that includes the workgroup’s assessment of 
the status of Posiva’s safety culture. STUK required 
that this assessment be submitted to STUK for in-
formation.
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APPENDIX 8 Licences and approvals in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act in 2015
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 1/G42214/2014,	16	January	2015,	OL3	–	Import	
of a boron concentration measurement system 
from Germany and import of neutron source el-
ements and a thermal shield from France. Last 
date of validity 31 January 2018.
•	 1/C42214/2015,	11	March	2015,	import	of	tech-
nical design documents of a neutron flux meas-
uring system for reactor units OL1 and OL2 
from Japan. Last date of validity 31 January 
2018.
•	 3/C42214/2015,	13	October	2015,	import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “P” 
from Sweden (OL2 e 36). Last date of validity 
31 January 2016.
•	 4/C42214/2015,	13	October	2015,	import	of	nu-
clear fuel with Euratom obligation code “S” from 
Germany (OL1 e 38). Last date of validity 31 
January 2016.
•	 6/C42214/2015,	 9	 November	 2015,	 OL1/OL2	 –	
import of reactor coolant pumps from Germany. 
Last date of validity 31 January 2018.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 14/Y42214/2014,	 19	 January	 2015,	 possession	
and transfer of nuclear information concerning 
the Fennovoima NPP to Fennovoima Oy, Platom 
Oy and VTT Technical Research Centre of Fin-
land. Last date of validity 31 December 2023.
•	 4/A42214/2015,	26	May	2015,	import	of	neutron	
flux detectors for Loviisa 1 and 2 from France. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2015.
•	 5/A42214/2015,	26	May	2015,	Loviisa	1	and	2	–	
import of intermediate shafts of the control rod 
drive mechanism from the Czech Republic. Last 
date of validity 31 December 2015.
•	 10/A42214/2015,	 9	 November	 2015,	 import	 of	
new fuel from Russia and transport to the Lovi-
isa nuclear power plant. Last date of validity 31 
December 2027 in terms of the fuel for Loviisa 1 
and 31 December 2030 for Loviisa 2.
Others
•	 1/F42214/2015,	 19	 January	 2015,	VTT	Techni-
cal Research Centre of Finland; possession and 
transfer of nuclear information concerning the 
Fennovoima plant to Fennovoima Oy, Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy and Platom Oy. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2023.
•	 16/Y42214/2014,	19	January	2015,	Platom	Oy;	
possession and transfer of nuclear information 
concerning the Fennovoima NPP to Fennovoima 
Oy, Fortum Power and Heat Oy and VTT Tech-
nical Research Centre of Finland. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2023.
•	 8/Y42214/2015,	15	September	2015,	Geological	
Survey of Finland; possession, processing, use 
and storage of nuclear materials. A maximum of 
15 g of special fissionable materials. Last date 
of validity 31 January 2025.
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